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Abstract 
The cognitive and neural bases of empathy were investigated by collecting data from 
healthy individuals, people with Asperger's Syndrome (AS) and those with 
Depersonalisation Disorder (DPD). A principal component analysis was conducted on 
a self-report measure, the Empathy Quotient (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, in press) 
and the emerging factors were consistent with those identified by social psychologists: 
cognitive empathy, emotional reactivity and social skills. In chapter 3, a series of tests 
confirmed that neither clinical group was impaired in reasoning outside the affective 
domain. In chapters 4 and 5, cognitive tasks were used to tap the different facets of 
emotion attribution. A speech rate task was developed to implicitly measure emotional 
arousal and a self-other trait overlap task to gauge the role of the self-concept. 
Speech rate showed the DPD group did not experience emotional arousal congruent 
with the target, unlike controls. Both clinical groups displayed more self-other overlap 
than controls on the trait-overlap task, indicative of a self-orientated strategy. In 
chapter 6, 'theory of mind tasks' were used tapping the attribution of false beliefs from 
vignettes (Rowe et al, 2001) and complex mental states from photographs of eyes 
(Baron-Cohen et al, 2001). These data suggested the different components of 
empathy may be 'dissociated'. People suffering DPD showed a disruption in affective 
empathy with preservation of the cognitive aspects whilst those with AS displayed the 
opposite profile. Lastly, a novel functional magnetic resonance imaging paradigm was 
used wherein healthy volunteers inferred mental states from brief video clips of an 
actor in various scenarios. This was designed to uncover the neural substrates of 
'shared representations' or 'simulation'. Brain activation was consistent with action 
perception models including pre-motor and parietal areas. Overall, this thesis has 
helped to refine and validate the concept of empathy including the neural correlates. 
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Empathy: definitions and concepts 
We all have an idea of what empathy 
is, and appreciate its importance. But 
empathy is a slippery concept that 
scientists and laypeople alike do not 
fully understand. Empathy is a multi- 
dimensional construct (Davis, 1980) 
with two main components: i) cognitive 
empathy, 'the intellectual/imaginative 
apprehension of another's mental state 
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(Hogan, 1969) and ii) emotional empathy, 'a vicarious emotional response to the 
perceived emotional responses of others' (Mehrabian and Epstein, 1972). The latter 
can also occur without a conscious representation known as 'emotional contagion' 
(Doherty, 1998). These definitions have recently been reformulated and updated as: i) 
cognitive empathy, 'understanding and predicting someone else's mental state' and ii) 
affective empathy, 'experiencing an emotion as the result of someone else's mental 
state or-+ eFe 6feed4r (Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright, 2004 in prose. ), that emotion 
having to be appropriate (see below). 
The word 'empathy is the English translation by Titchener in 1909 of the German word 
'Einfühlung' (Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright, 2004 irreres). 'Einfühlung' is a concept 
borrowed from aesthetics meaning 'to project yourself into what you observe'. The 
concept was extended to the study of inter-subjectivity by Theodore Lipps, who 
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Chapter 1 
conceptualised it in terms of a kind of 'inner imitation' (for an overview see Gallese, 
2003). The term sympathy was in use much earlier, and was often used to denote 
what we now call empathy (Darwin, 1872). Nowadays, academics usually distinguish 
empathy from sympathy2 - the latter being defined as 'recognising another's difficulties 
and being motivated to alleviate them' (Goldie, 1999). However, it is not clear to what 
degree this distinction is made in ordinary usage. 
Titchener was a psychologist concerned with describing and understanding empathy. 
Over the years, psychologists from many different fields have researched and studied 
empathy. Personality theorists are interested in empathy as a trait, including how it 
relates to concepts such as emotional intelligence (Goleman, 1995), and in the 
ikiwccýº 
relationship of trait vs. state empathy (Nezlek et al., 2001). Social psychologists have 
examined its role in group processes and in relation to pro-social behaviour (Davis et 
a/., 1999). Developmental psychologists, on the other hand, see it as an important 
milestone in areas such as moral reasoning (Harris, 1989). They are also concerned 
with the link between the development of empathy, parenting and attachment patterns 
(Van der Mark et al., 2002). Psychotherapists and counsellors take a more 
experiential interest in empathy as an important part of the therapeutic process 
(Rogers, 1992). Clinical psychologists and psychiatrists, however, are more 
concerned with empathy (or its disruption) as a symptom. More recently, 
neuroscientists have begun to consider the neural substrates of empathy and the 
effects on this capacity of brain damage or modulation. To this end, it is necessary to 
further disentangle the concept of empathy. 
Although this is not necessarily the case in non English speaking countries - see Decety (2003) 
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A key requirement for 'affective empathy' is that the emotional response be 
appropriate. The empathic emotional response can be classified in two ways (Davis, 
1994): i) 'parallel empathy' the response matches that of the target: for instance, 
feeling fear at another's fright, and ii) 'reactive empathy' which involves going beyond 
a simple matching of affect such as sympathy or compassion (see Figure 1.1). 
However, some emotional responses are not empathic e. g. happiness at another's 
misfortune or less obviously 'personal distress' (Davis, 1980, Eisenberg and Strayer, 
1987). 
Figure 1.1: Emnathv and related processes 







of Mind EMPATHY 
->Emotion REACTIVE* Attribution 
..... _... ................. ....................... ..................... 
PERSONAL 
DISTRESS 
+'Theory of mind' is used in the restricted sense to refer to meta-representation (see below). 
* feeling sympathy, compassion. pride etc. 
feeling happy in response to another's happiness or fright at another's fear. i. e. direct correspondence 
with target mental state. 
'Personal distress' occurs when a person perceives the misfortune of another and has 
a self-orientated response stemming primarily from thoughts as to how they would feel 
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in the same situation (Batson et al., 1987) as opposed to an other-orientated response 
such as sadness, sympathy or concern. Although this is still a type of emotional 
reactivity, and may share some of the same mechanisms as empathy, it is clearly not 
empathy itself. More contemporary definitions of affective empathy incorporate this 
distinction (Hoffman, 2000). 
Affective empathy relates purely to emotional states3, but cognitive empathy 
encompasses all classes of mental state such as beliefs, desires, emotions and 
perhaps sensations4. A belief is a term for the mental state (MS) of holding a 
proposition or an idea as true (Blackburn, 1996). They are often referred to as a 
epistemic or intentional states as they refer to something in the worlds (Stone et al., 
2003). Beliefs are also known as 'propositional attitudes' (PA) because understanding 
them is 'a simple case of knowing what they are about or directed towards. To 
interpret behaviour as governed by intentional states is known as taking the intentional 
stance (see Griffin and Baron-Cohen, 2002 for discussion). 'Affective states' such as 
desires and emotions (Stone et al., 2003) also refer to something in the world (and so 
have propositional content), but have an important qualitative dimension too. This is 
especially true of emotions, which unlike beliefs cannot be fully appreciated by simply 
knowing what they are directed towards. 
The object of cognitive empathy can be any one of the mental states just described. 
One can have an 'intellectual or imaginative' understanding of another's belief, desire 
or an emotion. This may mean that cognitive empathy is in itself a multi-dimensional 
Although it is conceivable that someone could have an emotional response to another's belief. 
Percepts are also a class of mental state, but they will not be discussed here. 
This is also known as having 'content' or intentionality Brentano (1895) PsyrholoSD'from an empirical 
siandpoinl, Routledge, London. 
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construct. Whether all types of mental state attribution share the same cognitive 
processes and neural structures is currently under debate (Stone et al., 2003). It 
remains unclear whether 'cognitive empathy' draws on different resources and 
processes as a function of the target mental state, although there is some evidence 
that it is not made up of completely disparate abilities (Stone et al., 2003). 
The umbrella term 'theory of mind' (ToM) refers to the ability to attribute mental states 
to others in order to explain and predict behaviour. This definition encapsulates 
cognitive empathy and the representational component of 'affective empathy'6 (Blair, 
1996). ToM involves both 'cold cognition' such as inferences about epistemic states 
like beliefs and 'hot cognition' which focuses on affective states such as emotions 
(Stone, 1999). There is much research on cold ToM but less on how a 'theory of mind' 
deals with affective states. This is in part due to the difference between emotions and 
propositional attitudes (PA). 
A vital function of a ToM is the ability to appreciate the representational qualities of 
mental states. A fully-fledged ToM must be able to detect that some mental states 
refer to representations of the real world rather than the real world itself. This is 
especially true of PA: 'I believe it is raining', is true irrespective of the actual weather. 
For this reason PA are known as opaque. Conversely, sensations and perceptions 
are transparent inasmuch as they refer to the real world and do not ordinarily require a 
suspension of truth: 'it is raining', is either true or not. Some restrict the use of the 
term ToM to refer to instances that require the use of meta-representation. 
6 Emotional contagion may be the exception. 
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Emotions also have a representational component, for example, appreciating that a 
person is scared of injections requires an understanding of their specific 
representation of an injection, which may feasibly differ from the injection's 'real-world' 
qualities. However, in some situations certain aspects of the phenomenal qualities of 
emotions can be transparent inasmuch as facial expressions which explicitly convey 
information such as valence and intensity (and so automatically give the information 
regarding the mental state - see Zahavi and Parnas, 2003) are universal (Ekman, 
1999). Emotions are therefore a less uniform class of mental state. Epistemic states, 
however, and in particular false beliefs, provide the perfect litmus test for the operation 
of a fully competent ToM. They are the only class of mental state which 
unambiguously tap the ability to employ a meta-representational ToM. This has led to 
a large amount of data on the comprehension of other peoples' beliefs within this field 
(Baron-Cohen, 2000). 
Our knowledge of emotional understanding has, however, been largely based on 
simple emotion attribution paradigms using emotional expressions alone without 
reference to the emotions' content and hence not requiring meta-representation. In 
terms of empathy, it is not clear where simple emotion expression paradigms fit in. 
Goldie (1999) argues that simply knowing someone is scared is not enough to be 
considered an 'understanding' (as in the definition of cognitive empathy), but there has 
been a recent move to view such paradigms as tapping empathy [see Carr et al, 
(2003) for instance]. Furthermore, it is possible that emotional resonance occurs in 
such paradigms, suggesting they may also invoke 'affective empathy'. Phillips et al., 
(2003) point out that producing and regulating an emotional response to stimuli are 
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important parts of emotion perception; however, the issue of emotion induction in 
emotion perception paradigms is rarely considered'. 
This split between emotions and other mental states has led to a gap in our knowledge 
of emotional understanding. Ecologically valid cognitive tests which tap the 
appreciation of affective states in more complex situations other than simple emotional 
expression paradigms (with or without emotional resonance) have only recently gained 
popularity (Channon et al., 2001, Harris, 1989, Stone et al., 1998). As a result we do 
not fully understand the mechanisms involved in such tasks nor whether (or to what 
degree) they can be dissociated from those used to comprehend epistemic states. Yet 
it is the affective aspects of empathy that most people think of as defining empathy. 
2. Empathy: mechanisms and processes 
fR The definitions and explanations given so far say little about the mechanisms and 
processes that enable an empathic reaction. - Inter-subjectivity may be dependent on a 
whole range of skills, and the mechanisms involved may depend on the target mental 
state, the available cues and individual differences. º The nature of mental state 
attribution as a whole has been the focus of debate in the philosophical literature. 
There are two main schools of thought; however, much of the debate as to the utility of 
these approaches has focused on propositional attitudes or epistemic states as 
opposed to affective states (see above). 
But see Adolphs, R., Damasio. H., Tranel, D., Cooper, G. and Damasio, A. R. (2000) A role for 
somatosensory cortices in the visual recognition of emotion as revealed by three-dimensional lesion 
mapping Journal of Neuroscience, 20,2683-2690. Also Blair, J. (1999) Psychophysiologial 




Theory-theory: this school of thought suggests that people possess or develop a 
'theory' to explain others' mental states and behaviours 'using generalisations about 
how people reason, decide and act' (Henderson, 1996) The 'theory-theory approach'8 
has been described as a 'detached ... activity' (Gallese and Goldman, 1998). This 
view has been popular amongst functionalists and developmental psychologists. 
According to Gopnik and Goldman (1993) ascriptions of mental states are regarded as 
'theoretical' merely because such states are not directly observable in others9, and 
"are seen as 'theoretical posits' invoked to explain and predict behaviour in the same 
fashion that physicists appeal to electrons and quarks" (Gallese and Goldman, 1998). 
However, other theory-theorists hold that the theory is innate and arises from a 
dedicated module as opposed to being constructed from incoming data like as 
scientific theory (Zahavi and Parnas, 2003). 
8 Simulation: the alternative approach suggests that 'attributors use their own mental 
mechanisms to calculate and predict the mental processes of others' (Gallese and 
Goldman, 1998). Gallese et al., (1998) point out that simulation is 'an attempt to 
replicate, mimic or impersonate the mental life of -the target'. When a person is 
simulating there is said to be a 'correspondence' with the MS of the target with the 
main difference being that the attributor is using 'pretend' or 'offline' mental states. 
Imitation or 'overt action simulation' (Blakemore and Decety, 2001) is the likely 
candidate for the developmental basis for simulation and perhaps ToM per se (Meltzoff 
and Gopnik, 1993b). 
" Some authors reserve the term 'theory of mind' to refer to the `theory-theory' approach. However. 
many use the phrase more broadly to denote any mental state attribution as is the case here. 
This is holds true for some aspects of emotions. 
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Recent formulations suggest that neither account of mental state attribution is likely to 
be mutually exclusive (Davies and Stone, 1995, Vogeley et aL, 2001). It is important 
to appreciate that both approaches can conceivably be used to understand affective 
states - with or without emotional resonance The full extent of this debate is outside 
the scope of this thesis (Davies and Stone, 1995, Gopnik and Goldman, 1993) except 
to say that there are reasons for considering the utility of a simulation approach for the 
attribution of affective states. For instance, Adolphs (1999) points out that 'simulation' 
may be of particular use with concepts that can't be encoded lexically. This may 
include the qualitative component of an emotion including factors such as intensity as 
opposed to valence. 
Work using physiological measures suggests that 'emotional contagion' may be reliant 
on a crude imitative process, which is consistent with a simulation account. This idea 
goes as far back as Charles Darwin (1872) who observed that people tend to subtly 
mimic the facial expressions of others in an emotional state. In fact, some authors 
define emotional contagion as the tendency to "automatically mimic and synchronise 
facial expressions, vocalisations, postures and movements with those of another 
person and consequently to converge emotionally' (Cacioppo et al., 1988). More 
recently, Sonnby-Borgstrom, Jonsson and Svensson (2003) found that people high on 
empathy as measured by the Questionnaire Measure of Emotional Empathy 
(Mehrabian and Epstein, 1972 see chapter 2) showed 'stronger' facial motor mimicry 
reactions to targets as measured by electromyographic activity (EMG). 
9) Several recent models of empathy from the field of affective neuroscience also have 
striking similarities with simulation. The 'shared manifold hypothesis' proposed by 
Gallese (2003) builds on recent evidence of the existence of 'mirror neurones' that fire 
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in response to both observing and carrying out an action. Decety and Chaminade 
(2003) have also put forward a 'shared representations' model based on the premise 
that perception and action share the same neural and cognitive processes. " They 
argue that perception of a behaviour in another person leads to activation of one's own 
representation of that behaviour and draw on evidence from neurophysiological and 
functional imaging studies of paradigms that manipulate imitation, observation and 
execution of action' (see chapter 7 and Blakemore and Decety, 2001, Chaminade et 
aL, 2002, Decety and Chaminade, 2003, Decety et aL, 2002, Ruby and Decety, 2001). 
One study found behavioural interference when participants both executed and 
observed the same movements simultaneously (Kilner et aL, 2003). Decety and 
Chaminade (2003) suggest that this 'shared representations' model is consistent with 
what they call 'sympathy' - which we term 'affective empathy'. 
Another similar model has been proposed, known as the Perception Action Model 
(Preston and deWaal, 2003). Although the authors give an account of affective 
empathy, they point out that the model focuses on process rather than response and 
is therefore broad enough to incorporate all forms of empathy. They summarise the 
model: 'an attended perception of the objects' state automatically activates the 
subjects' representation of the state, situation, and object, and that activation of these 
representations automatically primes or generates the associated autonomic and 
somatic responses, unless inhibited'10. A recent study found that participants 
imagining and recalling their own emotional experience and someone else's emotional 
experience activated the same brain areas (Preston, 2002). 
10 Damasio's (1994) somatic marker hypothesis is consistent with this model 
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Although the full philosophical debate on mental state attribution lies beyond this 
thesis, the similarities between simulation accounts and recent models of empathy 
from neuroscience are important. In order to explore empathy as it relates to 
emotional states, the possibility of a simulation account cannot be ignored and this and 
the corresponding models need to be empirically explored. The first step would be to 
develop a cognitive test of 'simulation' which does not rely solely on 
neuropsychological data. 
* 3. Empathy: the neural correlates 
Advances in methods for mapping functions to the brain have led researchers to 
propose candidate areas for localisation of the processes involved in social cognition. 
As far back as 1992 a social brain network was described comprising the orbito-frontal 
. cortex, superior temporal gyrus and amygdala (Brothers and Ring, 1992). The medial 
frontal cortex has also been shown to be activated in functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) paradigms using the standard false belief tasks adapted for the 
scanner (Fletcher et al., 1995 and see chapter 7 for overview). These tests require the 
comprehension of first and second order false beliefs alone (cold cognition). 
Evidence to support Brothers and Ring's model has been forthcoming. Stone et al., 
(1998) tested people with bilateral damage to the orbito-frontal cortex on a task 
requiring the apprehension of a faux pas: a task tapping more complex emotion 
attribution. The volunteers were also given some first and second order ToM tasks. 
Although the participants could do the ToM tests ('cold cognition') - they had trouble 
with the faux pas despite being able to appreciate that the protagonist in the story 
would have been upset or hurt. The authors concluded that this brain area may be 
involved in the integration of mental state and affective information. 
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Farrow et aL, (2001) also found the orbito-frontal gyrus to be activated, along with the 
superior frontal gyrus and precuneus, in an fMRl study requiring participants to judge 
the emotional states of others', along with the forgivability of their crimes. Eslinger 
(1998) reviewing the functional data on frontal lobe lesions also found that the orbito- 
frontal systems may be implicated in affective empathy. Other studies also implicate 
this brain region with problems in social cognition (see Adolphs, 2001 b). 
There is also evidence to suggest that the amygdala is involved in mental state 
attribution (Adolphs et al., 1999, Adolphs et aL, 2001c, Canli et al., 2002) People 
with bilateral amygdala damage have trouble attributing complex mental states from 
pictures of the eyes alone (Canli et aL, 2002). Furthermore, our group has also found 
that people with amygdala damage have problems with the faux pas test (see above) 
and tests that tap the idiosyncratic emotional reactions stemming from complex beliefs 
(Shaw et al., 2004$), The amygdala is also thought to be specialised for perceiving 
emotional expressions with negative valence" (Dolan et a/., 2001), although it seems 
to be involved in more general basic emotion perception as well. It is not clear, 
however, whether the amygdala is also recruited in the perception of non-facial social 
information such as body language (Adolphs and Tranel, 2003). 
This raises the issue of whether neural circuits are specialised for perceiving certain 
emotional states (see chapter 7 for overview). As already mentioned, the amygdala is 
implicated in the recognition of basic emotions but may be especially implicated in fear 
and perhaps other emotions of negative valence and potential dangers in the 
There is some work suggesting it may not be valence specific and that past findings are due to 
inadequate controls for intensity between positive and negative emotions. For instance see Harriman, S., 
Ely. T., Hoffman, J. and Kilts, C. (2002) Activation of human amygdala in positive and negative emotion 
Psychological Science, 13,135-141. 
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environment [see above and Le Doux (1998)]. The processes involved in the 
perception of facial expressions of disgust, however, are thought to be localised in the 
insula (Philips, 1998), although again this area is also implicated in emotion perception 
per se. The idea that brain regions are functionally specialised for specific emotions 
(see chapter 7) is of importance when attempting to localise empathy (see Blair and 
Perschardt: response to Preston et aL, 2003). If the neural correlates of different 
emotions are fractionated along with different classes of mental state then localising 
empathy may involve many different brain regions. - 
More recent work has focused on the localisation of the simulation type models (see 
above and chapter 7). Decety and co-workers in a series of studies using observation 
and imitation paradigms (see above) have shown the premotor areas, right inferior 
parietal areas, precuneus, and somatosensory cortices to be involved in 'shared 
representations'. The right inferior parietal cortex is thought to be of particular 
importance in distinguishing self from other actions (Blakemore, 2003b, Blakemore et 
aL, 2003). The discovery of 'mirror neurones' in the premotor area-V5 of the macque 
monkey also supports the idea that the premotor cortex is involved in simulation in 
humans (Gallese and Goldman, 1998). But some of this evidence is indirect, being 
based on the assumption that action imitation is a valid model for empathy, and so 
needs to be viewed cautiously. However, this assumption does seem consistent with 
recent findings that similar brain areas are activated (as those in action recognition) 
when viewing other peoples' mental states. Decety and Chaminade (2003), found 
similar activation when participants viewed film clips of people discussing emotional 
events, as did Carr et al., (2003) when participants both imitated and observed others' 
emotional expressions (see chapter 7 for an overview). More evidence is needed of 
23 
Chapter 1 
activation of the 'shared representation' network in mental state attribution paradigms, 
if this is to be of use as a model of empathy. 
Adolphs et al., (2000) used 3D lesion mapping on a sample of 108 people with focal 
brain lesions and found emotion perception to recruit the somatosensory-related 
cortices12. The authors point out that this is consistent with the idea that 'we recognize 
another individual's emotional state by internally generating somatosensory 
representations that simulate how the other individual would feel'. Other studies have 
also implicated somatosensory related areas in the imitation of emotional expressions. 
Carr et aL, (2003) found insula activation when people both observe or actively imitate 
emotional expressions, and comments' that the activation over both conditions was 
remarkably similar. 
Another area that may be of importance for empathy is the anterior cingulate. Vogeley 
et al., (2001) had participants adopt both the first and third person perspective in a 
traditional ToM task, and compared areas of brain activation. This area was 
implicated in both the attribution of mental states to the self and to other people (see 
chapter 7). This kind of study reminds us how brain areas and processes implicated in 
the representation of one's own mental states may be important in attributing states to 
others, in line with a 'shared representations' approach. Lane et al., (1997) found the 
rostral anterior cingulate to be activated in a Positron Emission Tomography study, 
where participants were directed to attend to their subjective emotional responses. 
Critchley et al., (2003) report work with people with focal damage to the anterior 
cingulate and healthy volunteers suggesting that the dorsal areas of this structure are 
'2 This is also consistent with Damasio's work on the somatic marker hypothesis -see Damasio, A. 
(1994) Descartes' error: Emotion, reason, and the human brain, Avon Books, New York. 
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involved in the modulation of bodily arousal states. In a review paper, Mary Phillips 
and colleagues (2003) further implicate the anterior cingulate in the different facets of 
emotion perception. 
It seems therefore that two broad accounts of neural circuits are emerging as 
candidates for mental state attribution and/or empathy. The first are the frontal areas 
primarily for epistemic states and the second, are 'body' (parietal, somatosensory and 
motor-related) area's for affective states. However, this distinction is not absolute and 
there is overlap in areas of activation between paradigms using 'cold' and 'hot' 
cognition. This is not a surprise: neither account is likely to be mutually exclusive, 
tasks are often complex and may invoke both strategies, and there may be individual 
differences and optimum conditions for the use of each approach. In addition, 
research on simulation circuitry in the brain is still fairly new, and the current data 
needs to be replicated and the new models thoroughly tested. 
4. Empathy: conditions 
Disruptions in the empathic process are part of the symptomatology of several 
psychological and developmental conditions. Clinical observation and diagnostic 
criteria lend support to the accuracy of these labels, but empathy has remained ill- 
defined with empirical data scarce and inconsistent. The following conditions have all 
been associated with empathy: 
Psychopathy: The Psychopathy Checklist (Harfet a/., 1992) cites a lack of empathy 
as a key component of one of its three factors. Blair (1996) suggests this may be due 
to a deficit in the "mechanism which normally regulates the emotional responsiveness 
to distress signals ". 
25 
Chapter 1 
Williams Syndrome: Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan (2000) suggest that children with 
Williams Syndrome are impaired on false belief tasks but not on tasks requiring 
perceptual understanding of affective states. The authors argue for a dissociation on 
the basis of the type of mental state (see chapter 6). 
Alexithymia: People with alexithymia tend to focus on external, objective facts rather 
than on their own feelings or those of others (Guttman and Laporte, 2002). It has 
been recognised as a clinical phenomenom in conditions such as borderline 
personality disorder and anorexia nervosa and has been found to be inversely related 
to empathy (Guttman and Laporte, 2002) as measured by the Interpersonal Reactivity 
Scale (Davis, 1980 and see chapter 2). 
Schizophrenia: It is thought that ToM processes may play a role in some delusional 
states (Frith and Corcoran, 1996). People with schizophrenia have also been shown 
to have differential neural activation to controls when performing ToM tasks (Russell et 
a/., 2000). 
Obsessive Compulsive Disorder/Anorexia/Paranoid Disorder(s): Gillberg (1992) 
proposes that these conditions be grouped together as disorders of empathy, as they 
can all be characterised by limited capacity for social interaction, extreme 
obsessiveness and alexithymia. 
Turner's Syndrome: People with Turner's Syndrome lack a complete X chromosome: 
recent reports also indicate a possible deficit in emotion processing and perhaps 
empathy. Lawrence, Campbell, Swettenham, Terstegge, Akers, Coleman and Skuse 
(2003) found a group of girls with Turners Syndrome to be impaired on the 'Eyes task' 
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(Baron-Cohen et aL, 2001). This study also showed a deficit in a task requiring the 
identification of fear from the upper part of the face. 
The two conditions that are to be the focus of this thesis are Asperger's Syndrome, a 
mild form of autistic spectrum disorder; and Depersonalisation Disorder, a condition 
characterised by an altered perception of the self, including one's own emotions. 
4.1 Autism spectrum disorders (ASDs) 
People with autistic spectrum disorders suffer from a myriad of symptoms. The 
diagnosis for ASDs includes a reference to 'a qualitative impairment in social 
interaction' (DSM-IV, 1994 and see chapter 3 for full details of diagnosis). One of the 
symptoms of ASDs is a particular difficulty with many of the skills required to employ a 
ToM. Asperger's Syndrome (AS) is a milder form of ASD, and a diagnosis is given 
when someone meets the criteria for autism yet has normal intelligence and language 
skills (ICD-10). 
The ToM account of autism is well established and refers specifically to the problems 
people with ASDs have with the representational aspects of ToM. People with AS 
also display deficits with this component of ToM, but to a lesser degree, and they tend 
to fail only the more complex second order and other advanced ToM tasks. However, 
the role in these tasks of domain general factors such as IQ and 'executive function' 
processes in these tasks still needs to be fully clarified (see chapter 6), and may have 
a bearing on the performance of people with AS on this tasks. 
An alternative area of research has focused on the ability of people with ASDs to 
process affective mental states. Hobson, Ouston and Lee (1988) tested autistic 
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children on a task requiring the matching of emotional voices with emotional 
expressions and found them to perform less well than the control group. However, the 
findings from studies using simple emotion expression paradigms are inconsistent 
(see chapter 6 for full overview). Bormann-Kischkel et al., (1995) compared people 
with high-functioning autism (HFA) against a matched control group on a task requiring 
emotion recognition from photographs and the autistic group were significantly 
impaired. However, Loveland et al., (1997) found no differences between controls and 
those with autism on emotion identification tasks using both verbal and non-verbal 
information. Blair (2003c) argues that such inconsistencies disappear once extraneous 
variables such as IQ are properly controlled, and that in fact people with ASDs do not 
have any problems appreciating facial affect. He then goes onto suggest that this 
profile i. e. proficiency with facial affect whilst finding 'cold' ToM cognition difficult, is 
opposite to that observed in people with psychopathy, hence providing evidence of a 
dissociation of function (Blair, 2003c). 
Children with ASDs have also been shown to have imitation deficits (Williams et al., 
2001) which may be a precursor to their more extensive ToM problems (see chapter 5 
for overview). For instance, one study found that a group of very young children with 
autism (i. e. 20 months old) displayed less imitation than comparison groups (Charman 
et aL, 1997 - and see chapter Jr for overview). Stone et al., (1997) also found that 
although eßt autistic children showed weaker imitation skills, they showed a similar 
pattern of performance across tasks, with imitation of body movements being more 
difficult for them than imitation with objects. 
A few tests have also examined emotion attribution in ASDs using more complex 
designs. Baron-Cohen et al., (1991) found that children with autism could understand 
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emotions stemming from situations but not from beliefs. Autistic children were also 
quite good identifying a character's emotional state from a video and demonstrating a 
parallel emotional state (Yirmiya et aL, 1992). Although they were significantly worse 
than age and gender matched controls, they did surprisingly well. People with ASDs 
4.0 
have also been found to have intact physiological responses.. both non-person based 
and person-based emotional stimuli, as measured by galvanic skin response (Blair, 
1999). 
People with AS seem to do badly on more complex ToM tasks. Baron-Cohen (1997) 
found that despite passing traditional ToM tasks, people with AS and HFA had trouble 
with appreciating a difficult faux pas. Such tests tap the ability to integrate inferential 
ToM with affective information (see above). Furthermore, Baron-Cohen et a/., (2001) 
tested people with AS and HFA on their ability to attribute mental states simply from a 
picture of a person's eyes, and found that they performed significantly worse than 
controls. Channon et al., (2001) examined adolescents with AS on a test requiring 
the appreciation of real-life problem-solving and solution generation using situations 
such as how to deal with noisy neighbours. The group were found to be impaired on 
several indices. 
The ability of people with AS to empathise with others' emotional states both 
intellectually and emotionally is still under debate. This is in part due to the fact that 
those with HFA and AS are often combined to form one group making it difficult to 
ascertain the specific deficits of those with AS 13. Shamay-Tsoory (2002) gave self- 
report empathy questionnaires, the faux pas task and emotion processing tasks to 2 
people diagnosed with Asperger's Syndrome, and found that they scored lower than 
1' Some argue that the distinction between high-functioning autism and AS should be dropped. 
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controls. The author proposes that the deficit in AS lies specifically in integrating 
cognitive and affective material. 
Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright (2004 in press) also found that those with HFA and AS 
scored significantly lower than controls on a self-report 'Empathy Quotient' which taps 
all facets of empathy (see chapter 2). However, items tapping cognitive and affective 
empathy were lumped together, making it difficult to tease out the groups' affective 
empathy skills. It also remains unclear how people with AS perform on paradigms 
tapping imitative ability. One study found a group of 4 people with AS to have intact 
function of 'mirror neurones' in an object manipulation task - but this may have been 
an artefact of sample size (Avikainen et al., 1999). In addition, the sparing of language 
in this group may have important implications for mental state attribution, as links have 
been made between the brain areas responsible for these two functions14 (see chapter 
5). 
So it seems that, in contrast to those with more severe forms of autism, people with 
AS are relatively spared the 'cold' aspects of ToM, although it not clear whether their 
performance is qualitatively the same. However, there are few data on the ability of 
people with Asperger's Syndrome to appreciate affective states that require 'hot' 
cognition. This issue is potentially interesting in view of the fact that different types of 
empathy may be dissociated both cognitively and neuroanatomically, and that such 
knowledge could play a vital role in interventions if necessary. 
'There has been a recent suggestion that the traditional language region of the brain may be involved in 
imitation Heiser, M., lacobobi, M., Maeda, F., Maruc, J. and Mazziotta, J. (2003) The essential role of 
Broca's area in imitation European Journal of Neuroscience, 17,1123-1128. 
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4.2 Depersonalisation disorder (DPD) 
This condition is defined as an 'alteration in the perception or experience of the self so 
that one feels detached from and as if one is an outside observer of one's mental 
processes or body' (DSM IV, 1994). People suffering from depersonalisation disorder 
(Senior et al., 2001) frequently complain of a subjective deficit in empathising. 
However, to our knowledge, despite these anecdotal reports, there are no studies 
examining empathic ability in DPD. 
Theoretically, several possible explanations may account for these subjective reports. 
People with DPD are known to show problems in emotion processing. Emotional 
blunting is often reported in clinical settings and has been verified empirically. Sierra 
et aL, (2002) found that, as a group, people with DPD showed less physiological 
activation as measured by galvanic skin response (GSR). In addition, Phillips et al., 
(2001) found people with DPD rated scenes to be less aversive than a control group, 
and that they failed to activate the same brain regions whilst viewing these. It is 
entirely plausible that this problem in processing emotional material also affects the 
attribution of emotional states in others. This is especially possible if one accepts a 
simulation/shared representations account of empathy that relies on the use of the 
self-knowledge to interpret other people's affective states. The empathy deficits 
reported by this group may therefore be an objective by-product of differential emotion 
processing. 
On the other hand, an objective empathy deficit could exist for entirely different 
reasons. People with DPD often have a co-morbid diagnosis for depression and 
anxiety (Lambert et al., 2001). It is therefore conceivable that either of these 
conditions (or their complex interaction) could affect empathic ability, perhaps via low 
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level emotional reactivity (anxious or depressed mood) or via motivational factors as in 
the case of depression. The relationship between DPD, depression and anxiety is 
particularly hard to disentangle and it is also possible that sufferers of DPD are not a 
homogenous group in this regard. 
A final possibility stems from cognitive behavioural accounts of DPD. Cognitive 
models of anxiety, depression and panic include processes such as negative 
attribution bias and a tendency for negative (sometimes catastrophic) evaluation of the 
self and/or situation. Recent DPD models have drawn on this literature and suggested 
that similar processes may be at work in DPD (Hunter et aL, 2003). Such negative 
evaluations could lead the sufferer to incorrectly evaluate their own ability to 
empathise and interact with others. This would suggest that the reported empathy 
deficits are subjective rather than objective. 
In order to test these claims, it is necessary to administer both self-report and objective 
tests of empathy and perform statistical comparisons between the two. This will shed 
light on the anecdotal reports of this distressing lack of fellow-feeling reported by some 
sufferers of DPD and, in turn, contribute to treatment interventions. 
5. Aims of the thesis 
Standardised ToM tests, self-report measures and novel experimental tasks will be 
used to ascertain whether people with AS and DPD have objective empathy deficits, 
and to further clarify the nature of any problems in this domain. 
The expectation is that people with AS will display evidence of difficulty with the more 
advanced tests of ToM which focus on intentional and epistemic states. However, it is 
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unclear whether such marked problems will emerge in tests that-tap the ability to 
appreciate other peoples' affective states (with and without emotional resonance). We 
will therefore employ novel tasks to explore whether there is a dissociation in this 
clinical group between empathy measures as a function of the type of mental state. 
Both novel tasks and self-report measures will also be used to explore whether people 
with DPD have objective or subjective disturbances in their ability to understand and 
resonate with the emotional states of others. From anecdotal reports alone it is not 
clear whether the reported lack of empathy results from an objective empathy 
disturbance, a disruption of attributions about the self, or from the often co-morbid 
symptoms of depression and anxiety. 
A novel fMRI paradigm will also be used to explore the neural correlates of simulation 
(likely to be a key process in empathy - see above) in healthy volunteers. There is 
very little direct empirical research into the neural correlates of this process. It is 
hypothesised that a simulation strategy will activate the pre-motor and other body- 
related areas such as the parietal cortex, as opposed to the brain regions that are 
activated when attributing non-affective mental states or during 'cold' cognition. 
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Measuring Empathy: Self-Report Measures 
1. Overview of self-report measures 
In order to measure empathy, it is 
useful to have a reliable and valid self- 
report scale. Although objective 
measures are important, people often 
have some idea of their own empathic 
capacity and it is important to utilise 
this insight when attempting to assess 
empathy levels. Several scales have 
been developed over the years, each 
reflecting the different 
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conceptualisations of empathy. 
However, they tend to be either based 
on limited definitions or to have other 
important weaknesses. 
2.1 Construct validity 
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1.1 Questionnaire Measure of Emotional Empathy (Mehrabian and Epstein, 1972) 
This Questionnaire Measure of Emotional Empathy (QMEE) was designed to tap 
emotional empathy, which the authors define as a 'vicarious emotional response to the 
perceived emotional responses of others'. It includes items such as: 
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"I get very angry when I see someone being ill-treated. 
"I am very upset when I see an animal in pain. 
"I cannot continue to feel OK if people around me are depressed. 
" It makes me sad to see a lonely stranger in a group. 
In an effort to control for participants responding in a socially desirable way, items 
were taken from a larger set on the basis of non-significant correlations with the 
Crowne and Marlowe (1960) Social Desirability Scale (SDS). This process is 
necessary to address some of the criticisms of self-report measures, which in this 
case, would show as people wanting to appear more 'empathic', empathy being a 
socially desirable trait. The final version of the QMEE has a correlation of r=0.06 with 
the SDS. 
Factor analysis of data gathered from the QMEE revealed several underlying clusters, 
such as susceptibility to emotional contagion, appreciation of the feelings of unfamiliar 
and distant others, emotional responsiveness, and a tendency to be moved by others' 
positive/negative experiences. The scale is deemed to have good internal reliability: 
split-half reliability is . 84 and individual items all correlated at p= . 01 level with total 
score on scale. 
Despite the scales' reliability, it is not clear that it actually measures empathy. 
Construct validity was measured on the basis of prediction of aggressive behaviour - 
which may or may not be directly related to empathy. In fact, the authors suggest that 
it may measure general emotional arousability as opposed to reactions specific to 
others' emotion (Mehrabian et al., 1988b). This eventually led them to construct a new 
scale, the Balanced Emotional Empathy Scale (Mehrabian et al., 1988a) - which is 
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limited more to reactions specific to others' emotions. Unfortunately, it is again unclear 
whether the items tap only emotional empathy, for example, I cannot easily empathise 
with the hopes and aspirations of strangers/I easily get carried away by the lyrics of a 
love song'. 
1.2 The empathy scale (Hogan, 1969) 
This measure was also developed in the 1960's and purports to measure cognitive 
empathy, including role-taking and perspective-taking. The authors define cognitive 
empathy as 'the apprehension of another's mental state - without actually experiencing 
that state'. It includes items which deemed indicative of an empathic response if 
answered true: 
"I am not easily angered. (true) 
"I must admit I often try to get my own way regardless of what others may want. 
(false) 
" It is the duty of a citizen to support his country. (false) 
" As a rule I have little difficulty putting myself in other peoples' shoes. (true) 
Unfortunately, no items were included to control for socially desirable responding, 
however, test reliability was good at . 84. In terms of construct validity, the 
questionnaire correlates significantly with scales measuring communication 
competence, moral maturity, social insight and effective social functioning. The initial 
factor analysis revealed three underlying dimensions, these being even-tempered 
disposition, sociable interpersonal style and humanistic socio-political attitudes. 
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However, a later factor analysis suggested it may actually measure social self- 
confidence, even temperedness, sensitivity and nonconformity (Johnson et al., 1983). 
In criticism, the emergence of a factor tapping attitudes and the inclusion of items such 
as 'it is the duty of a citizen to support his country' (a negative response is deemed 
empathic) suggest the scale relies upon assumptions about the consequences of 
being empathic which may be influenced by cultural norms as opposed to measuring 
empathy per se. It has also been suggested that the scale simply measures social 
skills rather than pure empathy (Davis, 1994). While it is true to say that social skills 
rely on cognitive empathy to a degree, they may also be reliant on other skills such as 
affective empathy, the ability to integrate emotional and cognitive states, emotion 
perception and possibly an element of rule-based reasoning. 
1.3 The interpersonal reactivity index (Davis, 1980) 
The Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) is a multi-dimensional measure of empathy 
which includes several constructs not considered in previous self-report scales. The 
author criticises preceeding scales (see above) for summing both cognitive and 
emotional aspects of empathy into one single score. The IRI includes subscales that 
measure: perspective-taking which fits with traditional definitions of cognitive empathy; 
empathic concern (which specifically addresses the capacity of the respondent for 
warm, concerned, compassionate feelings for others i. e. a facet of affective empathy); 
fantasy items which measure a tendency to identify with fictional characters; and 
personal distress (which is designed to tap the occurrence of self-orientated responses 
to others' negative experiences - see chapter 1 for discussion). 
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Factor analysis confirmed the presence of each of these of underlying dimensions. 
Each subscale consisted of 7 items each measured on a5 point Likert scale ranging 
from 'does not describe me at all' to 'describes me very well'. The cognitive items 
include such questions as: 
" Before criticising someone, l try to imagine how I would feel if I were in their 
place. 
"I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look 
from their perspective. 
Examples of empathic concern items are: 
"1 am often quite touched by things that I see happen. 
9 When I see someone taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective towards 
them. 
Fantasy items on the other hand focus on imaginative capacity: 
"1 really get involved with the feelings of the characters in a novel. 
01 daydream and fantasise, with some regularity, about things that might happen 
to me. 
Lastly, the personal distress subscale includes items such as: 
" In emergency situations, I feel apprehensive and ill-at-ease. 
When I see someone who badly needs help in an emergency, I go to pieces. 
The questionnaire has high test-retest reliability between r= . 61 and r= . 81. and 
internal reliability ranges from . 75 to . 78 for each of the subscales. But importantly the 
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IRI does not control for social desirability. Furthermore, although Davis (1980) claims 
to be measuring empathy as a global concept, others have pointed out that the fantasy 
items do not tap pure empathy (Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright, 2004 in press) and 
despite being crucial to its measurement, personal distress is not classed as empathy. 
While it may be useful to use the subscales in isolation (see Davis, 1994) - as each 
subscale only includes 7 items - the range of scores would be greatly reduced. 
1.4 The empathy quotient (Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright, 2004 in press). 
The Empathy Quotient (see appendix 1) is the most recent addition to self-report 
measures of empathy. Unlike previous scales it was explicitly designed to have a 
clinical application and be sensitive to a lack of empathy as a feature of 
psychopathology. There are 60 items including 20 filler items; responses are given on 
a4 point scale ranging from 'strongly agree' to 'strongly disagree'. Approximately half 
the items are reversed. Participants receive 0 for a 'non-empathic' response, 
whatever the magnitude, with 1 or 2 for an 'empathic response' depending on the 
strength of the reply and so the total score is out of 80. Six experimental psychologists 
working in the field independently rated each item as to its association to a given 
definition of empathy. 
The EQ was validated on 197 healthy control volunteers and 90 people with 
Asperger's Syndrome (AS) or high-functioning autism (HFA) and age and gender 
matched controls (a gender ratio of 2.6: 1 m: f was found). It was shown reliably to 
distinguish between the clinical and control groups. Consistent with previous 
literature, the authors found gender differences in the control group, with women 
scoring significantly higher. In addition, the EQ was found to be correlated with a 
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Friendship Questionnaire designed to measure and intimacy in relationships (Baron- 
Cohen and Wheelwright, 2004 in-prow). The EQ was also shown to have high test re- 
test reliability (r= 0.97) over a period of 12 months. Furthermore, Baron-Cohen et a/., 
(2003b) recently replicated the female superiority on the EQ and showed once again 
that it distinguished between those with AS/HFA and controls. 
As the EQ covers both cognitive and affective empathy using a wide range of items 
and has been validated on clinical groups, it seemed the most appropriate scale for 
use in this study. As it is fairly new, information regarding the scales construct validity 
is limited. It was therefore necessary to further examine the reliability and validity of 
the EQ prior to its use. 
2. The empathy quotient: reliability and validityIs 
The EQ was therefore given to several different groups in order to check its validity 
and utility across samples. Test-retest reliability was re-examined, as was the 
association between the EQ and various other 'empathy' measures in order to 
examine the scale's validity. Specifically, the relationship between the EQ and the 
Eyes task (Baron-Cohen et aL, 2001) was explored as the latter is an objective 
measure of cognitive empathy and hence an indicator of construct validity. The 
association between the EQ and the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI Davis, 1980) 
was also considered, as a check on concurrent validity. Furthermore, to our 
knowledge the inter-relation between the EQ items and social desirability has not yet 
been examined. This knowledge is necessary in order to address a general problem 
with self-report measures: that people may respond according to how they would like 
IS This chapter is in part reproduced from Lawrence, E., Shaw, P., Baker, D., Baron-Cohen, S. and 
David, A. S. (2004 in press) Measuring empathy - reliability and validity of the Empathy Quotient, 
Psychological Medicine, 34. 
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to appear, that is to say, highly 'empathic'. Lastly, an exploratory factor analysis was 
performed in order to consider the factor structure of the scale and to shed light on the 
various components of empathy. 
2.1 Construct validity 
Participants 
There were 53 volunteers consisting of 28 women and 25 men with a mean age of 
32.5 years (± 10.9). Approximately, half of this group were recruited from mental 
health professionals at the Institute of Psychiatry, London. The remainder were 
recruited from non-academic/clinical staff and through advertisements in the local 
area. 
Procedure 
All measures were administered in a quiet room as part of a wider testing session. 
Participants were given the EQ (Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright, 2004 i. -pre) self- 
report measure of empathy. Missing values on the EQ, resulting from a double 
endorsement or no endorsement, were substituted with the group mean rounded to 
the nearest whole number. 
Participants were also given the Social Desirability Scale (SDS - Crowne and Marlowe, 
1960). On this measure, 1 point is allocated for each item endorsed, resulting in 
scores ranging from 1 to 33 with a high score indicating that the respondent is prone to 
give answers in accordance with social desirability, e. g. 'I sometimes feel resentful 
when I don't get my own way'. 
41 
Chapter 2 
The Eyes Test (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) was also administered. This test measures 
the ability to decipher a mental state from a picture of the eyes alone, and according to 
the authors, is an advanced measure of 'mind-reading' (see appendix 2). In terms of 
the various components of empathy, this task would be expected to tap cognitive 
empathy and it has the advantage of not relying on self-report. This test has been 
shown to distinguish reliably between people with AS/HFA and healthy controls. One 
point is allocated for each correct answer with the final score being out of 36. 
Lastly, participants completed the National Adult Reading Test (NART - Nelson, 1982). 
Participants read 50 irregular sounding words (i. e. ache) which yields an estimate of 
verbal intelligence. 
Results 
Mean EQ scores for all items for both men and women can be found in Table 2.1 (see 
below). These are similar to those found in the original study (Baron-Cohen and 
Wheelwright, 2004 iri-mess) i. e. males 41.8 (±11.2) and females 47.2 (±10.2). 
Furthermore, the difference between men and women was again significant (t = -3.5, 
df 51, p= . 
001). The data were normally distributed [slightly negative skew (-. 190) and 
kurtosis of less than 1 (-. 717)]. 
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Table 2.1 Mean and SD EQ scores stratified by gender 
total score on the EQ 
n Mean SD Min Max 
gender male 25 41.28 10.1 22 58 
female 28 50.57 9.2 30 66 
Group Total 53 46.19 10.6 22 66 
Each item on the EQ was entered into a Pearson's Product Moment Correlation 
analysis along with the total score on the SDS. A positive correlation above .3 was 
taken as an indicator of socially desirable responding. Items 11,18,27,34, and 37 of 
the EQ, all correlated significantly with total SDS score, but item 27 correlated below 
. 3, and item 37 had a negative rather than positive relationship. Items 11,18 and 34 
were therefore dropped from subsequent analyses. 
The mean score on the Eyes Test was 27.6 (± 4, n= 48), again very similar to the 
normative data. In the original sample, participants from the general population had a 
mean of 26.2, and participants drawn from a sample comprising students had a mean 
of 28. These data were then correlated with total EQ score and a modest positive 
relationship was found (n = 48 r= . 294, p= . 033). 
The estimated IQ score from the NART for this group was 120.48 (± 4.7), which is 
above normal range. As both the Eyes Test and EQ have verbal components, a 
correlational analysis was run to examine the association between verbal IQ, as 
estimated from the NART, and each of these variables. There was a near significant 
relationship between performance on the Eyes Test and verbal IQ (r = . 385, p=0.07) 
but not between the total EQ score and verbal IQ 
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As a result of this relationship a multiple regression analysis was performed to include 
both total EQ score, verbal IQ and other demographic factors (gender, age, education 
and whether the participant was a clinician/academic or not). The only significant 
predictor of the Eyes test was verbal IQ score (multiple R= . 369), which accounted for 
11.7% of the variance. However, both gender (r = . 
266, t=1.83, p= . 
074) and EQ 
score (r = . 
255, t=1.75, p= . 087) approached significance. 
Discussion 
Scores on the EQ did not deviate substantially from the Baron-Cohen data, indicating 
the scale's reliability across samples. There were also significant differences between 
men and women, as in the original data. Women scored slightly (but not significantly) 
higher than in the original sample, which may be because a higher proportion of them 
were drawn from mental health workers. This may prevent firm conclusions regarding 
gender differences. 
Five items correlated significantly with total score on the SDS and 3 of these were 
weak to moderate positive correlations, hence were left out of the analysis. The 
negative correlation with item 37 is somewhat mysterious and may be due to chance 
factors. That the remaining 35 items showed no association with social desirability 
supports the scale's construct validity. 
The mean score on the Eyes Test matched those found by the original authors 
confirming a successful replication. As expected, this task was significantly associated 
with total score on the EQ. This is of particular interest, as the Eyes Test provides an 
objective measure of empathy and hence adds further weight to the validity of the EQ. 
However, the fact that this association did not reach significance in the regression 
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analysis needs to be considered. Verbal IQ, as estimated by the NART, was the sole 
predictor of performance on the Eyes Test. This raises the possibility that the EQ and 
Eyes task tap different constructs. Nevertheless the weak but non significant partial 
correlation with total EQ score and the independence between verbal IQ and EQ 
suggest that perhaps performance on the Eyes task is reliant on both verbal IQ and 
empathy. 
An alternative explanation for the role of verbal IQ is that it is an artefact of sample 
selection. A selection bias could have led to a particularly high 1Q range which may 
have been a confound: clinicians/academics in the field of psychological medicine 
have high IQ's, and unrelated to this, they also do well on the Eyes Test. However, a 
dichotomous occupation variable measuring this occupational variation was not a 
predictor in the multiple regression. These results suggest that the relationship 
between the Eyes task and the different factors underlying the EQ, as opposed to the 
total score, should be investigated. 
2.2 Concurrent validity and test-retest reliability 
Participants 
44 people were re-contacted between 10 and 12 months after Study 1.25 people 
replied consisting of 9 men and 16 women with a mean age of 32 years (± 9.5). 
There were no significant age differences between this group and those reported in 
Study 1 (t = 1.29, df 51, p> . 05) nor on gender distribution (x2 = 1.99, df = 1, p=> 




Participants were sent both the Empathy Quotient and the Interpersonal Reactivity 
Index (Davis, 1980). The EQ was sent again in order replicate the test-retest reliability 
observed in the original study. The IRI was sent as a measure of concurrent validity. 
The range of scores for each subscale on this questionnaire is 0- 35, with 35 
representing a high 'empathy' score for perspective-taking, empathic concern and 
fantasy items subscales. A high score on the personal distress scale, however, is 
indicative of a tendency to display self-orientated emotional reactivity. 
Twenty-five people filled out and returned the EQ. Twenty-four of this group also 
returned the IRI along with a further 4 people who filled out the EQ at time 2 only. This 
group therefore comprised 11 males and 17 females (mean age 32.1 years, ± 9.7). 
There were no age differences between this group and the participants in Study I (t = 
1.03, df 124, p> . 05), nor was there any difference in gender distribution (x2 = 1.22, 
dfl, p> . 05). 
Results 
The test-retest correlation coefficient between EQs administered at time 1 and at time 
2 was (n = 25, r =. 835, p x. 00*1). 
A correlation matrix was generated to examine the relationship between the IRI and 
the total EQ score from questionnaires sent out at time 2. The 3 items that correlated 
with the SDS in Study 1 were again dropped from the analysis. Moderate correlations 
were found between the EQ and both the 'empathic concern' subscale (n = 28, r= 
. 423, p= . 025) and the 'perspective-taking' subscale (n = 28, r= . 485, p= . 009). The 
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correlation coefficient was close to zero for the 'fantasy' items (n = 28, r=-. 027, p> 
. 05) and not significant for the 'personal distress' items (n = 28, r= -. 158, p> . 05). 
Discussion 
The EQ shows high test-retest consistency over a period of 10 to 12 months, a finding 
which adds yet more support for the reliability of this measure. 
Furthermore, the relationship between the EQ and subscales on a previously validated 
self-report measure of empathy supports the scale's validity. The fact that the 
correlations are only moderate is as expected, as total EQ score is an index of global 
empathy. There was a significant relationship with both empathic concern and 
perspective-taking, indicative of concurrent validity. The lack of a significant 
relationship with 'personal distress' is also encouraging, as this is not intended to be a 
measure of empathy but of 'emotional reactivity'. The fact that a weak negative 
association was found supports the idea that 'personal distress' and empathy are 
inversely related. The absence of an association between the EQ and the IRI fantasy 
items is consistent with previous criticisms that this concept should not be considered 
a component of empathy (Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright, 2004 in-press). 
2.3 Factor structure 
Participants 
An additional 57 volunteers [22 men (38.6%) and 35 women (61.4%)] completed the 
EQ. These participants were recruited by the author and Dr Philip Shaw (Institute of 
Psychptry) during the course of other projects. These data were combined with those 
from Study 1 to create a control group of 110 psychologically healthy participants. 
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Furthermore, 54 people who contacted the Depersonalisation Research Unit at the 
Institute of Psychiatry, London, reporting symptoms of depersonalisation disorder 
(DPD), were also given the EQ. DPD is defined as an 'alteration in the perception or 
experience of the self so that one feels detached from and as if one is an outside 
observer of ones mental processes or body' (DSM IV, 1994). DPD can also include 
derealisation 'detachment from one's surroundings' and de-affectualisation, that is to 
say, 'emotional numbing'. DPD is also often accompanied by subjective complaints of 
a lack of empathy; it is unclear whether this is an objective deficit or not (see chapter 1 
and 3). However, there is no reason to suspect a problem in employing cognitive 
empathy, so it is unlikely that this group have a global empathy deficit. 
6ACI 
Some of these participants are a subgroup of a cohort reported elsewhere 
¢} w1 , Lou3 ). A further 8 people diagnosed with DPD were 
also recruited from the same unit. As a whole, this group comprised 32 men (51.6%) 
and 30 women (48.4%), with a mean age of 34.6 (± 10.8). A chi-squared analysis 
revealed that the gender distribution was not significantly different between the control 
group and the DPD group (x2 = 1.26, dfl, p >. 05). Neither was mean age significantly 
different between these two groups (t = -. 593, df 113, p >. 05). After some preliminary 
analysis, all the groups were combined (n = 172) to create a group consisting of 79 
men and 93 women with a mean age of 34.1 years (± 10.4). 
Measures 
The EQ was sent both to the additional 57 people recruited for the control group and 
those that formed the DPD group. The DPD group were also sent some further mental 
health screening measures, such as the Dissociative Experiences Scale version II 
(DES - Bernstein and Putnam, 1986, Carlson and Putnam, 1993) and the Beck 
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Anxiety and Depression Inventories - BAI and BDI (Beck et al., 1988a, Beck et a/., 
1988b). 
The DES is considered the 'gold standard' in measurement of DPD symptomatology. 
It is a 28 item self-report questionnaire with a cut-off score of 30 for severe dissociative 
disorders (Carlson & Putnam, 1993). Factor analysis has revealed three main 
components of the scale: 'depersonalisation/derealisation (DPD/DR)', 'amnesia' for 
dissociative experiences, and 'absorption' and imaginative involvement (Carlson et aL, 
1991). Eight items make up the DES-Taxon which is sensitive to the detection of DPD 
with a cut-off score of 13 (Simeon et al., 1998). 
The BAI and BDI were also given to participants, due to the co-morbidity observed 
between depersonalisation disorder, depression and anxiety (Simeon et al., 1998). A 
score below 11 on either scale is considered within the 'normal' range, whereas a 
score above 30 is classed as 'severe'. 
Preliminary Analysis 
The mean EQ scores for the DPD group (including all the items) can be found in Table 
2.2. No significant differences were found in EQ score between the psychologically 
healthy group tested in Study 1 and those with DPD: for men (t = . 783, df 55, p> . 05) 
or women (t = 1.485, df 55, p> . 05). The difference between men and women on 






Table 2.2 Mean and SD EQ scores for the SQ group stratified by gender 
total score on the EQ 
N Mean SD Min Max 
gender male 32 38.94 12.4 15 66 
female 30 46.76 10.1 23 65 
Group Total 62 42.66 11.9 15 66 
53 people completed the DES, BAI and BDI. The mean score on the BAI was 21.6 (± 
12), and BDI was 20.3 (t 10.5). The mean score on the DES was 23.2 (t 14.2), the 
DPD/DR subscale 36.6 (± 24), amnesia 6.2 (± 2.5) and absorption 27.6 (t 17). The 
mean score on the DES-taxon was 23.3 (15.4). 
The BAI, BDI and EQ were all entered into a correlational analysis and the coefficients 
were found to be close to zero. A correlation matrix for the EQ and the mean DES 
score along with the scores for the 3 subscales was also generated. No correlations 
reached significance, although there was a trend for a negative relationship between 
total EQ score and the DES amnesia subscale (r = -. 256, p= . 067 for a two-tailed 
test). 
This analysis shows that people reporting DPD who suffer mild to moderate levels of 
anxiety and depression do not suffer a global empathy deficit. In fact, they show the 
same pattern of results on the EQ as the psychologically healthy population detailed 
above, including gender differences. However, it is entirely possible that people with 
DPD may display differences ion the specific components of empathy, that is to say, 
they may have problems experiencing affective empathy due to the emotional blunting 
they often report. It was hypothesised that there would not be any difference between 
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the EQ factor structures of the DPD group and healthy controls - despite any possible 
differences in their scores (the latter will be examined in chapter 3). Two separate 
factor analyses were conducted to test this prediction. 
Procedure 
An exploratory factor analysis, using a principal components analysis to construct the 
initial model, was performed on the EQ. Although the data are ordinal, many authors 
feel that this procedure is still useful as long as meaningful factors are extracted 
(Hutcheson, 1999). Gorsuch (1974) points to a problem with using non-continuous 
data in factor analysis: it can result in spurious factors where items load according to 
'difficulty', and that although this must be considered when interpreting the factors, it is 
much less likely with trichotomies. Kim and Mueller (1978) argue that the main 
artefact of using ordinal data in exploratory factor analysis is that the factors may be 
harder to interpret. These issues were borne in mind when interpreting the data. 
Nine cases had missing values ranging from 1 to 4 and were dealt with as described 
above. However, one additional participant had a whole page missing and so these 
values were left as missing. 
Results 




Table 2.3 Mean and SD EQ scores for entire sample stratified by gender 
total score on the EQ 
N Mean SD Min Max 
gender male 79 40.9 11.9 15 66 
female 93 49.6 9.6 23 69 
Group Total 172 45.58 11.6 15 69 
These are remarkably similar to the normative data for both men (mean 41.8 ± 11.2) 
and women (47.2 ± 10.2). There were also significant gender differences between 
men and women (t = -5.34, df 147.38, p=0.001) and this held both the control and 
DPD (see figure 2.1) groups mirroring the comparison made above between 
participants from study 1 and those with DPD. 
























Group Comparison -a separate analysis was conducted for each group (DPD vs. 
healthy volunteers) in order to examine the similarity of the factor structure as 
hypothesised. A principal components analysis followed by an exploratory factor 
analysis was then performed (as there was no a priori hypothesis about the underlying 
structure) with a varimax rotation to maximise the independence of the components. 
For each analysis a scree plot was used (Cattell, 1966) to decide upon the number of 
factors, as opposed to eigenvalues which may give rise to many uninterpretable 
factors. Values less than .3 were suppressed, since they accounted for less than 10% 
of the variance for that factor. 
In order to compare the factor structures of the two groups, a salient loading profile 
(Abdel-Khalek et al., 2002) was performed using . 35 as a cut-off point to define a 
salient loading (see table 2.4). These figures were considered along with tentative 
labels for each of the factors for each group (Tabachnick and Fiddell, 1989). On the 
basis of this information the decision was made to combine all the data into one 
analysis. 
Table 2.4 - Salient Loading Analysis 
No of Salient Loadings Common Loadings 
Control Group DP Group No. %* 
Factor 1 12 17 12 100 
Factor 2 10 10 8 80 
Factor 3 10 9 5 50 
* the percentages were calculated in proportion to the control salient loadings 
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Data Screening -A Pearsons correlation matrix was generated, and all EQ items that 
failed to correlate with any other item at .2 
(Hutcheson, 1999) or that had low 
communalities (i. e. a small amount of the item's variability was accounted for by the 
factor), in the final model were removed. This resulted in the removal of 8 items, 
namely 15,18,28,37,38,39,49,60 (see appendix 1). Conversely, none of the items 
correlated too strongly, indicative of an absence of multicollinearity. 
All the items were also correlated with the SDS. Five EQ items showed a significant 
relationship with the total score on this scale, namely 11,18,34,37,46. Again, item 
37 showed a negative relationship; however, it also had a low loading, as did item 18 
(see above), and so this stage of data screening only resulted in the removal a further 
3 items. Eleven items were therefore left out of the analysis. 
Sample Size - there were 29 items and 172 cases, conforming to the 5 cases per item 
rule for an adequate sample size for this kind of analysis. 
Final Analysis - the scores for the remaining 29 items for the entire sample were 
subject to an initial principal components analysis (PCA) with a varimax rotation in 
order to assess the number of underlying factors in the data. The communalities lie in 
the mid range except for items 10 and 57. After examining the content of these, it was 
decided to keep 57 but to remove 10 which did not load onto any of the factors in the 
final model. The analysis was re-run without this item leaving 28 items in total. 
The scree plot showed that only 3 or 4 plots (factors) appeared stacked and separate 
from the rest, with the remaining plots falling away and bunched together (see figure 
2.2 below). The eigenvalues for the 4 factors were 6.95,2.56,2.082, and 1.45. The 
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decision was made to keep 3 factors, as it was apparent from both the scree plot 
and eigenvalues that the first 3 are by far the strongest and they all had eigenvalues 
over 2. These factors account for 41.4% of the total variance. 









13579 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 
Component Number 
The item loading for these 3 factors in the rotated solution are shown in Table 2.5. 
Double loadings were allocated on the basis of content, with agreement reached 
between the two raters. The Keiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy 
was 0.846 and the Bartlett test of sphericity was highly significant, suggesting the 
data were suitable for PCA. Factor 1 was labelled 'cognitive empathy', factor 2 
'emotional reactivity' and factor 3 'social skills' - these labels will be expanded upon 
in the general discussion. 
55 
Chapter 2 
Table 2.5: Final Item Loadings from the Principal Components Analysis 
Validity - In an attempt to further examine the construct validity of the model, the 
correlation between factors was examined. Factors 1 and 2 correlated significantly (n 
= 171, r= . 497, p= . 0001) as did factors 1 and 3 (n = 171, r= 
. 254, p= . 001) and 2 
and 3 (r = . 209 p= . 006). These associations were as expected; however, the 
coefficients are not so high as to preclude discriminant validity. 
Each factor was correlated with the IRI scores from Study 1 in order to examine 
concurrent validity. Factor scores were used, these being a more accurate index of a 
person's score on a particular factor. Factor 2, 'emotional reactivity', showed a 
significant association with the 'empathic concern' subscale of the IRI (n = 28, r= . 583, 
p= . 001) and with 'perspective taking' (n = 28, r= . 442, p =. 019), but not 'personal 
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distress' (tests are two-tailed). However, factor 3 'social skills', displayed a weak but 
non-significant relationship with perspective taking (n = 28, r= . 263, p> 05). Factor 1, 
though did not correlate significantly with any of the IRI subscales. 
A correlation matrix was also generated for total score on the Eyes task and the 3 
factor scores. There was a modest but significant correlation between performance on 
the Eyes Test and factor 3 'social skills' (n = 53, r= . 273, p= . 048). The Eyes score, 
factor scores and demographics (see study 1) were also entered into a multiple 
regression analysis. Again, verbal IQ was the only significant predictor of performance 
on this task, with gender approaching significance (see Study 1 for statistics). As a 
further check on validity, each factor score was also correlated with predicted verbal 
IQ as detailed in Study 1. None of the factors showed a significant association. 
Gender Differences: A3x2 repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was 
also conducted to examine gender differences on each factor. Again there was a main 
effect of gender (F(j, 169) = 19.46, p= . 001), and an interaction between gender and the 
scores on the different factors (F(2,338) = 5.85, p= . 003). T-tests revealed significant 
gender differences on 'cognitive empathy' (t = -3.083, df = 169, p =. 002) and on 
'emotional reactivity (t =-4.725, df = 169, p= . 001), but not on 'social skills' (t = 
0.206, df = 169, p >. 05), with women having higher scores. 
2.4 Discussion 
The aim of this study was to examine the reliability, validity and factor structure of the 
EQ. The mean score on the EQ, in all the studies reported, was very similar to those 
found in the original study. Gender differences were also found for total EQ scores in 
mirroring the original study. These results also suggest that the questionnaire is 
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reliable and useful across different samples and confirm that the EQ has high test- 
retest reliability over 10-12 months, again supporting the original findings. 
The EQ showed strong concurrent validity, as evident from its moderate correlations 
with the previously validated 'empathic concern' and 'perspective-taking' subscales of 
the IRI (Davis, 1980). Furthermore, all the items entered in the final analysis 
distinguished between empathy and social desirability as measured by the SDS 
(Crowne and Marlowe, 1960), suggesting high discriminant validity. However, if the 
dropped items are to be used in subsequent studies, then it is important to ensure that 
social desirability is also measured. 
The association between the Eyes Test and EQ goes some way in establishing the 
EQ's validity. A low but significant correlation was observed between performance on 
the Eyes task and total EQ score, and a weak association was also found with 'social 
skills'. Given that the Eyes Test includes many complex mental states and hence taps 
a form of cognitive empathy, this association is important. To find a relationship 
between the EQ, an explicit self-report measure, and the Eyes task, an implicit 
measure which also taps a different modality, is therefore of value. 
However, the fact that EQ scores in both Study 1 and Study 4 were not significant 
predictors of performance on this task in multiple regression analyses reminds us of 
the need to control for extraneous variables. Verbal IQ as estimated by the NART was 
the only significant predictor of performance on this task in both of these analyses. 
However, the EQ score was approaching significance as a predictor in Study 1, and 
the lack of inter-correlation between verbal IQ and the EQ indicates that these 
variables are orthogonal. Although it is not possible to conclude from these data alone 
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whether the EQ and Eyes Test are indeed tapping different constructs, the significant 
correlations observed hint that the Eyes task may tap both verbal IQ and empathy. It is 
also possible that the role of verbal IQ in the Eyes Test was confounded by sample 
selection; although this is unlikely because the occupational differences in the sample 
were not, in themselves, a predictor of performance. It therefore seems that both 
verbal IQ and total EQ scores account for some of the variance in the Eyes Task. 
An exploratory factor analysis was carried out in order to elicit the underlying factor 
structure. The final solution accounted for a moderate amount of the total variance i. e. 
41%. The first factor, labelled 'cognitive empathy', includes items that measure the 
appreciation of affective states e. g. I can tell if someone is masking their true 
emotion', epistemic states e. g. 'I find it easy to put myself in somebody else's shoes' 
and desire-based states e. g. I can easily work out what another person might want to 
talk about'. This is in line with the broader definition of 'theory of mind' as including the 
attribution of all types of mental state. However, it is also of interest that 'affective 
state' items had stronger loadings on this factor. This may also explain why no 
association was found between this factor and the 'perspective-taking' subscale of the 
IRI, as the latter is geared more towards epistemic states. Whether or not different 
types of mental state attribution share the same processes is an issue currently under 
debate (see chapter 1 and subsequent chapters). 
The second factor was labelled 'emotional reactivity' as the items loading onto this 
factor reflect the tendency to have an emotional reaction in response to another's 
mental state e. g. 'seeing people cry doesn't really upset me', or I tend to get 
emotionally involved with a friend's problems'. However, items such as 'people often 
say I am insensitive... ' and 'I can't always see why someone felt offended' also load 
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onto this factor, illustrating how sometimes 'cognitive' empathy alone may not be 
enough to fully comprehend a social situation. It is possible that a full appreciation of 
some interactions is dependent on a certain amount of emotional resonance (see 
Adolphs et aL, 2000). 
The absence of a control for 'personal distress' (Davis, 1980) in the EQ prevents us 
from naming factor 2 simply 'affective' empathy. From this data alone, we cannot be 
sure that the emotional reactions tapped in this scale are other- rather than self- 
orientated. One way round this potential confound is to administer the scale in 
conjunction with the 'personal distress' items on the IRI (Davis, 1980). This 
combination would give an accurate profile of empathic response. Interestingly, 
although this factor moderately correlated with 'empathic concern' and 'perspective- 
taking' on the IRI, it was not associated with 'personal distress' items. This suggests it 
may be tapping pure empathy after all. 
The emergence of a factor tapping 'social skills' is of interest. A problem in grasping 
and employing everyday social skills, e. g. 'I often find it difficult to judge whether 
something is rude or polite', seems to be indicative of a lack of intuitive social 
understanding. These skills seem to require a certain amount of cognitive empathy, 
which is highlighted by the weak relationship between this factor and the perspective- 
taking subscale of the IRI. They may also rely on a knowledge base of 'social rules' 
required to navigate social situations. However, over-reliance on such rules, as 
measured in some items e. g. I consciously work out the rules of social situations', may 
be indicative of a problem with the spontaneous employment of empathy. So it seems 
that although an intuitive grasp of social skills is reliant on empathy and is therefore an 
indicator of empathic ability, an over-reliance on social rules may conversely predict a 
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lack of empathy. It is of interest that the usual, perhaps innate, female advantage was 
not observed on this factor. 
This attempt at reducing the items in the EQ to a few simple factors has been 
successful, and this series of studies confirms that the EQ provides a reliable and valid 
way of measuring empathy via self-report in both healthy and clinical populations. It is 
encouraging that Factor 1 and 2 map onto the traditional ideas of empathy, and that 
factor 3 provides a measure of applied empathy. Gender differences (female 
superiority) were also found on both cognitive empathy and emotional reactivity, 
supporting the previous literature. The DPD group did not differ on EQ scores as a 
whole, indicating an absence of a global empathy deficit. But there may well be 
differences on the specific components of empathy - and this will be fully examined in 
chapter 3. 
One limitation of this study is the use of ordinal rather than continuous data in the 
principal components analysis, which could have resulted in a degraded solution. 
However, the factors that came through were easily and meaningfully interpretable. 
That said it should be borne in mind that this analysis is exploratory and more work 
needs to be done to ascertain the predictive validity of this scale. A further limitation is 
the rather disparate and incompletely characterised samples used including the fact 
that the sample in study 1 displayed a high verbal IQ as estimated from the NART. 
The consistency observed across studies, however, suggests that the EQ is robust to 




Of all the self-report measures of empathy reviewed, the EQ fits contemporary 
definitions of empathy most closely and is the most appropriate for clinical research. 
But it is important to attempt to tease out the different kinds of emotional reactivity (i. e. 
affective empathy vs. personal distress) and hence distinguish between empathic and 
other types of emotional responses to others' mental states. Unfortunately, the EQ 
doesn't control for this potentially confounding variable, nor does it control for social 
desirability. It therefore seems that the best combination of self-report measures 
would be to administer the EQ along with the 'personal distress' subscale of the IRI 
(Davis, 1980) and the SDS (Crowne and Marlowe, 1960). 
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Characteristics of Clinical Groups 
1. Group characteristics 
The data in this thesis were collected 
from two separate clinical groups: 
people with Asperger's Syndrome 
(AS) and those with 
Depersonalisation Disorder (DPD). 
There were 16 people in each clinical 
group and a control group comprising 
53 healthy volunteers. Some of the 
data collected from the control group 
have already been reported in 
Section 2.1 of Chapter 2. 
1.1 Control Group 
Volunteers were recruited via circular 
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4. Conclusion 
email at the Institute of Psychiatry. In 
addition a database of volunteers maintained by staff at the Institute was consulted 
and postcards put in local newsagents, the local library and job centre. There were 
53 participants of whom 29 (57%) were recruited from academic or clinical staff at 
the IOP and the remaining 24 (43%) from the local area and non-mental health 
workers at the IOP. Sixty-five percent of the women recruited were mental health 
workers, as opposed to 48% of the men. 
The sample consisted of 25 (47%) men and 28 (53%) women. The mean age was 
34.1 years (± 10.9). Forty seven (88%) stated their nationality as British, 1 (2%) Sri 
Lankan, 2 (4%) American, 1 (2%) Irish, 1 (2%) German and 1 (2%) Indian. 40 
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(77%) felt their ethnic background was white European, with 12% indicating that 
their ethnicity differed from their nationality, being 2 (4%) Afro-Carribean, 1 (2%) 
black, and 2 (4%) mixed race. 
Six (11%) of the group were educated through to secondary school, 5 (10%) to 
further education, 14 (27%) to degree standard and 27 (52%) had a postgraduate 
qualification. 24 (45%) people were single, 10 (19%) co-habiting, 11 (21%) 
married and 4 (8%) people divorced, the remaining people either separated, 
widowed or with a non-cohabiting partner. 
1.2 Diagnosis 
Both those with Asperger's Syndrome (AS) and Depersonalisation Disorder (DPD) 
were diagnosed by psychiatrists using standardised ICD-10 criteria or DSM IV 
criteria. In addition, valid and reliable 'gold standard' measures were also 
administered. 
1.2.1 Asperger's group 
Diagnosis 
Asperger's Syndrome is often described as a mild autistic spectrum disorder, 
because it mirrors more severe forms of autism except that diagnosis is given on 
the basis of normal language development. All the volunteers were diagnosed with 





Diagnosis is based on the combination of a lack of any clinically significant general delay in language 
or cognitive development plus, as with autism, the presence of qualitative deficiencies in reciprocal 
social interaction and restricted, repetitive, stereotyped patterns of behaviour, interests, and activities. 
There may or may not be problems in communication similar to those associated with autism, but 
significant language retardation would rule out the diagnosis. 
Demographic details 
The mean age of this group was 37.7 years (±10.1); there were 14 men (87.5%) 
and 2 women (12.5%). All the participants in this group were British, and they all 
indicated that their ethnicity would fall into the category of white European. Four 
were unemployed (25%). They further numbered 2 civil servants (12.5%), 2 shop 
workers (12.5%), 2 students (12.5%), 1 charity worker (6.3%), 1 factory worker 
(6.3%), 1 gardener (6.3%), 1 admin worker (6.3%), 1 family support worker (6.3%) 
and 1 retired person (6.3%). Three (18.8%) of the participants had been educated 
through to secondary school, 5 to further education (31.3%), 6 (37.5%) to degree 
level and 1 (6.3%) had a postgraduate qualification; there was 1 instance of 
missing data. Thirteen (81.3%) described their relationship status as single, 1 
(6.3%) as having a non-cohabiting partner and 2 (12.5%) were married. 
Clinical Characteristics 
Six people were also administered the Autism Diagnostic Interview-Revised (Lord 
et al., 1994), an interview for caregivers of individuals with possible pervasive 
developmental disorder and 3 were assessed using the Autism Diagnostic 
Observation Schedule (Lord et al., 1989) -a tool designed to allow clinicians to 
record their observations in order to reach a conclusion about diagnosis. These 
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are both accepted 'gold standard' measures of autistic spectrum disorders (ASDs), 
the main difference being that the former utilises reports from caregivers and is 
therefore particularly useful for younger people, whereas the latter is often used 
when no caregiver information is available. All met the criteria for AS using these 
measures. Informant information was not available for the remaining 7 people. 
1.2.2 Depersonalisation group 
Diagnosis 
Depersonalisation Disorder (DPD) is severe depersonalisation associated with 
functional impairment. Depersonalisation as a symptom can be both primary and 
secondary to other psychiatric illness (Lambert et al., 2001a). It can occur in 
healthy individuals after taking illicit drugs (Medford et al., 2003), and during times 
of extreme stress such as 'near death' experiences (Noyes and Kletti, 1977). 
When depersonalisation is severe and the primary symptom, a diagnosis of DPD is 
given, which is classified as one of the dissociative disorders in the DSM IV but as 
a neurotic condition in the ICD-10. 
All participants in this group were diagnosed with DPD following a full psychiatric 
interview and assessment (by Dr Sierra or Dr Medford at the Depersonalisation 
Research Unit at the Maudsley Hospital, London) at the request of the individual 
and their referring clinician. A final clinical diagnosis was made according to DSM- 
IV (1994) criteria 300.6 and ICD-10 using the Present State Exam or PSE (DSM- 
IV, 1994). The PSE includes items for depersonalisation and derealisation: 0= 
not present, 1= moderately intense or transient, and 2= intense and persistent. 
Our case definition required a total score of 2 or above without an obvious 




The DPD group consisted of 16 people including 4 (25%) women and 12 men 
(75%). The mean age of the group was 32 years (t 7.8). There were 14 (81.3%) 
people of British nationality, 1 (6.3%) German and 1 (6.3%) Australian. 11 (68.8%) 
people were single, 2 (12.5%) were co-habiting, 2 (12.5%) married and 1 (6.3%) 
was separated. 2 (12.5%) participants were educated to secondary level, 2 
(12.5%) had completed further education, 9 (56.3%) had been educated to degree 
level and 3 (18.8%) had postgraduate qualifications. There were 3 (18.8%) 
students, 3 (18.8%) unemployed and a photographer, a graphic designer, an 
education welfare officer, a news analyst, a sales manager, a gardener, a nursery 
assistant, a company director, a technical writer, and a housing worker. 
Clinical Characteristics 
All participants (including those in the larger DPD group described in Chapter 2 
Section 2.4) were given the Dissociative Experiences Scale version II (DES - 
Bernstein and Putnam, 1986, Carlson and Putnam, 1993), the Cambridge State 
and Trait Depersonalisation scales (Carlson and Putnam, 1993), the Beck Anxiety 
Inventory (BAI - Beck et al., 1988a) and Beck Depression Inventory (BDI - Beck et 
aL, 1988b). These were sent to participants prior to referral to the clinic, and the 
information was entered into a comprehensive database maintained by Dr Dawn 
Baker at the Depersonalisation Research Unit, Institute of Psychiatry, London. 
Some of the data in this database have been reported elsewhere (Lambert et al., 
2001 a, Lambert et al., 2001 b). The DES, BAI and BDI scores for the larger DPD 
group can be found in section 2.4. of chapter 2 
The mean DES scores for the smaller DPD group described here were 23.9 (± 
13.9), with the mean DES taxon score being 24.9 (± 16.6) and the DES DP/DR 
factor being the highest at 36.4 (± 22.1). There were 5 instances of missing data 
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resulting from people failing to complete and return the measure. Background and 
normative data for the DES scale can be found in section 2.4 of chapter 2- but to 
summarise: an overall score above 30 is indicative of severe dissociation with the 
taxon having a cut-off of 13 for dissociative disorders, a score above 8 on the 
DP/DR scale being suggestive of a dissociative disorder. This group, therefore, 
tended to score in the dissociative disorders range for the taxon and the DP/DR 
factor, but not on the DES overall. This is consistent with previous data reported 
for the larger DPD group and other samples (Lambert et al., 2001 a, Lambert et al., 
2001 b). 
The Cambridge Depersonalisation 'trait' and state' self-report questionnaires are 
devised to tap depersonalisation independently from other dissociative disorders. 
The trait scale measures the frequency and duration of DPD symptoms of the last 
6 months, whilst the state scale simply measures the frequency of symptoms over 
the last week. The median trait score in the original paper was 113 and the cut-off 
point for depersonalisation is 70. The median score in this sample was 130, 
therefore well within the depersonalisation range. There were 2 instances of 
missing data. 
Lastly, participants were also given the BAI and BDI, due to the co-morbidity 
between DPD, depression and anxiety (Baker et al., 2003, Lambert et al., 2001 a). 
A score below 11 on either scale is considered within the 'normal' range, whereas a 
score above 30 is classed as 'severe'. The mean score on the BAI was 22 (± 9) 
and for the BDI it was 22.8 (± 10.7). Again, there were 2 cases of missing data. 
This therefore suggests that this group suffered mild to moderate depression and 
anxiety, mirroring the characteristics of the larger cohort reported elsewhere 
(Lambert et al., 2001 b). 
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2. Self-report measures 
Following up the conclusions of Chapter 2, the EQ, the Social Desirability Scale 
and the 'personal distress' items of the IRI were given to both clinical groups. 
These were administered as part of a larger testing session, and participants either 
completed them during the testing phase or took them home to fill in and return. 
2.1 Crowne and Marlow social desirability scale 
Background 
The background to this scale has been reviewed in Chapter 2. This measure was 
administered in order to examine socially-desirable responses in both of the clinical 
groups. It is important to confirm that all groups are within normal range on this 
variable, and that there are no group differences which might confound 
comparisons. 
Analysis 
There was 1 case of missing data so the following results are based on a sample 
size of n= 15. The mean scores were 11.71 (± 6.3) for the DPD group, 13.57 (± 
5.1) for the control group, and 14.44 (± 6.3) for those with Asperger's Syndrome. A 
one-way ANOVA was also performed to examine group differences on this 
measure. The overall F test was not significant (F(2.82) = . 786, p >. 05). 
Discussion 
The tendency to respond to self-report measures in a socially desirable way is 
within the normal range for each of the clinical groups. Neither clinical group's 
scores were significantly different from the control group on this measure, 
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confirming the validity of comparisons between these groups on self-report 
measures. 
2.2 The empathy quotient 
Background 
For an overview of the background, . reliability and validity of 
this measure see 
Chapter 2. The prediction is that the AS group will score significantly lower overall, 
also on factor 1 'cognitive empathy', and factor 3 'social skills'. But it is not easy to 
predict how the AS group will perform on the 'emotional reactivity' items, as the 
evidence is not conclusive (see chapter 1). However, many of the items also 
include a 'theory of mind' component, so it is likely that this group will also perform 
significantly worse on this factor too. It is expected that the DPD group may also 
have a significantly lower score on the 'emotional reactivity' items due to the 
symptom of emotional blunting they frequently report. 
Analysis 
The total EQ scores for the controls, the AS group and the DPD group can be 
found in Table 3.1. The results were stratified by gender, as a female advantage 
has been found consistently on this measure (Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright, 
2004 in press, Baron-Cohen et al., 2003b). 
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total score on the total score on the 
EQ EQ 
Mean SD Mean SD 
group Control 41.3 10.1 50.6 9.2 
DPD 41.4 8.8 43 5.6 
AS 26.4 12.6 36 17.0 
A univariate ANOVA with both group and gender as fixed independent variables 
and total EQ score as the dependant variable, showed significant differences 
between groups (F(2,78) = 6.79, p=. 002) with post hoc Scheffe tests revealing that 
the AS group scored significantly lower than both the control group and the DPD 
group. Gender was also significant, with women scoring consistently higher than 
men (F(,, 78) = 4.20, p= . 044). However, there was no significant interaction 
between group and gender, confirming that the apparent difference in scores 
between the female control and DPD groups was not significant (NB: there were 2 
women in the AS group). 
Based on the results of the data screening and factor analysis in Chapter 2, mean 
scores for each EQ factor were also calculated for each group (see Table 3.2). 
Table 3.2 Mean and SD EQ factor scores for each group 
factor 1- cognitive factor 2- emotional factor 3- social 
empathy reactivity skills 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
group control 15.2 4.8 10.2 4 7.2 2.6 
DPD 14.9 5.5 9.5 3.4 4.3 2.5 
AS 7.5 7.1 6.7 3.4 3.4 3.4 
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A3x3 repeated measures ANOVA was used to ascertain whether there were any 
significant group differences on the three EQ factor scores, with gender entered as a 
co-variate. As expected, there was a main effect for group (F(2 80) = 11.77, p= . 
002) 
and a significant interaction between EQ factors and group (F(4.160) = 3.95, p= . 
004). 
The interaction between EQ factors and gender was also significant (F(2,160) = 4.66, p= 
011). 
In order to tease out the simple effects, a one-way ANOVA with post hoc Scheffe tests 
(p = . 
05) was conducted for group by factor. The AS group differed significantly from 
both the other groups on all factors, and the DPD group differed significantly from the 
control group on factor 3 `social skills' (see Figure 3.1). 






















T-tests also revealed significant differences between males and females on 'cognitive 
empathy' (t = -4.29, df 82, p< . 
001 - values for unequal variances), 
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'emotional reactivity' (t = -. 3.03, df 82, p=0.003), and 'social skills' (t = -. 1.98, df 
82, p =. 051). 
An item-by-item analysis of the specific 'emotional reactivity' items revealed that 
people with DPD did not perform significantly worse than controls on any one of 
them. However, the AS group scored significantly lower than controls on the 
following items: 
"I get upset if I see people suffering on news programmes. (t = 2.33, df 67, p= . 023) 
" It is hard for me to see why some things upset people so much. (t = 3.1, df 67, p= 
. 003) 
" Other people often say that I am insensitive ... I don't always see why. (t = 3.19, df 
67, p= . 002) 
"I can't always see why someone .... felt offended by a remark. (t = 3.48, df 67, p= 
. 001). 
In order to check that the DPD group tested here were representative of the larger 
DPD sample reported in Chapter 2, the same analysis was run with the larger DPD 
group. A3x2 repeated measures ANOVA was therefore conducted to examine 
the differences between healthy controls and the larger DPD group on the 3 factor 
scores. There was a main effect for group (F(,, 169) = 15.11, p=0.001) and a 
significant effect for factor x group (F(2,338)2 12.08, p<0.001). T-tests showed that 
the main group difference was on factor 3 'social skills' (t = 6.66, df = 169 p= 
0.001). 
In order to examine the relationship between the_ EQ factors and other indices of 
DPD symptomatology, a further analysis was run using the data from the larger 
DPD group. A correlation matrix was generated for the DES scores and each EQ 
factor. There were significant correlations between 'social skills' and DES mean (n 
= 52, r=-. 348, p= . 011), amnesia (n = 52, r=-. 
291, p= . 036) and 'absorption' (n = 
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52, r=-. 369, p =. 007). The relationship between the BDI, BAI and each factor was 
examined. This revealed that 'emotional reactivity' showed a significant positive 
correlation with anxiety scores (n = 52, r= . 313, p=0.024) and 'social skills' 
showed a significant negative correlation with depression scores (n = 45, r=- . 346, 
p=0.012). 
Discussion 
As predicted, the AS group scored significantly lower on both the total EQ score 
and each of the individual EQ factors. The DPD group did not score any lower 
than the control group on total EQ score, mirroring the findings from the larger DPD 
group in Chapter 2. This suggests that people reporting symptoms of 
depersonalisation who suffer mild to moderate levels of anxiety and depression do 
not suffer a global empathy deficit. In fact, they show the same pattern of results 
on the EQ as the psychologically healthy population detailed - including gender 
differences. The apparent difference between total EQ scores for the female DPD 
and control groups was not significant and probably arose as an artefact of sample 
selection because the female controls were drawn from a group that may have 
been particularly empathic i. e. mental health workers. 
The AS group performed according to predictions reporting significantly less 
proficiency on items tapping 'cognitive empathy', 'emotional reactivity' and 'social 
skills'. This difference was most prominent with 'cognitive empathy' and social 
skills'. This is in line with the existing literature, which suggests that people with 
ASDs have a deficit in employing a 'theory of mind' - particularly as social skills are 
constantly reliant on this mechanism. An item-by-item analysis of 'emotional 
reactivity' revealed that the AS group scored significantly lower on items that 
require the appreciation of the representational qualities of other peoples' minds, 
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as expected. However, their performance on items that are not so reliant on such 
an ability was not significantly different. Here are some examples: 
" Seeing people cry doesn't really upset me. Reverse scored 
"I tend to get emotionally involved with a friend's problems. 
"I really enjoy caring for other people. 
"1 usually stay emotionally detached ... watching a film. Reverse scored 
This may account for the fact that, although significant, the AS groups score was 
only 1 SD below the control group on this factor, a smaller difference than that 
observed on the other 2 factors. 
Contrary to predictions, there were no group differences on 'emotional reactivity' in 
the DPD group and the item-by-item analysis did not shed any light on this. There 
were, however, significant differences on 'social skills'. The relationship between 
DPD and indices of empathy is particularly hard to disentangle when one considers 
the co-morbidity of both depression and anxiety in DPD. But the BDI scores had a 
negative association with 'social skills' and it is therefore possible that depressed 
mood accounts for some of the group differences on 'social skills', perhaps due to 
motivational factors. 
Alternatively, the DES mean and DES absorption scores also showed a negative 
association with 'social skills', suggesting that there may be some specific 
components of DPD that lead to people to report a problem in this area. However, 
no firm conclusions can be drawn about either explanation until further studies are 
conducted using objective measures of empathy. This is necessary to overcome 
the potential criticism of all self-report measures, which is that they rely on biased 
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subjective evaluations. One way of overcoming this problem would be to obtain 
objective reports from someone who knows the respondent well. 
The gender differences observed in previous studies were replicated, confirming 
that this sample is representative of the normal population. It was interesting to 
see female superiority in both 'cognitive empathy' and 'emotional reactivity', 
indicating that the gender differences ordinarily observed do not result solely from 
an advantage in one domain. This is consistent with models that see the male 
and female brain as varying on a continuum from 'systemising' through to 
'empathising' (see section 3.3 below). 
Finally, the BAI scores showed a positive relationship with 'emotional reactivity' - 
which is important when one considers that this factor may also include a tendency 
to experience 'personal distress' as a result of others' emotional states. This 
finding emphasises the need to control for anxiety when attempting to measure 
'affective empathy'. More attention needs to be paid to the effects of both anxiety 
and depression on empathy, and this may be of importance in clinical settings. 
2.3 Interpersonal reactivity index 
Background 
The literature reviewed and findings from Chapter 2 suggest that it is necessary to 
administer the 'personal distress' items of this scale along with the EQ. This allows 
conclusions to be drawn as to the nature of factor 2, which is tentatively labelled 
'emotional reactivity', as opposed to 'affective empathy', due to its failure to 
distinguish between self- and other- orientated reactivity. It remains unclear how 
the AS group will score on this measure thus this analysis is exploratory and the 
predictions are two-tailed. However, it is expected that the DPD group will score 
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lower than the control group on this measure, as the emotional blunting reported by 
this group is thought to extend to negative emotions about the self. 
Measures 
Five items from the IRI were chosen due to time constraints. These were: 
" Do you feel apprehensive and ill at ease in emergency situations? 
" When you see someone get hurt do you tend to remain calm? reversed 
" Does being in a tense and emotional situation scare you? 
" Do you feel helpless when you are in the middle of a very emotional situation? 
" Are you usually pretty effective at dealing with emergencies? reversed 
These items were dispersed among questions concerning the respondents' 
attitudes' and opinions. Participants were required to endorse a simple 'yes' or 'no' 
to the items, as opposed to a Likert scale - again due to time restraints. Four 
people from the DPD group and 2 from the AS group failed to return the 
questionnaire. Only 48 control participants were given the IRI, as opposed to 53, 
as the first 5 respondents formed part of a pilot study which omitted this measure. 
Analysis 
The mean and SD scores on this scale are shown in Figure 3.2. A one-way 
ANOVA was performed with post hoc Scheff6 tests to examine the simple effects. 
There was a main effect for group (F(2,73) = 5.58, p= . 006) and the differences 
were mainly between the AS and control group, with the former scoring 
significantly higher on this index. 
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Figure 3.2: Mean scores and 95% confidence intervals for 'personal distress' items 
4.0 



















People with AS score significantly higher on items that measure the propensity to 
react to negative situations of others with 'personal distress', i. e. a self-orientated 
reaction. Contrary to predictions, people with DPD scored slightly, but not 
significantly, lower on this measure. This self-orientated response is incompatible 
with empathic responding (although it is possible that it shares some of the same 
mechanisms) and these findings therefore suggest that the AS group may have 
difficulty responding empathically to others' emotional states. However, it must be 
borne in mind that some of the questions may tap the ability to employ a 
representational 'theory of mind' (ToM) which may also account for the findings in 
the AS group. 
The fact that the DPD groups scores were in the predicted direction but of small 
effect may suggest that it is possible that the small number of items and yes/no 
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format lacked sensitivity. It may therefore be worth replicating this finding using the 
original measure, i. e. 7 items and a Likert scale. If this trend is indeed due to 
group rather than random differences, one explanation would be that people with 
DPD have a problem generating any emotional reaction to others' distressing 
states, whether self- or other-orientated. 
3. Cognitive function 
In order to ensure any experimental effects were not due to global deficits, 
measures of IQ, conditional reasoning and physical problem-solving were 
administered to both clinical groups. Although all the novel tasks have their own 
internal control (see subsequent chapters), it was considered important to ensure 
that cognitive functioning as a whole was intact before reaching any conclusions 
about emotional reasoning in each of the clinical groups. 
3.1 Verbal intelligence quotient 
Both clinical groups and the control group were given the National Adult Reading 
Test (Nelson, 1982) as part of the experimental session. This measure yields an 
estimate of verbal IQ. A measure of verbal IQ was deemed necessary, as much of 
the material used in the study was in written form. 
This NART was always given early on in the testing session, after about 10 
minutes had been spent clarifying demographic details, obtaining consent and 
performing one short experimental task. Participants were asked to read aloud 50 
irregular sounding words e. g. 'ache'. The experimenter marked the score sheet as 
the participant proceeded through the list. The participant was also recorded onto 
a Sony Mini Disc player to enable the experimenter to re-score the test if 
necessary. The mean and SD Verbal IQ for each group can be found in Table 3.3. 
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Table 3.3 Mean scores for verbal IQ predicted from national adult reading test 
predicted verbal iq 
from NART 
Mean SD 
group control 121.1 5.1 
dp 117.8 5.2 
as 117.4 6.5 
The data show that all the groups are above the average range for IQ of 100 (±15). 
As all the groups have similar IQ's and are well-matched on this variable, 
comparison between groups on different variables will be fruitful. 
3.2 Conditional reasoning tasks 
The use of reasoning tasks to study certain aspects of mental disorder has 
burgeoned over the last few years. This is in part due to the increase in cognitive 
models of mental illness, i. e. depression, anxiety, delusional states (Nelson, 1982, 
Dalgleish and Power, 1999). Conditional reasoning tasks have also been used to 
this end. Such tasks lead respondents to make systematic errors, which are 
reliably reduced and exacerbated under different conditions. 
Kemp, Chua, McKenna & David (1997) used a conditional reasoning task to 
examine the reasoning style of people with delusional beliefs. There are four forms 
of conditional reasoning statement, with two leading to valid inferences and two 
inducing the endorsement of fallacies. The two valid forms are: 
" Modus Ponens/Form A (if p then q) 
" Modus Tollens/Form not B (If not q then not p). 
And the invalid forms are: 
0 Denying the Antecedent/Form not A (if not p then not q) 
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9 Affirming the Consequent/Form B (If q then p). 
The authors manipulated the tasks to include both additional and alternative 
premises and statements with emotional content. The provision of alternative 
premises (if p or r then q) usually reduces the endorsement of fallacies but has no 
effect on the valid forms. On the other hand, the provision of additional premises 
(if p and r then q) normally suppresses valid inferences. Emotional content also 
leads to inaccurate responses in both healthy volunteers and clinical groups. 
An example of an alternative statement is: 
"if it rains I will get wet, if it snows I will get wet. It does not rain, therefore.. . we 
can't say'. 
The alternative premise of 'if it snows... ' highlights the fallacy by showing people 
that there are other options - this therefore reduces the amount of fallacies 
endorsed. 
Statements with additional premises, on the other hand, reduce the amount of valid 
inferences, as they highlight alternative possibilities leading respondents to deviate 
from the usual reasoning pattern. An example of an additional statement is: 
"if she meets her friend she will go to the play, if she has enough money she will go 
the play. She meets her friend ... therefore she goes to the play" 
In the Kemp et al., (1997) study, the clinical group, i. e. people suffering from 
delusions, were found to make significantly more errors than a control group both 
overall and on the emotional statements. This, along with the data from other 
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reasoning tasks in this study, was interpreted as possible evidence for a cognitive 
bias in people with delusions. However, the authors were clear to point out that all 
groups made errors on statements with emotional content. Healthy individuals 
high on schizotypal traits have also been found to display reasoning biases on 
such tasks (Lawrence and Peters, 2004 in press). In order to make predictions 
about the current clinical groups' performance, it is necessary to examine more 
closely the basis of the common errors on such a task. The over-endorsement of 
fallacies in the statements with emotional content is an ideal starting point. 
In this kind of task, it seems that highly emotive material prevents participants from 
displaying the same accurate reasoning strategy that they previously applied to 
non-emotive statements. It is entirely possible that this is due to the activation of 
cognitive and neural mechanisms specialised for material with emotional content. 
There is a wealth of literature suggesting that the processing of emotional material 
has distinctive cognitive and neural correlates (Dolan, 2002). It is probable, 
however, that people with DPD will not show this pattern of errors with emotional 
material. If we assume that physiological arousal is the trigger for the differential 
processing of emotional material (it being the main quality that distinguishes this 
mental state from others) then emotional blunting (or lack of physiological arousal) 
may avert this effect. This would result in people with DPD showing an advantage 
on such a task. 
Another error consistently shown by both controls and the clinical group in the 
Kemp study was the suppression of valid inferences when an additional premise 
was provided. It seems that additional premises remind participants of other'real- 
world' possibilities that could affect the outcome of the given situation. Presumably 
this then leads respondents to consider the additional premise in forming their 
answer, despite instructions to ignore it. Participants are then tempted to deviate 
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from their previously accurate reasoning strategy in order to give an answer that is 
consistent with both premises and hence externally coherent. The cognitive 
strategy needed to avoid this mistake is simply to ignore the additional statement 
and resist the temptation to process the premise in context. 
This attribute is part of the cognitive style documented in those with AS who show 
fl-. V1 2oo3 
what has been termed 'weak central coherence' (9ela4, -2692). Non-autistic people 
tend to process disparate facts globally and attempt to construct meaning between 
them. This cognitive strategy probably underlies the pattern of errors observed on 
tasks such as these. However, several studies show that people with ASDs do not 
share this tendency, and instead process information in a piecemeal fashion 
(Happe, 1999). Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen (2001) found that both people with autism 
and Asperger's Syndrome (split into 2 separate groups) were significantly less 
likely to integrate fragments of a drawing in order to recognise it despite being able 
to recognise the same drawing as a single part. People with autism also show an 
advantage on the Embedded Figures Task (Ring et at, 1999) which requires the 
extraction of an image from a series of lines designed to disguise the object. This 
processing style also transfers to other domains such as verbal comprehension. 
Happd (1999) found that a sample of 16 people failed to process information in a 
context-dependent manner, leading to more inaccuracies on homographs e. g. 
there was a tear in her eye vs. there was a tear in her dress. 
If people with ASDs do show 'weak central coherence', then we might predict that 
they will show an advantage on conditional reasoning statements with additional 
premises. If additional premises ordinarily lead participants to try and generate a 
coherent solution which is consistent with the additional information then people 
with ASDs are less likely to employ such a strategy and more able to ignore the 
additional information and process the premises in isolation. This should lead to 
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enhanced performance. A similar explanation was given by Scott, Baron-Cohen, & 
Leslie (1999) for their finding that children with autism outperformed verbal-age 
matched controls on a counterfactual reasoning task. Success on these tasks 
requires one to suspend 'real-world' empirical knowledge and process the 
premises independent of information in long-term memory. It seems reasonable, 
therefore, that the same cognitive style that leads to success on counterfactual 
reasoning tasks will result in an advantage on conditional reasoning statements 
with additional premises. 
It was hypothesised that: 
0 Neither clinical group will perform significantly worse than controls overall 
on the conditional reasoning statements. 
" The DPD group will make fewer errors on the tasks with emotional content. 
" The AS group will make fewer errors on tasks with additional premises. 
Materials 
There were 48 items, including some with emotional content and some with neutral 
content. Of the neutral statements, there were 3 sets of 4 in the simple form, 3 
sets in the alternative form and 3 sets in the additional form. There was 1 set in 
the simple form with emotional content, 1 alternative set with emotional content, 
and lastly 1 additional set with emotional content. The statement with emotional 
content is as follows; 
If she is raped she will go to the police. 
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She is raped. (MP) 
9 She will go the police. (T) 
" She will not go to the police. 
9 Can't say. 
The alternative version would read: 
If she is raped she will go to the police. 
If she is mugged she will go the police (alternative) 
She is raped. (MP) 
The additional version would read: 
If she is raped she will go to the police. 
If she is able to walk she will go the police. (additional) 
She is raped. (MP) 
Procedure 
Participants were instructed as follows: "assuming that all the statements are true, 
please tell me which answer follows on from the given statement". The presence 
of additional and alternative statements was not explicitly marked, but was implicit 
from the statement. If prompted regarding additional and alternatives, the 
participants were told that the statements are to be taken as true in their own right. 
This reasoning task was given as part of a larger testing set. For both groups, the 
task was given in two sections to allow participants a break, i. e. 1- 24 followed by 
25 - 48. The DPD group was administered the task before and after some 
emotional diary extracts (see chapter 4). The latter were counterbalanced using a 
4x4 Latin Square - which means the conditional reasoning task was followed or 
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preceded by 4 different extracts at an equal frequency. The AS group were given 
the task slightly later in the battery, after the diary extracts and the first and second 
set were broken up by a physical problem-solving task (see below). 
Analysis 
The mean scores for each group in the neutral conditions can be found in Table 4. 
The normative data are taken from Kemp et al., (1997). To allow comparison with 
the control data, mean as opposed to median percentages are given, despite the 
fact that the percentages are derived from a rather small range of scores. 








% valid simple 85.9 95.3 
inferences (89*) 15.7 (89) 12.8 
% simple fallacies 72.7 64.8 
endorsed (81) 27 5 (81) 44.1 
% valid alternative 78.1 87.5 
inferences (86) 19.0 (86) 16.7 
% alternative 37.5 39.6 
fallacies endorsed (39) 
36.3 (39) 41.7 
% valid additional 68.8 84.4 
inferences (73) 25.7 (73) 18.7 
% additional 50 34 4 52.1 46 3 fallacies endorsed (57) . (57) . 
* Figures in parentheses are mean scores from the control group in the Kemp et al., (1997) study. 
The mean percentages for each condition with emotional content are given in 











% valid simple 90.6 2 20 93.8 17 1 inferences (84) . (84) . 
% simple fallacies 9.4 27 2 28.1 44 6 
endorsed (91) . (91) . 
% valid alternative 87.5 22 4 93.78 17 1 inferences (88) . (88) . 
% alternative 50 44 7 43.8 44 3 fallacies endorsed (44) . (44) . 
% valid additional 68.8 40 3 71.89 25 6 inferences (63) . (63) . 
% additional 43.75 44 3 53.1 49 9 fallacies endorsed (78) . (78) . 
A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to examine the variation between 
the clinical groups and the success of the experimental manipulations. There were 
differences between the category of response, i. e. valid vs. invalid fallacious 
inferences (F(l, 30) = 76.26, p< . 001), and the means demonstrate this to be due to 
fewer fallacious than valid inferences overall. Whether or not the statement had 
emotional content was also significant (F(l, 30) = 6.349, p= . 017), and inspection of 
the means showed that fewer invalid fallacies were endorsed in the emotional 
conditions. 
The interaction between category of response (i. e. valid inferences vs. Invalid 
inferences) and the provision of extra premises, i. e. simple, additional or alternative 
premises, was also significant (F(2,60)= 6.02, p=0.04). It seems that there were 
fewer valid inferences with additional statements than without additional 
statements [simple form (t = 3.24, df 31, p=0.003); alternative form (t = 3.5, df 31, 
p=0.001)]. However, the number of fallacies endorsed in the presence of 
additional statements did not differ from the number endorsed without additional 
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statements [simple form (t = -. 745, df 31, p >. 05); alternative form (t = -1.28, df 
31, p> . 
05)]. 
There was also an interaction between category and emotional content (F( 30) _ 
10.87, p=0.03) and paired t-tests revealed that there were significantly more 
fallacies endorsed in the neutral conditions as opposed to the emotional conditions 
(t =-3.268, df 31, p= . 
003). Lastly, there was a significant interaction between 
category, the provision of extra premises (simple, additional, alternative), and 
emotional content (F(2,60) = 10.77, p=0.001). The means suggest this to be due to 
the markedly lower rates of invalid fallacies endorsed by both groups in the simple 
emotional statements (see Figure 3.3 - invalid simple). 






















unhatched bars represent emotional content 
88 
Chapter 3 
There were no significant interactions between group and category response (F (1, 
30) = . 357, p> . 05), group and emotional content (F(, 30) = . 181, p> . 05), and 
between group and extra premises (F(2,60) = . 116, p >. 05). In order to examine any 
group effects with control data, and hence the main hypotheses more closely, one 
sample t tests were conducted. 
Firstly, the AS groups performance on valid inferences made with additional 
statements was examined. There was a significant difference in the neutral 
condition, as the AS group endorsed more valid inferences in the presence of 
additional premises than the controls (t = 2.43, df 31, p= . 028). However, this was 
not the case for the DPD group (t = -. 66, df 31, p> . 05), and this finding did not 
hold for statements with emotional content. 
One sample t-tests were also conducted to compare the data from both clinical 
groups with the control data, on fallacies endorsed and valid inferences made on 
the statements with emotional content. Both groups endorsed significantly fewer 
fallacies than the control group in the emotional conditions - DPD vs. Control (t =- 
7.11, df 15, p= . 0001) and AS vs. Control (t =-6.03, df 15, p=0.001). 
Discussion 
The main finding is that neither clinical group performed less well than controls on 
the task as a whole. This confirms that the reasoning ability of both groups is 
intact. The results also indicate that most of the experimental manipulations were 
successful. More valid inferences were made than fallacies endorsed, alternative 
premises reduced the endorsement of fallacies in neutral statements and additional 
premises suppressed valid inferences. 
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The prediction regarding the AS group's performance on the statements with 
additional premises was also upheld. The controls but not the AS group made 
fewer valid inferences in the presence of additional statements; in fact, one 
sample t-tests showed that, with the neutral statements, people with AS made 
more valid inferences than controls in the presence of additional statements. This 
is likely to result from their tendency to process information in isolation from its 
context. 
There was also a main effect for emotional content, and there were no differences 
between the groups when reasoning with emotional material. It seems that fewer 
fallacies were endorsed by both groups with statements that had emotional 
content. This was most marked with simple statements, resulting in a significant 
interaction effect for category of response (valid vs. fallacious) x extra premises 
(additional, alternative or simple) and emotion (neutral vs. emotional). One sample 
t-tests using the Kemp et aL, (1997) normative data confirmed that both clinical 
groups endorsed fewer fallacies than controls in the statements with emotional 
content. In neither clinical group was emotional content found to have a 
deleterious effect on reasoning, and surprisingly both groups endorsed fewer 
fallacies on emotional statements. 
To find no impairment in reasoning with emotional content in the DPD group is in 
line with the predictions. This suggests that the emotional blunting often reported 
by people with DPD can have the advantageous effect of preventing the cognitive 
biases that can often occur with emotional material. There was even a tendency 
for the DPD group to show superior reasoning on these items. Perhaps there is 
something about the statements that enables more accurate reasoning, if they are 
not perceived as emotionally charged. One possibility is that they have more 'real- 
world' content and are somehow more concrete than the neutral statements, and 
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that this provides an advantage ordinarily obscured by the physiological 
component of emotional content. Further experimental manipulations are needed 
to test this idea, as the current paradigm does not explore this issue. 
The fact that people with AS performed better on with emotional content is also 
puzzling. The difference is slightly less marked in this group because they tended 
to endorse fewer simple fallacies in the first place (although not significantly); yet 
the difference between their performance on statements with emotional and neutral 
content remains considerable. One explanation is that the non-global cognitive 
style preferred by people with AS also allows them to process the statements 
independently from their emotional content. If people with AS do not recruit 
semantic memory when processing such statements, then perhaps they also avoid 
activating 'emotional' memory stores. If this is the case, then the statements will 
not be tagged as 'emotional', and the biases ordinarily seen will not occur. Again, 
however, it is impossible to say from these data alone, and further experimental 
tasks are needed to explore this possibility. 
There were certain limitations to this study. The lack of a healthy control group 
prevented proper statistical analyses, and the reliance on normative data restricted 
this further. Moreover, the unequal number of statements for some comparisons - 
i. e. emotion vs. neutral, necessitated the use of percentages, and hence, non- 
normally distributed data which may have affected the findings. It may be worth 
replicating this study focusing on emotional vs. neutral statements and additional 
vs., simple statements, in line with the predictions and hence allowing the use of 
raw scores. 
To conclude, these data reveal that neither clinical group has a global reasoning 
deficit. On the contrary, both groups excel on particular aspects of these tasks and 
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it seems that the cognitive style displayed by each clinical group can lead to 
advantages in certain domains. This is of importance in demonstrating intact 
cognitive function, and suggests that widespread cognitive impairment is unlikely to 
play a causal role in the interpretation of subsequent data. 
3.3 Physical problem-solving task 
Autistic spectrum disorders may represent an extreme form of the male brain 
(Baron-Cohen, 2002a, Baron-Cohen, 1999a, Baron-Cohen and Hammer, 1997). 
The Extreme Male Brain (EMB) hypothesis sprang from a long tradition of research 
into gender differences in cognitive processing. The idea is that there are two 
main ways of understanding the environment: 'empathising' and 'systemising'. 
Empathising is the drive to identify the thoughts and feeling of other people, and 
respond emotionally. Systemising, however, is the tendency to analyse the 
components of a system in order to deduce the rules that govern it; a system being 
something with an input, a rule-governed operation and an output (Baron-Cohen et 
a/., 2003b). 
The controversial element of this hypothesis is the proposition that men are more 
likely to lean towards 'systemising' and women towards 'empathising'. However, 
the proposal is that men and women have a propensity towards a particular kind of 
processing, rather than an absolute way of seeing the world. This theory also 
allows for the existence of a cognitively balanced brain which does not have a 
preference for either viewpoint. Several studies suggest that the different genders 
vary in their cognitive approaches (Baron-Cohen, 1999a, Baron-Cohen, 2002a) 
although the precise cause of this variation is difficult to discern. There is some 
evidence to suggest that the systemising/empathising distinction is at least in part 
genetic (Baron-Cohen, 1999a, Baron-Cohen, 2002a, Lutchmaya and Baron- 
Cohen, 2002), but this is not conclusive. 
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More specifically, the relationship between the two set of skills, and whether or not 
they are independent mechanisms, remains unclear. In one sense, they seem to 
be on a continuum with some kind of trade-off between the two, and the pattern 
observed in ASDs supports this (see below). A small but significant inverse 
relationship has been found between the EQ and the 'Systemising Quotient' (SQ) 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 2003b); the latter offers a self-report measure of systemising - 
see below. However, people exist that are good (or bad) at both skills, suggesting 
they are distinct mechanisms (Baron-Cohen et al., 2003b). This issue is important 
to the EMB hypothesis, and the nature of the interrelation between these two 
domains requires further empirical investigation. 
But how does this relate to people with ASDs? People with ASDs are thought to 
be at the extreme end of the 'male' continuum and hence very good 'systemisers'. 
This proposal stems in part from the observation that people with autism do not 
show deficits in theory building per se despite being bad at constructing a 'theory' 
of mind. There is evidence that their performance in the domain of physics equals, 
or even surpasses that of people without ASDs. For instance, children with autism 
can appreciate the workings of a camera (Baron-Cohen et at, 2003a). This 
observation came from tasks designed a decade ago as a control for 'false belief' 
tasks (see chapter 1) they match in cognitive load and structure. A child is shown 
a scene containing an object and is asked to take a photograph of it; while the 
photo is developing the object is moved and the child asked where the object will 
be in the photograph. Despite the fact that the photograph is no longer congruent 
with the visual scene, children with autism tend to get this kind of task correct. The 
one crucial difference between this task and a false belief task is that a camera is 
mechanical as opposed to intentional. This finding, coupled with an abundance of 
anecdotal evidence regarding the obsessions of some people with ASDs towards 
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mechanical systems, led to the formal proposal of an extreme male brain 
hypothesis of ASDs. 
More recently, Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Stone, & Rutherford (1999b) tested 3 
people with high-functioning autism on a physics task, and on a test of 
'empathising' that involves reading another's emotional state merely from a picture 
of the eye region (Baron-Cohen et a!., 2001). All 3 participants were found to be 
bad at the latter while excelling at the former. The sample were selected on the 
basis of their superior skills in the fields of maths, physics and computer science; 
all subjects which fall into the domain of systemising, so their superior performance 
on the physics test was no surprise. However, it wasn't clear how they would 
perform on the eyes task, and their actual performance was consistent with the 
EMB theory and supports the notion of a trade-off between the two domains. 
As autism is likely to have at least some genetic origins, a series of studies has 
also been conducted examining the professions of the parents and grandparents of 
people with ASDs. A study of over 1000 families of people with ASDs, with a high 
response rate of 919, found that the fathers and grandfathers are more than twice 
as likely than 4 control groups (Tourette's Syndrome, Down's Syndrome, Language 
Delay and Non-language delay) to work in the field of engineering (Baron-Cohen et 
a/., 1997), with 28.4% of the ASD sample having at least one father or grandfather 
who was an engineer. This study was further replicated with a smaller American 
sample (n=79) (Mearns, 2002), and a similar pattern of results was found. 
Lastly, a recent paper has looked at the relationship between 'empathising' and 
'systemising'; as measured by the EQ and the newly designed 'Systemising 
Quotient (SQ). The SQ has been constructed to complement the EQ, insofar as it 
has the same number of items, response options, filler items and reverse-score 
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items. However, the content differs, focusing on 'examples from everyday life in 
which systemising could be used to varying degrees' (Baron-Cohen et al., 2003). 
Findings confirm male superiority on the SQ and female superiority on the EQ - in 
line with the EMB theory. In addition, people with AS scored significantly more 
highly on the SQ than matched controls and lower on the EQ, again consistent with 
the EMB theory. 
In order to examine this theory and to confirm that both of our clinical groups are 
capable of reasoning outside of the emotional domain, participants were given the 
20-item physics test used in the study by Baron-Cohen et al., (1999b). 
The predictions were that: 
0 The AS group will score higher than control participants in the original 
study. 
0 The AS group will outperform the DPD group. 
" There will be an inverse relationship with scores on the EQ. 
Procedure 
The physics test was given to participants as part of the wider testing session. For 
the AS group, it was given in between the two sections of the conditional reasoning 
tasks detailed above. This was for the purposes of consistency with the DPD 
group' but also to break up the conditional reasoning task which can demand a lot 
of attentional resources. The DPD group likewise, received the test in between the 
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two sections of the conditional reasoning task but interspersed with the emotion 
vignettes, that will be detailed in Chapter 4. 
Analysis 
The mean scores for each group can be found in Table 3.6 (again these are 
stratified by gender). All 16 participants from each group filled the questionnaire, 
although there were 7 instances of missing data (out of 320) resulting from only 3 
participants' questionnaires. To prevent losing the 3 datasets in their entirety, the 
missing data were replaced with the median score for that item, and so resulting in 
2 items being scored as correct and 5 as incorrect. 
Table 3.6 Mean and SD scores on the phy sics test for each group 
sex Gup Total 
male fusle 
Mtn SD MBan SD Wm SD 
gap DPD 11.7 1.8 9.8 25 11.2 2.1 
AS 11.2 at 9.5 21 11 3 
Gt pTO 11.4 26 9.7 22 11.1 2.6 
Independent t-tests were also run to explore gender differences. The groups were 
collapsed due to lack of variation. There were no significant differences between 
men and women's scores (t = 1.55, df 30, p> . 05) possibly due to the unequal 
sample sizes (women n= 6). 
A one sample t-test using the data from Baron-Cohen et al., (1999), whereby the 
mean score was 13.2, was performed on the data from men in both of the clinical 
groups. The analysis was conducted using just the male data to be consistent with 
the normative data which were collected from 14 men. Significant differences were 
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found between the male DPD participants and the control group (t = -2.9, df 11, p 
=. 014) and between the male AS group members and controls (t = -2.4, df 13, p= 
. 033). 
Further analyses were conducted to explore the relationship between the total EQ 
score and performance on the physics task. For the AS group there was a 
negative correlation between performance on the physics test and total EQ score (r 
= -. 486, p= . 057); again with no significant association within the DPD group (r =- 
. 155, p> . 05), although this finding was in the negative direction. 
Discussion 
Despite the fact that both clinical groups performed significantly worse than 
controls on the physics task, their scores were not considerably lower. It should be 
noted that the analysis was restricted to a one sample t-test, hence not utilising the 
full spread of scores in the original normative data. Furthermore, the participants in 
the original study had full-scale IQs, as estimated from the NART, of 130.9 ± 6.4 as 
opposed to 117 (± 5.9 in DPD group and 6.4 in AS group) for the clinical groups in 
the current study. The authors of the original study recognise the role of IQ in this 
test, and it seems therefore that high IQ may have confounded their results to 
some extent. Taking these factors into account, it is reasonable to conclude that 
both clinical groups in this study can reason effectively in the physical domain. 
This supports the mounting evidence that neither clinical group suffers from a 
generalised reasoning deficit. 
A non-significant trend was observed for gender differences with male superiority 
on this task. Unequal sample sizes may have attenuated the significance of this 
finding which was in the predicted direction. Nevertheless the trend is line with the 
EMB theory; especially regarding the females in the DPD group, who would be 
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expected to be lower on systemising ability. However, these data alone do not 
shed any light on the causality of the findings. 
The most interesting finding from this study is the moderate inverse relationship 
between total EQ score and performance on the physics task for the AS group. 
Although this correlation was only borderline significant (p = . 057), the magnitude 
of the association is much stronger than that found between the SQ and EQ 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 2003b). This may be of help in understanding the nature of 
the empathising/systemising trade-off, as the data suggest the trade-off to be more 
prominent with particular aspects of systemising, namely technical or physical 
systems - at least for people with ASDs. The fact that no such relationship was 
found in the DPD group does not detract from this finding. Presumably the 
proposed trade-off between these two skills would not hold for people who have a 
potential deficit in empathising, which if it occurs is acquired after childhood and 
fluctuates (Baron-Cohen et aL, 2003a), as opposed to being developmental and 
enduring. Such a deficit would be expected to be independent of 'systemising' 
skills. 
To conclude: full statistical comparison with the control data set would be of value, 
as this would permit more stringent matching of the clinical and control groups on 
possible confounding or interacting variables such as IQ, age and gender. 
Nonetheless, these data go some way to support the Extreme Male Brain theory of 
autism and more importantly for the current study they confirm that the participants 
in the clinical groups have yet another cognitive domain intact. At least with the AS 
group and perhaps with the DPD group, these results coupled with the rest of the 
data presented in this section, suggest a move away from seeing these conditions 





The clinical groups described in this chapter have been diagnosed according to 
standardised and stringent criteria by qualified psychiatrists. In addition, valid and 
reliable 'gold standards' have been administered where possible. All in all, these 
measures confirm that the clinical groups in question are homogenous with regard 
to their diagnosis and representative of the populations from which they are drawn. 
Demographically, both the clinical groups and the control group are drawn from a 
varied socio-economic background with different ages and a range of occupations. 
Apart from the AS group, they came from a varied mix of nationalities and 
ethnicities. In the control group, gender was evenly distributed but there was a 
lack of women in both the DPD (n = 4) and the AS group (n = 2) which must be 
considered in subsequent analyses. All groups were well matched for verbal IQ as 
estimated from the NART all groups having a mean verbal IQ that is above 
average. 
According to self-report measures, the AS group reported significantly lower 
empathy levels and higher 'personal distress' levels than the control group. 
However, item-by item analysis revealed that differences on the 'emotional 
reactivity' subscale of the EQ may be in part due to problems employing a 
representational theory of mind rather than the other components of 'emotional 
reactivity'. The DPD group, by contrast, did not score any lower than controls on 
this particular dimension of empathy, despite predictions. They did, however, show 
a non-significant trend towards lower levels of 'personal distress' than the other 
groups. The DPD group also reported problems applying the skills required to 
show competence in social interactions. 
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In terms of cognitive functioning, both clinical groups were shown, in more than 
one domain, to be able to reason at the same level as, and sometimes superior to, 
controls. The DPD group outperformed healthy controls on conditional reasoning 
tasks with emotional content. The AS group also showed this pattern along with 
enhanced performance in tasks that benefited from reasoning in a piecemeal 
fashion. This was in line with predictions, and may highlight another domain where 
the cognitive style of people with AS, i. e. weak 'central coherence', is a bonus. 
Both clinical groups also performed within the normal range for their IQ on the 
physics task - confirming yet another spared cognitive skill. For people with AS, 
this was inversely related to their empathy skills and may therefore help untangle 
the relationship between systemising and empathising. 
To conclude, neither clinical group displayed a global reasoning deficit. This 
means that any data generated by emotional reasoning tasks in subsequent 
chapters are unlikely to be attributable to basic, low-level deficits. The AS group 
displayed impairments with the representational aspects of theory of mind in line 
with previous literature, although the full nature of their deficits in 'affective 
empathy' remains unclear. The DPD group, on the other hand, did not show a 
global empathy deficit as measured by self-report, although the findings suggest 
they may have problems with applied empathy and self-orientated emotional 
reactions to others' mental states. The next step is to design objective empathy 
measures to confirm the subjective reports of both of the clinical groups. 
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Novel and Objective Measures of Empathy 
1. Background 
Two types of empathy have been 
distinguished, namely cognitive and 
affective (see chapters 1& 2). 
Although cognitive empathy can refer 
to all types of mental state attribution 
i. e. epistemic, desire-based and 
emotion - affective empathy is most 
likely to result from observing other 
people's emotional states. 
Furthermore, there is a large body of 
literature on the appreciation of non- 
affective states but little on the 
comprehension of affective states, 
especially from more complex non- 
body based stimuli (see Chapter 1). 
To address this issue, a novel task 
was designed to focus on the 
attribution and appreciation of 
affective states from real-life diary 
extracts. The protocol was designed 
to capture the two main components 
of empathy: cognitive and 
physiological. 
Contents at a glance 
1. Background 
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states. 
1.2 Physiological arousal 
1.3 The use of the self-concept 
2. Task development 
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3.4.1 Diary extracts 
3.4.2 Speech rate 
3.4.3. Trait task 
4. Results 
4.1 Affective state labelling 
4.2 Speech rate 
4.3 Trait task 
5. Discussion 
6. Conclusion 
__.. ... . 
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Specifically, the use of the cognitive representation of the self was measured. This is 
a factor which may distinguish between the two competing philosophical approaches 
to mental state attribution: i) 'theory-theory' [the ability to deploy theoretical knowledge 
based on a set of principles (Zahavi and Parnas, 2003)] and ii) 'simulation' [the 
capacity to imagine being in the same situation as another (Decety and Chaminade, 
2003)]. In addition, emotional arousal in response to the affective states of the 
protagonist was measured. 
1.1 The appreciation of affective states 
The attribution of affective states has only really been examined in the context of 
simple paradigms tapping lower-level, more basic processes (Blakemore and Decety, 
2001b). These studies have relied mainly on facial emotional expressions alone, 
using both the whole or part of the face (Adolphs et al., 2001 a, Adolphs et aL, 2001c, 
Dailey et aL, 2002, Dolan et aL, 2001, Kucharska-Pietura et al., 2003, Baron-Cohen at 
aL, 2001, Hariri et aL, 2002b, Lidaka et al., 2003, Gur et a/., 2002, Adolphs, 2002, 
Shaw et al., 2003a, Jansari at aL, 2000), and/or voice (Hornak, 1996a, Hornak, 1996b, 
Morris at al., 1999), including various experimental manipulations such as the mode of 
presentation (Prkachin, 2003). More challenging tasks have also been constructed 
based on 'morphed' faces which vary the intensity of the displayed emotion 
(Surguladze et a/., 2003). Recently, Adolphs and Tranel (2003) manipulated the 
presence and absence of the face in emotion perception and found that participants 
with selective brain damage could label the emotions in the absence of the face 
despite not being able to when presented with the face alone. This suggests that the 
perception of facial affect may be neurally dissociable, in part, from the appreciation of 
emotional states from other bodily expressions (see chapter 7). 
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More complex mental state attribution tasks which recruit higher level cognitive 
processes (Blakemore and Decety, 2001 b), invariably focus on epistemic states so 
that the meta-representational ability of the mind can be tapped unequivocally. As a 
result, little is known about the processes involved in different types of affective state 
attribution and even less is known of how they may fractionate. A few studies have 
focussed on emotional state attribution from more complex stimuli, but mainly in the 
context of online studies, attempting to discover the brain basis rather than the 
underlying and accompanying cognitive processes (see chapter 7). 
A series of studies have looked at memory processes for emotional events using both 
images and narratives (Blakemore and Decety, 2001 a, Brierley et al., 2004 +a -press) 
but the stimuli used in these studies are not specific to other people's emotional states. 
However, Decety and Chaminade (2003) examined emotion attribution using video- 
clips of actors telling sad and neutral stories and manipulated the congruency of the 
motor expression with the content of the narrative. This was a Positron Emission 
Tomography (PET) study and the resulting neural correlates were shown to be 
consistent with a 'shared representations' network (see chapter 1 and 7). However, in 
terms of the behavioural correlates, likeability ratings (which were taken as an index of 
'sympathy') were significantly higher in the congruent emotional condition e. g. sad 
story/sad face and were lower in the incongruent emotion condition e. g. sad 
story/happy face. 
Some data exist on the perception of emotion through the voice (see above), however, 
studies using written material alone are rare. This is partly because the majority of 
real-life emotional communication relies to some extent on either non-verbal or vocal 
processes. However, the content of language is also an important source of emotional 
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cues, and as Decety at al (2003) showed, concordance between content and 
expression is important. To develop tasks that use lexical stimuli may be helpful as a 
symptom of some clinical conditions may be a specific inability to decode emotion from 
facial arrays (see below, chapter 1 and chapter 5). However, it studies based on 
written vignettes do have their own drawbacks, not being completely generalisable to 
everyday life whereby communication is often face-to-face (Parkinson and Manstead, 
1993). 
Theoretically it is possible to make some predictions about the kind of processes that 
may be involved in vignette based tasks. Higher level cognitive processes, similar to 
those invoked in traditional ToM paradigms, may be recruited (theory-theory and/or 
simulation - see chapter 1), depending on the level of meta-representation required. It 
is also possible that 'lower level' processes may be employed to comprehend some 
aspects of affective states, similar to those involved in the attribution of intention from 
action (Blakemore and Decety, 2001 b). It is also possible that non-specialised 
processes, such as those based on semantic memory and categorical knowledge, 
may be used; this may be especially so for stimuli that are very easy to decode i. e. 
'children are happy when they go to parties' (Baron-Cohen, 1991). It is important to 
control for this possibility, as any clinical group with an emotion processing deficit may 
be adept at employing such skills as the basis of a compensatory strategy. For this 
reason, care needs to be taken to empirically measure the processes underlying 
emotion attribution, especially if the tasks are to be of use in furthering the 
understanding of clinical groups. 
In developing such tasks, it is also important to manipulate the difficulty of the task in 
order to prevent a ceiling effect and prompt people use empathic processes rather 
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than simply rule-based reasoning. In addition, it is vital that the tasks be as 
ecologically valid as possible in order to try and recreate the empathic response in an 
experimental setting (Parkinson and Manstead, 1993). 
1.2 Physiological arousal 
Most emotion attribution studies fail to consider whether physiological arousal occurs 
when perceiving another person's emotion16, although there are many studies 
exploring affective responses to other types of stimuli (Phillips et al., 2003). Emotion 
induction appears intuitively to be a component of emotion perception. 
Developmentally, an imitation mechanism with accompanying physiological arousal, 
would be the obvious candidate for the transfer of knowledge between persons about 
the qualitative aspects of emotional states (Meltzoff and Gopnik, 1993a). Newborns 
are known to imitate facial expressions and this is thought to be an early mechanism 
'for understanding that others are 'like me' [which] underlies the development of ToM 
and empathy for others' (Meltzoff and Decety, 2003). One recent pivotal study 
suggests that imitation is still an important component of emotion perception in adults. 
Carr et aL, (2003) asked participants to simply observe emotional expressions in one 
condition and imitate them in another, and found similar brain areas were involved with 
greater activation in the imitation condition. However, it is still unclear whether the 
imitation was accompanied by emotional arousal. 
A further study of relevance here was conducted by Adolphs et al., (2000) found that 
people with lesions in the right somatosensory cortices were more likely to have 
problems with emotion perception. The authors interpret this finding as consistent with 
16 Except when this is explicitly built into the experimental design i. e. part of an emotion induction 
procedure - see Weiss, U., Salloum, J. and Scneider, F. (1999) Correspondance of emotional self-rating 
with facial expression, Psychiatry Research, 86,175-184. 
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'the idea that we recognise another individuals emotional state by internally generating 
somatosensory representations that simulate how the other individual would feel when 
displaying a certain emotion expression'. They further point out that such simulation 
could be overt or covert and there is no need for the individual to consciously feel the 
state of the other. These findings suggest that emotion perception does involve an 
element of emotion induction, albeit covertly. However, this still needs to be tested 
experimentally. 
Taylor et al., (2003) had participants rate their own emotional state whilst viewing 
pictures with affective content as an adjunct to the main experimental manipulation. 
The authors found that during sad images (which were the only images requiring the 
participant to empathise) self-reported emotional arousal was reduced when 
participants had to rate the pictures rather than simply passively view them. This 
suggests that any physiological arousal may be dampened by task demands. 
However, the subjective emotional ratings occurred after the task-related ratings and it 
is possible that this effect would be minimised if arousal was measured before the task 
commenced. Davis et al (1987) also asked participants to rate their own mood after 
watching dramatic film stimuli and found that emotional reactions of different valences 
were mediated by different components of empathy. 
As mentioned in chapter 1, EMG measures have also been used to explore facial 
muscle reactions (Cacioppo et aL, 1988) and recent studies suggest that these effects 
are not simply due to demand characteristics but genuinely reflect experienced 
emotions (Dimberg et al., 2002). Studies have also relied on skin conductance, heart 
rate measures and the startle response to measure physiological reactions in emotion 
processing paradigms (Lang et al., 1993, Vrana, 1988, Pissiota at al., 2003). 
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However, it is rare to find these methods employed in studies using other people's 
emotional states as the stimuli. Although, Decety and Charminade (2003) in the study 
described above, measured skin conductance and found a significant interaction 
response during the condition where facial expression and story content were 
incongruent for emotion, but no effect during the narrative or motor expression 
conditions alone. The potential problem with all these measures, and in particular with 
self-report scales, is that they are explicit and hence may be open to demand 
characteristics" i. e. subjects respond in the way they believe is expected of them. 
This is especially important with a construct like empathy which is a socially desirable 
trait (see chapter 3). 
One implicit but indirect method of measuring physiological arousal is speech rate. 
Vocal expression is complex, varied and has numerous components including 
intensity, loudness, pitch, frequency and tempo (Cook, 2003). There are many studies 
examining the perception of affective states via prosody (Kucharska-Pietura at at, 
2003, Ross et al., 1997) but less using vocal cues as an index of the emotional state of 
the speaker. Anecdotal evidence suggests that we speak faster when scared or 
anxious and more slowly when sad or depressed. This assumption finds some 
empirical support in a study which explores the correlates of expressive behaviour 
when recounting personal events. Participants showed more cardiovascular arousal 
when speaking about personal events in a mood-congruent way compared to a mood 
incongruent speech rate (Siegman and Boyle, 1993). Furthermore, Breitenstein at al., 
(2001) systematically manipulated speech rate and pitch for 5 emotions and found a 
faster rate to be associated with fear and anger and a lower rate to be associated with 




sadness. A review of emotion in voice and music confirmed these patterns, and found 
that articulation rate also increased when the speaker is happy (Scherer, 1995, Cook, 
2003). However, it does seem that speech rate is more sensitive to arousal than it is 
to valence, but this is the case with most physiological measures and speech rate has 
the distinct advantage of being implicit. 
A few studies have attempted to use speech rate as a measure of physiological 
arousal. Teasdale and Fogarty (1979) tested normal volunteers using mood induction 
and a counting task to assess speech rate. They found significant differences for 
mood on speech rate. In attempt to reduce the variability and demand characteristics, 
McKenna and Lewis (1994) asked participants to count both at normal speech rate 
and as fast as they could, before and after a mood induction procedure. They found 
that mood induction affects both maximal and self-paced speech rate, with speech rate 
accelerating in the happy mood condition and decelerating in the depressed mood 
condition. Lastly, Barrett and Paus (2002) used a mood induction technique with 49 
volunteers and examined several speech parameters, including rate. Demand 
characteristics were controlled for by using 'neutral' sentences as the reading stimuli, 
and distracting participants from the true nature of the task. A between-participants 
design was used to control for carry-over effects. Differences were found between the 
sad and happy mood condition, with participants having slower, quieter and more 
monotonous speech when sad. 
The utility of the speech rate method is also supported by studies that employ it as an 
indirect measure of depressive symptomatology. Barrett and Paus (2002) make 
tentative links between the 'hypopfrontality' observed in depression and the 
relationship between affect and this particular motor behaviour. Other authors have 
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linked speech differences in depression to dysfunction in meso-limbic nigrostriatal 
areas (Flint et al., 1993). Teasdale et a/ (1980) conducted a series of case-studies 
using speech rate and self-report measures of depression and despondency i. e. the 
Beck Depression Inventory (Beck et al., 1988b). They found that deceleration of 
speech rate was significantly associated with increased unpleasant affect whether 
resulting from depressive symptomatology or experimental manipulation i. e. mood 
induction. Godfrey & Knight (1984) used various indices of speech rate to assess 
depression levels in clinical groups from admission to discharge and found significant 
differences over time, suggesting speech rate to be a good outcome measure for 
treatment for depression. 
In the current study we sought to replicate these effects using the affective states of 
others' as the source of emotion induction. If the participant is in a state of parallel 
empathy, it is expected that their speech rate will accelerate after the participant has 
processed the diary extracts containing 'fearful' and 'happy' situations and decelerate 
after the extract containing 'sad' material. Anxiety levels and 'personal distress' were 
also measured, as both of these may affect arousal. In addition, participants were 
asked to perform this task before they were required to explicitly process the stimuli 
i. e. answer the questions (Taylor et at, 2003). The relationship between this measure 
and the different components of empathy was considered, particularly in response to 
vignettes of different valence (Davis et at, 1987). 
1.3 Use of the 'self-concept' 
The ability to take the other person's perspective is a prerequisite of any empathic 
response. Traditional 'theory of mind' (ToM) tests rely on the ability to take the 
perspective of the target, and in so doing, set aside one's own perspective - 
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particularly with representational epistemic states. There are two major philosophical 
theories as to the nature of mental state perspective-taking namely: Simulation and 
Theory-Theory (see above and chapter 1). However, this issue has largely remained 
in the domain of philosophy and there is a lack of empirical work distinguishing 
between the two. Social psychologists have also been interested in perspective- 
taking, and being slightly distanced from the ToM programme, their work is from a 
slightly different theoretical basis. 
Davis (1996) examined the use of the self-concept in perspective-taking. In this task 
participants watched a videotape of a person speaking about personal events and 
were asked to 'imagine the self or 'imagine the target' in the situation or in the control 
condition, simply watch the video. Participants in the 'imagine self and 'imagine other' 
conditions attributed a higher proportion of traits that they had previously attributed to 
themselves to the character, than those who had instructions to simply watch the 
video. 
There is a growing body of empirical work examining the cognitive and neural 
correlates of the self and self-processing (Kelley et al., 2002, Kircher et al., 2002, 
Kircher et al., 2000, Kjaer et aL, 2002). However, there is little work examining the use 
of the self-concept in mental state attribution. Vogeley et al (2001) examined the 
possible neural correlates of self- and other-processing using an adapted ToM 
paradigm based on false belief vignettes. The same vignettes and probes were 
presented in both the third and first person and both common and distinct areas of 
activation were found. The authors interpreted this as suggesting that neither the 
'simulation' nor 'theory-theory' account is likely to be mutually exclusive. Consistent 
with this interpretation are a further set of studies which have found traditional ToM 
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areas to be activated when participants reported self-generated thoughts (McGuire et 
a/., 1996), when they reported a self-induced tickling sensation (Blakemore et al., 
1998) and when reflecting on their own abilities, traits and attitudes (Johnson et aL, 
2002). 
Although Davis does not explicitly affiliate his work with the philosophical theory of 
'simulation', there are considerable parallels. It is reasonable to suggest that the main 
difference between a 'theory-theory' and 'simulation' approach is the use of the 'self- 
concept' in understanding the other's mental state (Vogeley et al., 2001). In essence, 
a person using the 'simulation' approach would reason along the lines of "I like parties 
so John likes parties", the theory-theory approach would, however, predict the use of a 
more objective strategy such as "people like parties so John likes parties". Although, 
both approaches are more complex than this, in terms of solid predictions, it seems 
likely that if a person is 'simulating' the mental state of another, they will use and have 
available a cognitive representation of the self (see chapter 1 for an overview). 
In addition, Davis (1994) also points out that perspective taking can prime people for at 
least two different types of affective state; i) sympathy and compassion, and/or ii) 
feelings of unease and personal distress. Much has been written by social 
psychologists regarding the distinction between these two outcomes, however, this is 
rarely considered within the neuroscientific or philosophical literature, despite the fact 
that it is crucial to the development of an empathy model. Not only does care need to 
be taken to distinguish different types of affective response but there is also the 
possibility that these distinct responses are based on different cognitive processes. 
This generates questions open to empirical measurement; does 'personal distress' 
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result from the same kind of cognitive process as 'empathy' or can perspective-taking 
be further fractionated? 
The first step in answering these questions is to empirically establish the relationship 
between the self-concept and perspective-taking, aside from the resulting emotional 
responses. There are a few studies that may be of relevance here. Davis et al., 
(1996) found a linear relationship between perspective-taking and self-concept as 
measured by trait overlap, so that an increase in perspective-taking led to an increase 
in overlap between the traits attributed to the target and self (or vice versa). However, 
he only tested healthy volunteers and one recent study, examining schizotypy within 
the normal population, suggests that perspective-taking may differ between groups. 
Langdon and Coltheart (2001) tested people who scored both low or high on 
schizotypal traits on both visual and mental perspective-taking tasks. They found that 
the people scoring high on schizotypal traits not only performed badly on the mental 
perspective-taking task but also on certain aspects of a visual perspective-taking task. 
The visual task required the participant to rotate the self relative to an array (as 
opposed to rotating the array relative to the self). In order to explain these results, the 
authors borrowed concepts from the field of spatial navigation namely: ego- and 




Figure 4.1 Allocentric and egocentric frames of reference adapted from Vogeley & Fink 
2003 







The authors define allocentric simulation as that the ability to reconcile one's own first 
person view of the world with other people's viewpoints and on an equal footing1d. 
Egocentric simulation, however, is described as being tied to one's own point of view. 
Similarly, Vogeley and Fink (2003) define an allocentric viewpoint, as a framework that 
is independent from the agents position (see diagram 1). However, they also point out 
that such different mental representation skills may not be best explained with 
reference to the same concepts as those employed to define abstract body 
representation. The main finding in this study is that people scoring high on 
schizotypal traits may excel at egocentric simulation at the cost of allocentric 
18 This is not to be confused with a detached theory-theory approach as it is still simulation and so is 
likely to involve the use of the self-concept. It may be useful to consider 'allocentric' as 'putting 
yourself in another's shoes' vs. 'egocentric' as 'putting the other in your shoes'. 
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simulation and that this underlies their difficulty with certain aspects of visual and 
mental perspective taking. This effect was replicated in people with schizophrenia 
(Langdon et al., 2001). There is some evidence that the overlap between self and 
other is unlikley to be absolute in healthy controls (Ramnani and Miall, 2004) and 
others also point out that too much overlap could lead to conceptual confusion (Decety 
and Sommerville, 2003)aad. 
The idea that shared perspectives can be egocentric is not new. Feningstein and 
Abrams (1993) found that people are more likely to assume that 'others' think the 
same way them, when there is an increase in self-focussed attention. But this has to 
be balanced with the known increase in empathy than can occur when the target is in 
a similar situation to the self [for instance see Houston (1990)]. However, it does 
seem probable that perspective-taking may further fractionate, and this may be related 
to the extent to which the self-concept is utilised. It seems reasonable to suggest that 
an egocentric frame of reference would rely more heavily on the self-concept than an 
allocentric frame of reference (see figure 4.2). This, in conjunction with the existence 
of distinct emotional responses i. e. personal distress and empathy, may indicate that 
the association between the self-concept and perspective-taking may not be simply 
linear. Rather it may tail off once an optimum level is reached - whereby the use of 
the self-concept beyond that would be indicative of 'egocentric' perspective-taking. 
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Figure 4.2: Predicted degree of overlap between self and other representations 
ALLOCENTRIC* EGOCENTRIC" 
SELF OTHER SELF OTHER 
* Possible basis for empathic emotional response 
" Possible basis for personal distress response. 
This idea may have consequences for the pattern of results expected from the trait 
task (Davis et al., 1996) especially with different groups. For instance, an egocentric 
frame of reference may be preferred by people who score highly on self-absorption or 
narcissistic traits and/or in groups who have difficulty adopting the third person 
perspective. In terms of the current study, it is important to replicate the self-trait 
overlap effect in a different sample of healthy volunteers, before testing the hypothesis 
that different groups may vary in their use of the self-concept. It is also important to 
explore the relationship between empathy, personal distress and other demographic 
variables with the trait overlap task. 
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To summarise, the aim of the set of tasks described below is to measure basic 
affective state attribution including the use of the 'self concept in this process and the 
physiological arousal that may accompany it. An implicit cognitive task will be 
employed to examine the use of the cognitive representation of the 'self and an 
indirect, and again implicit, behavioural task will be employed to measure physiological 
arousal. This multi-level approach to the appreciation of affective states is designed to 
fully capture the process, whilst experimentally controlling it. 
It is predicted that: 
0 Performance on the diary extracts will be associated with 'empathy' scores on 
the EQ, with a higher accuracy rate associated with higher empathy rates. 
0 Each vignette will be accompanied by speech rate indicative of congruent 
physiological arousal. 
" The extent of self and other trait overlap will be related to 'empathy' scores on 
the EQ 
2. Task development 
A novel task was developed with 3 main components; affective state labelling, speech 
rate and a trait task. As these tasks are new, their development will be described in 
depth. 
2.1 Vignettes: stimuli design 
The task consists of 4 vignettes which were adapted from real diary extracts displayed 
on a website called www. opendiary. coni (see appendix 3). Real diary extracts were 
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used to increase ecological validity (Parkinson and Manstead, 1993). There are 3 
vignettes with affective content and one tapping epistemic states. Situations which 
were considered likely to evoke certain emotional states, were used i. e. birth, death, 
and common fears such as injections. At no point were the target emotions explicitly 
stated, instead they have to be inferred from the text as there is evidence that people 
tend to naturally infer emotions when reading text with emotional content (Gygax at al., 
2003). The protagonists were two men and two women and the age range was varied. 
The extracts were followed by 3 multiple choice questions requiring participants to 
identify the emotion displayed by the protagonist. For each question there were 4 
alternatives from which to choose. To prevent the test from being too easy, the 
alternatives were slight variations on the correct answer, often less or more extreme 
versions of the same or similar affective states or semantic opposites in the control 
vignette (see below). The three questions were also graded in difficulty; I) basic 
emotion i. e. sadness in response to the death of a family member ii) basic emotion but 
less obvious reactions to the situation i. e. anger in response to a death iii) more 
complex mixed emotions (Plutchik, 1980) i. e. guilt in response to a death. 
Gygax et al (2003) found that that experimentally people tend to infer broad rather 
than specific emotions from written text which may add to the difficulty of this task and 
prevent ceiling effects. The control vignette included first, second and third order 
beliefs and participants were also probed as to their own opinion on the subjects 
covered, in order to tap their ability to represent other peoples' minds. As an additional 




Format of target questions: 
1st Level Belief - what a character thought 
1 51 Level Emotion - basic emotion 
2nd Level Belief - what a character thought another character thought 
2nd Level Emotion - basic emotion stemming from 1 S` level emotion 
3rd Level Belief - what an character thought a second character thought about the first 
character. 
3rd Level Emotion - primary mixed emotion (Plutchik, 1980). 
Procedure 
The vignettes were presented in written format, rather than orally, to control for vocal 
expression. Participants were given the vignette to read and then they were instructed 
to turn over and answer the questions without referring back. Standardised instructions 
were given: 
Below you will find some questions with a choice of 4 answers. Please read the question and 
say out loud the answer which you think is most accurate - there is no need to write it down. 
Please do not refer back to the extract and work as quickly as possible as you will be timed. 
You do not need to read the whole answer out - you can just say the letter - For Example; No 
1-A, No 2-B etc'. 
Remember it is important that you answer all the questions - sometimes more than one answer 
might seem appropriate - if this is the case then please give the answer that fits the best. Or if 
you think none of the answers are correct then please give your best guess. 
Responses were timed to the 0.01 second using a stopwatch frone the moment 




In the initial pilot, 10 people (7 women, 4 men, mean age 30.6 yrs, ± 4.1) completed 4 
emotion vignettes and 4 belief vignettes, which were counterbalanced. On the basis of 
these data the most appropriate belief extract was selected for further use. The text 
in the vignettes was also amended where necessary, as was the word length. The 
second pilot involving 5 people (3 women, 2 men, mean age 31.4 yrs ± 7.4) resulted in 
some further minor amendments in the text and word length of the extracts. 
Final Vignettes 
All the vignettes were further controlled for length and ease of reading level using 
Microsoft Office XP Professional - Word 2002, and the statistics for the final vignettes 
were: 
Emotion A 
Flesch Reading Level 8.78 Questions 7.92 
Total Word Count 327 Vignette 173 words & questions 139 words 
Emotion B 
Flesch Reading Level 8.00 Questions 7.35 
Total Word Count 316 Vignette 169 words & questions 143 words 
Emotion C 
Flesch Reading Level 5.5 Questions 4.84 
Total Word Count 307 Vignette 170 words & questions 137 words 
Belief 
Flesch Reading Level 7.25 Questions 6.89 
Total Word Count 308 Vignette 167 words & questions 141 words 
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To control for the practice and other order effects, the final vignettes were 
counterbalanced using a4x4 Latin Square. With additional non-arousing tasks 
(traditional ToM vignettes - see Chapter 6) between the diary extracts to further 
prevent carry over effects. The additional tasks were also counterbalanced using a 
reversed 4x4 Latin Square (see chapter 6). To prevent a response set, whether or 
not the correct answer was the most extreme of the alternatives was also varied. 
2.2 Counting task 
The counting task was used as a measure of speech rate and as an indirect measure 
of physiological emotional arousal. Participants were instructed to count out loud from 
1 to10 after each of the vignettes. As it was important that this test remain an implicit 
measure of arousal, demand characteristics were carefully considered. To this end, 
the counting task was also given after some different vignette-based tasks (traditional 
ToM tests - see above) to prevent participants realising that it related solely to the 
diary extracts. In order to obtain baseline counting rates, the counting task was also 
given once before all the vignettes and again after the diary extract without emotional 
content. 
Piloting 
See above for demographic details. The main effect was that people count more 
quickly as they move though the task. As the vignettes were counterbalanced, fatigue 




2.3 Trait task 
The paradigm used by Davis et a/., (1996) was adapted for use in the current study. 
Rather than relying on freely generated trait lists, the Trait Adjective Checklist' 
(Loehlin and Nichols, 1976) as used by Davis et aL, (1996), consisting of 159 traits 
presented in alphabetical order, was used in the pilot study. 
Piloting 
Participants were sent the list prior to the experimental session and were given it again 
after each vignette. The instructions were: 
Self 
Which of the following adjectives do you consider to be descriptive of yourself? Place a tick 
beside any adjective that you might use in describing yourself to someone else. Your 
behaviour will vary with the situation, of course, so place a tick beside the adjectives which 
might apply to you frequently, even though they are not appropriate all the time. Work rapidly 
putting down all your first thoughts. 
Tart 
Please place a tick next to the following adjectives that best describe James. We appreciate 
that you only have limited information but we are interested in your initial thoughts and there 
are no wrong or right answers. So please work rapidly putting down what first comes to mind. 
The main change made from the pilot study was a reduction in the number of traits 
used. The list was pared down to 75 adjectives by using the traits that were endorsed 
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most frequently whilst ensuring an even balance of positively and negatively-valenced 
traits (see appendix 4). 
3. Method 
The final version of the full task was validated on a group of psychologically healthy 
volunteers. 
3.1 Participants 
Volunteers were recruited via a circular email at the Institute of Psychiatry (IOP), a 
database of volunteers maintained by staff at the Institute and postcards in local 
newsagents, local library and job centre. There were 48 participants who were a 
subset of the 53 reported in chapter 3 (the data from the first 5 of the original sample 
were included in a pilot run - see above). Of the 48 participants, 26 (54%) were 
recruited from academic or clinical staff at the IOP and the remaining 22 (46%) people 
were recruited from the local area and non mental health workers at the IOP. The 
occupation status of the sample was therefore varied. 
The sample consisted of 23 (48%) men and 25 (52%) women. The mean age was 
34.38 years (± 11.23). Forty-two (88%) reported their nationality as British and 1 (2%) 
Sri Lankan, 2 (4%) American, 1 (2%) Irish, 1 (2%) German and 1 (2%) Indian. Thirty- 
six (75%) reported their ethnicity as white European, with 12% indicating that their 
ethnicity differed from their nationality being 2 (4%) afro-carribean, 1 (2%) black, and 2 
(4%) mixed race. 
Six (13%) of the group were educated to secondary school standard, 4 (8%) to further 
education, 13 (28%) to higher and 24 (50%) to postgraduate level. 21 (44%) people 
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were single, 10 or 21% co-habiting and 10 (21%) married and 3 (6%) people divorced 
with the remaining people either separated, widowed or with a non-cohabiting partner. 
3.2 Design 
This study is quasi-experimental as EQ score, which is based on a naturally occurring 
trait, is the independent variable. A repeated measures approach was used for all the 
variables. 
3.3 Procedure 
Volunteers had the details of the study explained to them before deciding whether or 
not to participate. Before the main testing session, the EQ, a social desirability scale 
(Crowne and Marlowe, 1960) and stage 1 of the trait task were sent to participants 
along with some additional measures not reported here. 
The volunteers attended in person for between 35 minutes and an 1 hr for which they 
were paid £5.00. They were given details of the study and a chance to ask questions 
before signing the consent form. The tasks were administered in a standardised way 
and the whole session was tape recorded, ostensibly for accuracy, but also as a 
means of testing one of the dependant variables: speech rate. 
3.4 Measures 
3.4.1 Diary extracts 
In the absence of confirmation from the protagonist, mental state attribution is to some 
extent arbitrary. The diary extracts (see above and appendix 3) were therefore scored 
as 1 for the 'preferred' answer and 0 for 'other answers, based on the pilot data 
responses. However, one of the questions consistently evoked a different answer 
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from 'high empathisers' (ascertained from a median split on the EQ) than that given in 
the pilot data. This answer was therefore coded as the 'preferred' answer, contrary to 
the pilot data. As there were 3 diary extracts depicting affective states each with 3 
multiple choice questions - the total score was out of 9. The questions on the extract 
portraying beliefs were coded as '1' for a correct answer and '0' for an incorrect 
answer, and so the total score was out of 3. 
3.4.2 Speech rate 
Speech rate was measured using a desk-mounted microphone and a portable tape- 
recorder. Participants were asked to count from 1 to 10, without an explanation as to 
why and post-experimental questioning revealed that many of them thought it was a 
distracter task and no-one guessed its real purpose. This therefore overcomes 
previous criticism of demand characteristics. The speech rate was then measured 
directly from the tape using a stopwatch which timed to 100th second. 
Coding - as speech rate is known to vary between individuals this variable was 
calculated within-participants. The time taken to count from 1-10 was converted to a 
percentage of the baseline speech rate for each participant. The decision was made 
to use the control vignette speech rate as a baseline, as this was considered a more 
natural index of speech rate than the first instance when people were asked to count. 
3.4.3 Trait task 
Participants were presented with a list of traits and asked to tick those that best 
described themselves. The list was given at least 24 hours before the experimental 
session although in most cases the interval was much longer. During the experimental 
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session, participants were then asked to tick from the trait list, the traits that best 
describe the character in the extract. 
Coding - the number of traits that the participant had previously endorsed for 
themselves and later attributed to the target was calculated and a mean was then 
calculated for all 3 affective state vignettes. According to Davis et al (1996), there are 
two ways of calculating the proportion of overlap: i) percentage of the 'self traits that 
were later endorsed for the target (self-overlap) and ii) percentage of a 'target' traits 
that were earlier endorsed for the self (target-overlap). 
4. Results 
All datasets were first examined for normality and where deviations were found the 
datasets were transformed using the appropriate method. Simple analyses were then 
performed for on the data gathered from each task, to explore the association 
between the outcome variables (accuracy rate on extracts, percentage trait overlap, 
speech rates) and demographic factors (see section 3.1): age, sex, verbal lQ as 
measured by the National Adult Reading Test (NART), occupation - mental health 
worker or not, education which was dummy coded, and self-report measures; total 
score on IRI personal distress items, and EQ factor scores (see chapter 2). 
Variables that had a significant linear relationship with the outcome variables were 
entered into a multiple regression analysis to control for potential confounds that may 
be problematic in a quasi-experimental design. So for each dataset the following 
analyses were conducted where appropriate: 
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" Simple analyses examining the association between the outcome variable, 
demographic factors and self-report measures. 
" Where significant associations were found, multiple regression analyses 
were conducted with the variables of interest. 
4.1 Affective state labelling 
Descriptive analysis 
The mean number of correct responses out of 3 for the control vignette was 2.23 (t 
. 
69), the 'sad' vignette was 2.19 (± . 
79), the 'happy' was 1.94 (± . 
86) and for the 
'fear' vignette was 1.85 (± 8.5) - see figure 4.3. 



















belief sad happy fear 
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Demographic factors and self-report measures 
A Pearsons Product Moment Correlation showed positive relationships between 
accuracy rates on the diary extracts, factor 1 'cognitive empathy' (n = 48, r= . 313, p= 
. 030) (see figure 1) and total score on IRI items (n = 47, r= . 288, p= . 047). - tests 
also revealed differences between those who had been educated to postgraduate 
level and those who had not (t = 1.194, df 46, p =. 058). 
People high on 'cognitive empathy' also performed more accurately on the control 
vignette (see figure 4.4), although this relationship was not significant. It is 
unsurprising that 'cognitive empathy' which includes items relating to all classes of 
mental state would also be associated with epistemic mental state attribution. 
However, the pattern observed is also consistent with the fact that more 'affective 
state' than 'epistemic state' items loaded onto 'cognitive empathy' (see chapter 2). No 
significant associations were found between any other demographic variables or EQ 
factors and the control vignette with non-affective content. 
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Multiple regression analyses 
I 
" Emotion Extract 
Control Extract 
Cognitive empathy' and 'personal distress' were both significant predictors of 
accuracy on the diary extracts containing affective states (see Table 4.1). There 
was a moderate and positive correlation between both these variables and the 
outcome variable (Multiple R= . 
479) which accounted for 22.9 % of the variance in 
accuracy rate in this sample (adjusted R2 = 19.4%). This suggests that these two 
variables explain approximately 1/5th of the variation on this task and that other 
factors must also play a substantial role. 
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Table 4.1: Summary of predictors of accuracy on affective state labelling task 
Model RR Square Adjusted R Std. Error Square 
1 . 318(a) . 101 . 
081 1.551 
2 1.479(b) . 229! . 194 
1.45 
a Predictors: 'Cognitive empathy' 
b Predictors: 'Cognitive empathy' and 'personal 
distress' 
The regression line was significantly different from 0 (F = 6.543 p= . 003) suggesting 
the model improved the ability to predict the outcome variable as opposed to a model 
simply based on the mean. The regression coefficients were . 749 for "cognitive 
empathy' (thus as 'cognitive empathy increases by 1 unit, target-overlap increases by 
7.49) and . 471 for personal distress ('cognitive empathy', t=2.893 p=0.006/ personal 
distress t=2.702, p= . 010) showing that although each predictor 
is making a 
significant addition to the model, cognitive empathy plays the larger role (see table 
4.2). This is confirmed by the standardised coefficients which indicate "cognitive 
empathy" to be the best predictor followed closely by 'personal distress'. 
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Table 4.2 Coefficients for predictors of accuracy on affective state labelling task 
Unstandardized Standardized 
Coefficients Coefficients 
Beta t Sig., 
Model B Std. Error I 
Cognitive empathy 1 . 6111 . 271 . 3181 2.252 . 029' 
2 Cognitive empathy! . 749! . 259! . 391 2.8931.006 
Personal distress . 4711 . 174: . 365! 2.702 . 010 
Both predictors had a positive association with the outcome variable. There were no 
significant inter-correlations between the predictor variables satisfying the 
multicollinearity assumption. These data suggest that both 'cognitive empathy' and 
'personal distress' play an important role in labelling affective states. 
In a separate analysis, none of these variables were significant predictors of 
performance on the control extract which may suggest different processes underlie the 
attribution of non-affective states. However, as the control task had a smaller range it 
is not possible to assert this conclusively. 
4.2 Speech rate 
The correlation matrix for speech rate and EQ factors showed no strong associations 
between empathy and speech rate. On the basis of these data, the decision was 
made to systematically examine the mean speech rates for each vignette, as a 
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percentage of the baseline (see Figure 4.5). The data were first examined for outliers 
and 2 cases were dropped and the data log transformed. 
Paired t-tests revealed a significant difference between the speech rate following the 
'sad' and 'happy vignettes (t = 2.325, df 44, p =. 025), with the difference between the 
'sad' and 'fear' vignette approaching significance (t =-1.942, df 44, p =. 059) but no 
difference between the 'happy' and 'fear' vignettes (t = . 370, df 44, p> . 05) (see Figure 
2 which is based on original scale for ease of reference). Hence, as predicted, speech 
rate decelerated with the mood-congruent vignettes and accelerated with the fearful 
and happy congruent vignettes, as predicted. 















N" 45 45 45 
sad vignette happy vignette fear vignette 
a. Over 100% Represents Slower than Baseline 
b. Under 100% Represents Faster than Baseline 
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Pre- and post-test anxiety levels did not correlate significantly with any of the speech 
rate variables and neither did scores on the personal distress items of the IRI. 
4.3 Traits 
Demographic factors and self-report measures 
The 'self-overlap' variable was transformed using square root. The relationship 
between both trait overlap variables: i) 'self-overlap' ii) 'target-overlap' (see above for 
details of calculations), demographic details and self-report measures, was then 
explored. There were also 2 additional variables of interest: i) 'mean number of traits 
attributed to the target' and, ii) 'total number of traits attributed to the self (see Davis 
et al., 1996). 
Both 'self-overlap' and 'target-overlap' showed a significant association with 'emotional 
reactivity' (tendency to respond emotionally to others' affective states - see chapter 2) 
suggesting increased use of the self-concept is related to the ability to respond 
affectively to others' emotional states ('target-overlap' n= 47, r =. 446, p =. 002/'self- 
overlap' r= . 342, p =. 019). The 'number of traits attributed to the self was also related 
('target-overlap' r =. 865, p <. 001/'self-overlap' r= . 540, p< . 01) as was the 'mean 
number of traits attributed to the target' ('target-overlap' r =. 536, p <. 001/'self-overlap' r 
= . 881, p< . 001) which is expected seeing as the 'overlap' variables are calculated on 
the basis of these figures. 
Multiple regression analyses 
A multiple regression analysis was performed to examine the contribution of the 
different variables in predicting the variation in the outcome variable. The number of 
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self traits attributed in the diary extract depicting beliefs did not have any significant 
associations with any of these variables and so was not analysed further. 
With 'target-overlap' (percentage of traits attributed to the target that were earlier 
endorsed for the self) as the outcome variable in the regression analysis, 'no of traits 
attributed to self and 'emotional reactivity' were significant predictors (see table 4.3). 
The variables were strongly correlated with the dependent variable (Multiple R= . 892) 
and together 'emotional reactivity' and 'no. of traits attributed to self accounted for 
79.5% of the variance (adjusted R2 . 786). The additional variance accounted for by 
adding 'emotional reactivity' to the model was approximately 5% as the 'no of traits 
attributed to self alone accounted for 74.8%. 
Table 4.3: Summary of predictors of 'target-overlap' 
Modell R R Square Adjusted R Std. Error Square 
I . 865(a) . 748 . 
743 13.5567 
,2 . 892(b) . 795 . 786 12.3691 
a Predictors: 'no of traits attributed to self 
b Predictors: 'no of traits attributed to self and 'emotional 
reactivity' 
As a whole the model had predictive value over and above that derived simply from 
the mean (F(2,45) = 86.35, p< . 001). The regression coefficient for 'emotional 
reactivity' was 6.37 (thus as 'emotional reactivity' increases by I unit, target-overlap 
increases by 6.37) and for 'number of traits attributed to self it was 1.47 and the 
standardised coefficients revealed that the latter was the best predictor at . 783 
(indicating that an increase of I SD in no of traits attributed to the self results in an 
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increase of . 783 of a SD in 'target-overlap). 'Emotional reactivity' was the secondary 
predictor (. 252) - see table 4.4. 





Model B Std. Error 
Beta t Sig. 
no of traits attributed to 
self 1.6281 . 141 . 865 11.569 . 001 
2 no of traits attributed to 
self 1.512 134 . 803 11.322 . 001 
'emotional reactivity' 5.648 1.781 . 225 3.171 . 0031 
This is consistent with the fact that the 'no traits attributed to the self overlaps with the 
outcome variable. There was a positive relationship between 'target-overlap' and both 
'emotional reactivity' (t = 3.51 p=0.004) and 'number of traits attributed to the self (t = 
10.93, p<0.001) suggesting that an increase in both 'emotional reactivity' and 'no of 
trait attributed to self is accompanied by an increase in trait overlap. 
A median split was also calculated on emotional reactivity scores in order to further 
represent the effect of this variable on trait overlap (see Figure 4.6). 
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Figure 4.6 Mean percentage target-overlap for low and high empathy groups with 95% 









With 'self-overlap' (percentage of the 'self traits that were later endorsed for the target) 
entered as the outcome variable, 'mean no of traits attributed to target' and 'emotional 
reactivity' were the only significant predictors. Again, these were strongly correlated 
with the outcome variable (Multiple R= . 904) accounting for 81.8 % of the variance 
(adjusted R 
. 
809). 'Mean no of traits attributed to the target' alone accounted for 77.4 
% of the variance again indicating that 'emotional reactivity' explained an additional 





Table 4.5: Summary of predictors of 'self-overlap' 
Model RR Square R 
Adjusted 
Square Std. Error 
1 . 880(a) 
j 
. 774 . 768; . 7544' 
.2 . 
904(b) I . 818 . 809 . 6843 
a Predictors: 'mean no. of traits attributed to targets' 
b Predictors: 'mean no. of traits attributed to targets', 'emotional 
reactivity 
The model again had significantly predictive value than is based on the mean alone 
(F(2,45) = 96.59, p< . 001). The standardised regression coefficients were . 219 for 
'emotional reactivity' and . 819 for 'mean no of traits attributed to the target' and there 
was a positive relationship for both variables (mean no of traits: t= 12.10, p< 
. 001/emotional reactivity: t=3.24, p= . 002). Again, this suggests that the 'mean 
number traits attributed to the target' is the best predictor of the 'self-overlap' variable 
followed by 'emotional reactivity' - see table 4.6. 









'mean no. of traits attributed II 
ý- y 
to target' 7.543E-02 . 0061 . 880 12.262 . 0011 
2 I'mean 
to tart 
no. of traits attributed i 7.026E-02 . 006 I . 819 
I 12.104 001 
9 i 
'emotional reactivity' . 326 . 101 . 219 3.2361 . 002 
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A correlation matrix indicated no significant relationships between 'self-overlap' or 
'target-overlap', calculated on the basis of traits attributed in the 'belief vignette, and 
EQ or'personal distress' measures. 
5. Discussion 
As predicted, the attribution of affective states, as measured by performance on the 
diary extracts, was related to 'cognitive empathy' according to scores on the EQ. 
'Personal distress' as measured by the IRI was also significantly associated with 
successful affective state attribution. In addition, each extract elicited a speech rate 
suggestive of physiological arousal congruent to the affective state expressed in the 
vignette. The extracts with affective content were also accompanied by a degree of 
trait overlap which was partially related to 'emotional reactivity'. 
More specifically, 'cognitive empathy' and 'personal distress' combined explained 
approximately 1/5`h of the variance in performance on the affective state labelling 
aspect of the task. For both measures there was a positive relationship with correct 
labelling of emotional states, suggesting an increase on either was accompanied by a 
higher accuracy rate. As expected, the most significant predictor was "cognitive 
empathy" followed by 'personal distress' and these two items were independent. 
Interestingly, the control task which tested the understanding of epistemic states was 
not predicted by either of these variable; it is possible that this is due to the smaller 
range of scores on the control vignette. Alternatively, it may be because 'cognitive 
empathy' had many high loadings for items that tap the appreciation of affective states 
as opposed to epistemic states. This would be consistent with a dissociation between 
the cognitive mechanisms for processing of epistemic as opposed to affective states. 
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These results also suggest that those who had a tendency to feel 'personal distress' in 
response to other's affective states were able to attribute emotions more accurately. 
This indicates that although their understanding was self-orientated, they were still 'in 
tune' with the protagonist. Taken together, these two variables provide a sensitive 
profile of one aspect of an 'empathic person' i. e. someone who scores highly on 
'cognitive empathy' but endorses few'personal distress' items on the IRI scale, hence, 
distinguishing between those who react in a self- rather than and other-orientated way. 
The main limitation of this task is that it is not possible to conclude definitively, from 
these data alone, that it taps 'empathy' as opposed to cognitively effortful rule-based 
reasoning, from these data alone. However, the fact that an empathy measure (the 
EQ) predicts performance on this task goes some way to support its construct validity 
and suggests it, at least in part, taps empathic processes. Although we cannot be 
sure that the cognitive empathy EQ items themselves, do not partially tap rule-based 
type reasoning too. In addition, 80 % of the variance remains unaccounted for by the 
model suggesting there are other processes at work. A further limitation is that the 
labelling of the affective states of our vignettes was to some extent arbitrary. It is 
difficult to overcome this in empirical research without, for example, obtaining self- 
reports from the target immediately after a mental state is displayed (Ickes, 1997). 
Lastly, it may be useful in replication to design more vignettes to provide a wider range 
of scores (especially with the control vignette) and a more sensitive measure of 
affective state labelling. 
Although there were no associations between EQ or 'personal distress' scores and 
speech rate, the data suggested that the task was successful in tapping physiological 
arousal and distinguishing valence. The group as a whole decelerated after the 'sad' 
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vignette, despite the fact that there was a general tendency to accelerate as people 
moved through the vignettes (controlled for by counterbalancing). Furthermore, 
participants accelerated after the 'happy' and 'fear' vignettes, again in line with the 
predictions. This variation between stimuli of differing valence was confirmed by 
paired Wests which showed significant differences between the 'sad' vignette 
compared to the 'happy' and 'fearful' vignette but not between the latter two. The fact 
that anxiety measures were not significantly related to speech rate further suggests 
that the changes observed resulted from the experimental manipulation. This is the 
first known study to find that people react 'physiologically' when reading about other 
people's affective experiences. Furthermore, this study confirms the utility of the 
speech rate as an indirect and implicit measure of such arousal. 
In criticism, however, this measure of physiological arousal only captures the response 
associated with 'parallel' empathy and does not allow for the distinction between 
different types of empathy, for example, 'reactive' responses such as sympathy or 
compassion. In addition, the lack of association observed between EQ scores and 
speech rate may cast doubt on the ability of speech rate measures to be sensitive 
enough to detect individual variation in physiological responses. However, it is also 
possible that this variation is not as pronounced in the normal population as it may be 
in clinical groups. In replication, it may be worthwhile using more sensitive 'speech 
print' measures, as have been employed in other studies In an attempt to detect any 
individual differences related to personality traits such as empathy. It would also be 
worthwhile controlling for diurnal variation of mood by testing people at the same time 
of day, especially as empathy may have temporal variation as a function of mood 
(NezIek et aL, 2001). 
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The results of the trait task suggest that the self-concept is indeed recruited during 
empathy. Both types of trait overlap index were significantly predicted by 'emotional 
reactivity', and 'mean no of traits attributed to targets' and/or 'no of self traits' - 
depending on the method used to calculate the overlap. In both instances, this 
combination of variables accounted for much of the variance. However, this is 
probably due to the fact that both 'number of traits attributed to self and 'mean number 
of traits attributed to the target' were not independent from the outcome variable. This 
association is expected therefore simply because the more self traits endorsed, or 
more traits attributed to targets, the greater the probability of some of the self-like traits 
being attributed to target. However, what is of importance is that 'emotional reactivity' 
was also a significant predictor of both trait overlap variables, above and beyond the 
sheer number of either set of traits. This therefore suggests that the extent to which 
the cognitive representation of the self is available after the attribution of affective 
states is related to the degree of 'emotional reactivity' (the tendency to react 
emotionally to others' affective states) experienced. This association supports the 
concurrent validity for the trait task. 
Interestingly, scores on 'personal distress' items did not correlate with either outcome 
variable, which may indirectly suggest that for this group, the degree of trait overlap is 
related to allocentric rather than egocentric processes. In further work it will be 
worthwhile ascertaining the degree of trait overlap that is indicative of egocentric vs. 
allocentric and where (and if) the use of the self-concept becomes non-optimal. The 
lack of association between empathy, 'personal distress' and trait overlap generated 
from the belief extract indicates that the use of the self-concept (and so possibly 
simulation) may be specific to affective rather than epistemic states. 
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The main limitation of this task is the use of freely generated traits as opposed to a 
fixed choice protocol. The latter would eliminate a possible source of response bias in 
those participants inclined to endorse lots of traits regardless of the task demands. 
Further measures to differentiate 'egocentric' and 'allocentric' processes, such as 
manipulating the degree of self-focus prior to an emotion attribution paradigm, would 
also be useful. Despite these limitations, however, the task appears to provide reliable 
incidental measures of the cognitive processes underlying the attribution of affective 
states; and to our knowledge this is the first time this has been attempted. 
The suggestion that participants used their self-concept and displayed behaviour 
consistent with physiological arousal provides further evidence that participants 
employed empathic processes rather than effortful reasoning strategies to label the 
affective states of the protagonist. This adds further weight to the task's construct 
validity. However, although it appears rule-based reasoning was not relied upon in 
healthy volunteers, it may be possible to perform well on this task using effortful 
strategies. Care therefore needs to be taken to use more sensitive indices of 
underlying processes i. e. reaction times, when testing clinical groups. The assumption 
would be that empathic responses should be quicker that those based on effortful 'cold 
cognition'. 
6. Conclusions 
The data reported here from healthy volunteers suggests that the 3 novel and 
objective tasks described here, validly and reliably tap the various components of 
empathy, namely: i) mental state attribution, ii) a simulation process and iii) 
physiological arousal. These tasks should be useful in exploring the subjective and 
anecdotal reports of a lack of empathy in AS and DPD (see chapter 3 for details of 
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groups). However, as our sample was not randomly drawn from the normal population 
regarding education, care needs to be taken to control for this when comparison 
between groups is contemplated. 
142 
Chapter 5 
There is also the suggestion that people with ASDs may process faces (Teunisse 
and de Gelder, 2003) and facial affect in a different way to control groups (Hobson 
et al., 1988). However, the findings are mixed (see chapter 6 for full discussion) 
and it is even less clear how people with AS fit in here. 
Several tasks have measured affective state labelling in ASDs using non-facial 
stimuli. Most of which also require meta-representation (see chapter I for 
explanation). Castelli et aL, (2002) used the Heider & Simmel paradigm (Heider 
and Simmel, 1944), in which participants view geometric shapes moving on a 
screen and are asked to infer their intentions. The AS/HFA group gave 
significantly fewer mentalising answers and showed differential neural activation to 
controls, but it is difficult to draw conclusions about the group's proficiency with 
affective states from these tasks alone, as a whole range of mental states were 
applicable i. e. coaxing, chasing, fighting. People with AS/HFA were also found to 
perform less well than controls on a task requiring the appreciation of a faux pas 
from a written narrative (Baron-Cohen et aL, 1999a) but again it is difficult to tease 
out their performance on emotional states alone, as a faux pas requires a joint 
appreciation of both the belief and emotional states of others. 
Royeurs (2001) found that a group of high-functioning people with autism 
performed the same as controls on static tests of mental state inference but were 
impaired on a dynamic naturalistic empathy task. This task required participants to 
watch a video of 2 actors interacting and every time the tape was stopped (72 
times), participants were required to write down their inference as to the mental 
state of the protagonist. Inferences were coded as correct if they matched or were 
similar to the actual state reported by the protagonist, making this one of the few 
studies to use real rather than inferred mental states as a benchmark. However, in 
another paper on the perception of affect in music, a group of children with ASDs 
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were found to perform at the same level as controls (Heaton et at, 1999). 
Furthermore, in an article reporting the psychological language employed by 
children with autism, they were found to be comparable-to clinical controls in their 
talk about affective states (Tager-Flusberg, 1992) but were impaired in social 
emotions. 
One of the first papers to test emotion attribution from narratives, both with and 
without the ability to appreciate representational states, used a test of the cause of 
an emotion (Baron-Cohen, 1991). Seventeen autistic, 16 clinical controls and 19 
clinically normal children were tested on this task that tapped emotion stemming 
from situations, desires and beliefs. In the 'situation' condition, the children were 
shown a doll called Jane and told that Jane is going to a birthday party - and 
asked how does she feel? In the 'belief condition the child had to predict the 
emotion that followed a mistaken belief, i. e. Jane was expecting a particular kind of 
breakfast cereal, that she liked but was given a different which she didn't like. 
There were significant group differences on the belief task, as predicted by a deficit 
in meta-representation, but the autistic children were spared in their knowledge of 
emotions from situations. 
It is unclear whether such data provides real evidence that the children appreciated 
the protagonist's affective states or whether their successful performance relied on 
the application of a rigid rule-based strategy Le. 'children like birthday parties'. For 
instance, it is possible for a child to simply learn that 'happy' applies to children 
going to parties with little understanding of the concept of happiness, including 
aspects such as the subjective dimensions (Hobson, 1991). The authors of 
another study which attempted to teach children with autism about mental states, 
concluded that it was likely that the group with ASIDs used rules to pass tests 
rather than a genuine understanding (Hadwin, 1996). 
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Serra et aL, (2002) also attempted to separate out awareness of the cause of an 
emotional state in a study with a group of children with lesser variants of autism. 
Storybooks were used to assess various aspects of the children's ToM: emotion 
recognition, the distinction between physical and mental entities, prediction of 
behaviour and emotions on the basis of desires and beliefs. They found the 
children to be impaired on the prediction of emotion from different cues and 
interpreted this as in keeping with an emotion processing deficit. Controls for 
meta-representational ability were not reported: a potentially important factori 
especially as two of the emotions, on which the children scored particularly badly, 
were curiosity and surprise; both of which are likely to be based on 
representational states (Baron-Cohen, 1991). The children performed at much the 
same level as the control group on the 'happy' vignette but not on the 'sad' 
vignette. Therefore, it is not clear whether these findings represent a real emotion 
processing deficit and, as with the previous study, whether or not the test can be 
solved using rule-based strategies. 
In a study utilising both verbal and non verbal cues, Loveland et al., (1997) found 
that people with autism and pervasive developmental disorder who were not high- 
functioning, had trouble inferring how a person felt based on what they had said, if 
the emotion was not explicitly stated. However, this was not the case for the high- 
functioning groups who tended to base their replies more on non-verbal 
information. Alternatively, a study looking at emotional memory in a group of 
people with high-functioning autism (HFA) showed them not to display the same 
enhancement in the recall of affective material as a control group, perhaps 
indicating a lack of the expected differential processing (Beversdorf et al., 1998). 
Overall, there is some debate as to whether observed emotion processing deficits 
can in fact be reduced to domain general skills such as verbal memory and IQ. 
Buitelaar (1997) found these two skills to be the best predictors of both emotion 
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recognition (based on faces and narratives) and traditional ToM tasks. It Is not 
clear whether such findings are indicative of the role of IQ ordinarily in such tasks 
or whether people with both autism and high IQs manage to use their intelligence 
to 'hack out' alternative routes to solve such problems (Happe, 1994a and see 
chapter 6 for overview). 
Lastly, Dennis et al., (2000) found that a group of high-functioning children with 
autism could label simple emotions but again had specific and significant problems 
with social emotions such as those based on deception. The emerging picture 
seems to be that people with ASDs may be able to understand basic emotions, if 
the need for meta-representation is minimal (which is not the case for social 
emotions) although it is not clear whether they use the same processes as 
controls. It is therefore reasonable to predict that people with Asperger's 
Syndrome may be able to infer the emotional state of the protagonist from a 
narrative (when not explicitly stated), but it is also entirely possible that they will 
use different processes to healthy volunteers I. e. the use of rule-base 
compensatory strategies. A narrative task such as that described in chapter 4, that 
excludes meta-representational ability as much as is possible, but is difficult 
enough to prevent ceiling effects and sensitive enough to pick up on the underlying 
strategies employed, would appear to be useful in exploring this issue further. 
1.1.2 Phvsioloqical arou -1 
Uta Frith points out that, anecdotally, there is reason to believe that people with 
ASDs have problems regarding only the meta-representational aspect of empathy 
(Frith, 2003). To use her terminology, she argues that there is no reason to believe 
that people with ASDs do not experience instinctive sympathy Le. an emotional 
reaction to other's emotional states. She further explains that any apparent 
empathy problems may be due to an inability to appreciate the mental state of the 
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other in the first place i. e. when requiring meta-representation, and secondly, in 
knowing how to react to another's emotional state. She gives several anecdotes of 
people with ASDs who were moved enough to act as a response to other people's 
distress. Despite such accounts, there is only a small amount of empirical data to 
back up these claims, although the studies are fairly consistent. 
Blair (1999) in one of the first studies to examine this issue directly, measured the 
galvanic skin response of a group of autistic children, to both non-person based 
and person-based emotional stimuli, taken from the International Affective Picture 
System (IAPS). He found that the ASID group had the same responses as the 
control group, to both sets of stimuli, suggesting that they could respond 
emotionally to other people's affective states. However, he also points out that 
from these data alone, it is not possible to conclude that their emotional response 
was qualitatively the same as in the control group. Galvanic skin response is a 
crude measure of arousal and valence, since emotional states also include a 
cognitive component, so it is not possible to say from these data alone whether the 
people with ASDs had an emotional state that was the same or similar to the 
control group. For instance, considering the evidence of high personal distress in 
this group (see chapter 3), further probing would be necessary to ascertain 
whether this response is likely to be self- rather than other- orientated. 
A further series of studies have shown intact emotional responses to non-facial 
stimuli in ASDs. Shalom, et aL, (2003) found similar galvanic skin responses in a 
group of high-functioning children with autism, to that of controls, as a result of 
viewing 24 non-facial pictures from the IAPS. These lack of group differences 
suggest both groups showed similar physiological arousal to the stimuli. There 
were, however, some differences on the behavioural aspect of the task with the 
autism group rating the unpleasant pictures as less interesting and the neutral 
148 
Chapter 5 
pictures as more interesting, than the control group ratings. The authors interpret 
the results in terms of an impairment in the system that mediates emotions 
(amygdala) and feelings (medial prefrontal areas). However, they point out that 
future replications need to control more adequately for response perseveration and 
verbal IQ. A further study found no differences in emotional modulation of the 
startle reflex in response to non-facial emotional pictures, in a group of children 
with ASI)s as compared to controls (Salmond et aL, 2003). 
In addition, Yirmiya, et aL, (1992) tested autistic children on a task purporting to 
measure 'affective empathy'. In this study the children were asked to identify a 
character's affective state from a video and then self-report their own emotional 
state. Autistic children performed significantly worse than the control group but they 
still did 'surprisingly well' scoring 6.94/10 as opposed to 8.21/10 in the control 
group. This suggests that the autistic children were able to respond with parallel 
saffective empathy' although not as well as the control groups. Unfortunately, the 
reliance on self-report alone of one's current emotional state makes this paradigm 
less suitable for use with adults. 
Another set of studies examined the response of children with ASDs to the 
affective states of the experimenter. Sigman (1992) found a group of autistic 
children to be less attentive to an adult showing distress, discomfort and fear, than 
control groups. Furthermore, Kasari (1993) in a study looking at the response of 
children with ASDs to someone displaying pride towards them, found they showed 
more avoidance responses, which the authors interpret as indicative of the children 
finding emotional displays aversive. However, In a study designed to further probe 
this hypothesis, physiological measures (heart rate) suggested the autistic children 
did not dislike affective displays (Corona et aL, 1998). Instead it seems they paid 
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less attention to the experimenter feigning distress than the control group, despite 
appearing concerned and interested. 
Bacon et aL, (1998) examined this issue from a slightly different angle exploring 
the different responses of those With high and low functioning autism, to an adult 
simulating distress. He found those with HFA to respond in the same way as the 
control groups i. e. they tended to look at the distressed adult, but they differed from 
the control groups in their ability to act in a pro-social way i. e. comforting the adult. 
Those who were low functioning, however, significantly differed on all indices of 
responding, in line with previous studies. So it seems that at the very least, people 
with less severe forms of autism may be able to comprehend the distress of other 
people, although they may not pay as much attention or offer comfort or display 
other forms of pro-social behaviour, in the same way as controls. Furthermore, it is 
not clear whether they find displays of affect in others' aversive, as the results are 
mixed. The'personal distress'scores from chapter 3 suggest they might. 
Regarding self-report measures of empathic emotional responding, it can be 
recalled that in chapter 3 the 'emotional reactivity' EQ scores of this group were 
only 1 SD below the control group, much less than the difference on 'cognitive 
empathy' and 'social skills'. Furthermore, although this difference was statistically 
significant, an item-by-item analysis revealed this may have been due to items that 
tap meta-representation rather than empathic emotional reactions. It would be 
helpful to know, therefore, whether group differences exist on other measures of 
emotional empathy, with less of a meta-representational load, such as the 
empathic concern items on the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1980). The 
fact that this group also scored significantly higher on the 'personal distress' Items 
(see chapter 3) further suggests their emotional responses may be self-orientated 
(see above and Figure 5.1). 
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Figure 5.1: Empathy and Related Processes 





-> Theory of 
-º AFFECTIVE Mind 
EMPATHY 
-º Emotion 
Attribution REACTIVE ' PERSONAL 
.................... > DISTRESS 
Bold italics denote the possible route(s) for people with AS. -it is not clear whether 
parallel affective empathy can be a prelude to personal distress. 
In this instance, theory of mind is used in the restricted sense to refer to meta- 
representational ability. 
It seems therefore, that people with AS are likely to experience affective 
responses, both to others' emotional states and emotional stimuli in general. 
However, tests showing this needs to be replicated and further effort needs to be 
made to establish the nature of the affective response i. e. egocentric vs. empathic. 
The speech rate task (see chapter 4) provides an implicit and objective means of 
assessing people's emotional responses. There is evidence to suggest that people 
with AS find emotion perception from prosody difficult (Rutherford et aL, 2002), 
however, there is no reason to believe this affects their own speech rate. In fact a 
study of speech and prosody in adults with HFAIAS, found no differences between 
this group and a comparison group on speech rate (Shriberg et al., 2001). One 
way of controlling for this and allowing for individual differences would be to 
151 
Chapter 5 
calculate speech-rate within-participants and analysis data based on speech rate 
change. 
1.1.3 The use of the self-concei) 
When shown a picture of a smilipq 
PCe, Christopher Boone said, "I knew that it 
meant 'sad', which is what I felt when I found the dead dog" (Haddon, 2003). 
Christopher Boone is a fictional character with Asperger's Syndrome, however, the 
author's astute characterisation highlights a real possibility that a basic 'online' 
strategy is open to those with AS. If emotion attribution is in part based on 
simulation-like processes then this raises the question of whether people with AS 
could potentially utilise this skill. Whether simulation is a key process in the 
appreciation of affective states is open to debate, but several recent theories 
suggest this may be possible (see chapter 1). Furthermore, the control data in 
chapter 4 suggest that participants used the self-concept in appreciating others' 
affective states and this is indicative of a simulation-type approach. 
As yet, there is no direct evidence as to whether people with AS can simulate 
mental states. However, there is a body of work on imitation in ASDs and imitation 
is 'overt action simulation' (Blakemore and Decety, 2001b). Imitation also involves 
an element of perspective-ta king, and may be a precursor to both empathy and 
TOM (Meltzoff and Decety, 2003). The findings regarding Imitation in autism are 
mixed. Charman and Baron-Cohen (1994) tested a group of 20 people with autism 
on standardised procedural and gestural imitation tasks and found no differences 
when compared to a clinical control group. Furthermore, Gepner et al., (2001) 
observed that some autistic children spontaneously mimicked the emotional 
expression of an actor in a dynamic emotion perception task. However, several 
studies have found imitation impairments and the general consensus Is that some 
kind of deficit exists. For instance, Stone et aL, (1997) found a group of autistic 
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children to display weaker imitation skills and although they showed a similar 
pattern of performance across tasks, the imitation of body movements was more 
difficult than imitation with objects. This independence between different types of 
imitation is further supported by the results of Hobson and Lee (1999) who 
observed that people with autiýrn reported imitating the actions of others more 
easier than imitating the person i. e. their style of action. Recent studies also 
seem to suggest that people with autism may have 'lower level' problems 
perceiving biological motion, which may have a bearing on their ability to imitate a 
person's body movements (Toichi et aL, 2002, Blake et aL, 2003). 
Other findings also suggest an imitation deficit in ASDs (Meltzoff and Gopnik, 
1993a, Rogers et aL, 2003) including a study with a group of young children (i. e. 20 
months) who displayed less imitation then comparison groups (Charman et aL, 
e4al- 
1997). A recent paper by Williams (2001) has gone so far to suggest that there 
may be a neurological deficit in the mirror neurone system (see chapter 1) and cite 
the well-documented symptom of echolalia in autism as evidence. Furthermore, 
Charman (2002) suggests that an imitation deficit may be the basis of autism as an 
empathy disorder. 
I 
To our knowledge there are no studies specifically examining imitation in 
Asperger's Syndrome. It is possible that those with AS share the imitation deficits 
seen in other ASIDs. However, there are some differences in the symptomology 
between AS and ASDs which may be of importance. Specifically, the significantly 
I lower prevalence of echolalia in AS (Szatmari et aL, 1989) and the sparing of 
language (DSM-IV, 1994) especially as tentative links have recently been made 
between brain areas that subserve imitation and language (see chapter 7 and 
Hamzei et aL, 2003, Heiser et aL, 2003 (OR press ). Furthermore, one recent study 
with 4 people with AS and one with HFA, using magnetoencephalography (MEG), 
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found activation in the primary motor cortex whilst viewing another's actions to be 
comparable with controls (Avikainen et aL, 1999). This may mean that imitation 
skills are spared in AS. Avikainen et aL, (2003) explored imitation in 6 people with 
AS and 2 people with high-functioning autism and found no advantage for imitating 
people as in a 'mirror-image', in the clinical groups as compared to controls. The 
authors suggest this may be due to a dysfunctional 'mirror neurone' system. 
However, in the 'non-mirror' image or 'crossed' condition i. e. imitating left side of 
the body with left side of one's own body etc, there as no difference between 
groups, which could alternatively suggest some preservation within this system. 
It is already known that people with ASI)s have difficulties in perspective-taking 
when the target mental states are representational, although the situation is 
unclear regarding emotional states. However, there is one more class of 
perspective-taking that may be of interest, in the visual domain. Children with 
autism perform as well as controls on such tasks as predicted by a meta- 
representational account, as such perception relies on primary representation and 
it is possible to use mental rotation strategies to solve such tasks (Baron-Cohen, 
1993). If people with AS apply different strategies to take another person's visual 
perspective albeit from a largely egocentric stance, then they may be able to 
mentally simulate from an egocentric perspective too'9, if the target mental state is 
transparent (see chapter 1). The difficulty still lies in measuring empirically whether 
or not a person has fully appreciated the affective state including all its dimensions, 
rather than simply using a rule-based strategy. 
The high 'personal distress' scores of people with AS in response to other's 
distress (see chapter 3) suggest a more comprehensive understanding of others' 
19 It must be remembered that this is not entirely egocentric as it is based on simulation which 
requires a concept of 'self' and 'other' - see chapter 4. 
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affective states, than a purely semantic one, but from an egocentric perspective. 
Furthermore, there is a small and growing literature focussing on self-concept in 
ASIDs. Toichi (2002) found that 18 high-functioning people with autism did not 
benefit from the self-reference effect in memory in comparison to a control group. 
Participants were given a list of personality traits and asked either phonological, 
self-referent or semantic questions about them, and this was later followed by an 
unexpected recognition test. For the autistic group, self-referent processing did not 
lead to the expected enhanced memory performance. Furthermore, Gallup et aL, 
(2003) in discussing the link between self-recognition and social cognition, point 
out that there is some evidence to suggest people with autism 'develop self- 
recognition later in life and [self-recognition] may be absent in 20 - 30% of cases'. 
In addition, it has long been noted that children with ASDs can have problems 
employing personal pronouns (for example see Lee and Hobson, 1994). 
Frith and Happ6 (1999) and others, argue that the concept of self is in fact reliant 
on TOM and that there is a direct relationship between the two. The nature of self- 
awareness in ASDs is the subject of debate and many of the issues relating to 
awareness of other people's mental states are of relevance, including the 
dissociation between affective states and those requiring meta-re presentation (for 
overview of philosophical debate see Zahavi and Parnas, 2003). For instance, 
Baron-Cohen (1989) suggests that although people with ASDs are 'unaware of 
their own mental states', this may not include affective states. Frith and Happ6 
(1999) examined self-awareness in AS empirically (n=3) and found that 
participants indeed had difficulty relaying information about their own mental states 
and that this was related to their performance on TOM tests. If this is the case then 
it would be reasonable to predict that people with AS would have a less developed 
self-concept than controls (although more so that those with other ASDs as their 
TOM ability tends to be more developed). As Frith and Happ6 (1999) state, it is as 
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if 'the self isn't central to their world - it is their world'. Frith (2003) further 
suggests that these problems with self-concept may be at the root of the core 
deficits in autism. 
Consistent with this idea, one study found a group of people with AS to score 
significantly higher on a self-consciousness scale designed to measure 'attention 
to the private aspects of the self, such as feelings or motives' (Blackshaw et aL, 
2001). Frith (2003) further suggests that when a full ToM first develops it is applied 
to the self, which might explain why the autobiographical narratives of some people 
with AS are incredibly detailed. It is also possible that this additional insight may 
also lead to increased vulnerability to social anxiety which high-functioning people 
with autism may suffer from (see Gillott et aL, 2001 for discussion, Amaral and 
Corbett, 2003). 
Adolphs (2001 b) found that people with ASI)s were able to fully understand at least 
88 personality traits and attributes, presented lexically, in the same way as 
controls. The self-other overlap trait task described in chapter 4 is therefore ideally 
placed for testing these claims. Based on previous literature, the prediction is that if 
people with AS are capable of simulating the affective states of others then it is 
likely to be from an egocentric standpoint. This would also fit with their inability to 
imitate in a mirror-image fashion despite being able to do so in a crossed way 
(Avikainen et al., 2003). It seems therefore that people with ASI)s may use either 
an egocentric simulation-like process in order to appreciate the affective states of 
the protagonist or a rigid rule-based strategy. If a simulation strategy is employed 
then this will be represented by significantly greater overlap between self and other 
traits than that observed in control groups. 
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1.2 Depersonalisation Disorder 
People with depersonalisation disorder (DPD) often report a subjective lack of 
empathy (see chapter 1,2 and 3). However, just as there are few data based on 
complex emotion attribution in healthy individuals, data on the performance of 
those with DPD on such tasks is non-existent. Furthermore, the empirical literature 
on DPD as a whole is sparce, with comprehensive studies documenting its 
prevalence as a primary clinical entity only appearing in recent years (Lambert et 
aL, 2001a, Sierra and Berrios, 2001, Simeon et al., 1997). Despite this, it is 
possible to make some predictions on the basis of recent work and anecdotal 
reports. 
1.2.1. Affective State Labellinq 
There is no reason to think that people with DPD will be particularly bad at labelling 
mental states. As a group they are not known for their social incompetence. They 
are also fairly insightful as to their own symptomatology and do not report any 
problems in this domain. Furthermore, no labelling abnormalities have been noted 
in any of the experimental studies. Phillips et aL, (2001) and Sierra et al., (2002) 
found that people with DPD were able to correctly label pictures from the IAPS 
according to their valence while their subjective levels of arousal were lower than 
controls. Moreover, their performance on a labelling task (see chapter 6) and 
scores on cognitive empathy ki (chapter 1) were intact. If one accepts that 
phenomenologically, people with DPD share some of the characteristics as those 
with psychopathy'O, specifically a lack of some subjective emotional responses, 
then the latter group are known to perform well on ToM type tasks requiring the 
labelling of mental states (Blair, 1996). 
20 There are important differences between the two conditions, for instance, DPD is acquired in later 
life whereas psychopathy is a developmental disorder, and this has an impact on nature of the 




1.2.2 Phvsioloqical arousal 
The emotional blunting reported by people with DPD leads to the prediction that 
their physiological responses to other people's mental states will be dampened. 
However, these anecdotal reports need to confirmed objectively. - One of the first 
studies to look at emotional blunting in DPD found differential neural activation to 
aversive scenes in contrast to both a healthy and clinical control group made up of 
people with obsessive compulsive disorder (Phillips et aL, 2001). The DPD group 
had reduced activation in the emotion-sensitive areas of the brain such as the 
insula. However, this study alone does not provide objective evidence of emotional 
blunting as there may be all sorts of reasons for differential neural activation in 
clinical groups. A further study measured the galvanic skin responses (GSR) 
responses in 15 people with DPD, 15 healthy volunteers and 11 people with 
anxiety disorders (Sierra et aL, 2002). They were shown 5 neutral, 5 pleasant and 
5 aversive pictures. Again, statistically significant differential responses indicative 
of emotional blunting were found in the DPD group when processing the aversive 
pictures. Furthermore, lowered noradrenaline levels consistent with autonomic 
blunting were found in a pilot study of 9 people with DPD (Simeon et aL, 1998). 
Turning now to the self-report questionnaires detailed in chapter 3, a complex 
pattern emerges. The DPD group's mean scores on the 'personal distress' items 
were in line with affective dampening. Strikingly, however, the DPD group did not 
report themselves as impaired on 'emotional reactivity' as one would predict. 
However, this may have been because these items also tap aspects of cognitive 
empathy on which this group is not thought to be impaired. It seems therefore that 
in order to investigate this further, implicit and objective tests of physiological 
arousal, specifically in response to others' emotional states, are needed. The 
speech rate measure detailed in chapter 4 was therefore be employed. 
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1.2.3 Use of the self-concept 
Again, there is little empirical work on the nature of the self-concept in DPD, 
despite the diagnosis and definition of the condition resting on disturbances in the 
concept of the self. Depersonalisation disorder is defined in the DSM-lV (American 
Psychiatric Association, 1994) as an 'alteration in the perception or experience of 
the self so that one feels detached from and as if one is an outside observer of 
ones mental processes or body' and depersonalisation, in common usage, refers 
to a subjective sense of unreality in one's self (Hunter et aL, 20044prpfes 9). 
Paradoxically, despite this sense of loss or deterioration of the self, it has been 
suggested that 'excessive self-observation' may play a role in DPD (Mellor, 1988). 
Recent cognitive-behavioural accounts of DPD expand on this and suggest that 
DPD sufferers are constantly preoccupied with comparing how they actually feel 
with how they should feel (Hunter et aL, 200PHffe*. The authors also point out 
that this group has a tendency to high levels of introspection and to over- 
intellectualise. The key idea is that this excessive focus on the self leads to 
I attentional biases that heighten the detection and severity of symptoms'. In 
support of this argument, the authors also found promising initial results from a 
treatment program that includes a strategy to reduce self-focus (Hunter et al., 2004 
ift P+069). 
Further support for the role of excessive focusing on the self in DPD symptomology 
can also be found in the normal psychological literature (Silvia and Abele, 2002). 
In this study with healthy volunteers the authors manipula ted the effect of focusing 
on the self on the intensity of emotional experience. In the first condition, 
increased self-awareness was implicitly induced by the use of mirrors and self- 
narrative, and it was found to decrease the reported intensity of emotional 
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experiences (during mood induction to create both sad and happy moods). When 
the instructions were to explicitly 'try and experience the emotional state' a 
reversed result was found, with increased self-awareness increasing intensity of 
emotional experiences. This highlights the need for implicit tasks that control for 
demand characteristics. 
The evidence of excessive self focus and the anecdotal reports of a lack of 
empathy, suggest that people with IDPID may use egocentric techniques for 
apprehending other people's affective states. The trait task will be used to 
examine this and it is predicted that the IDPID group will show more self-other 
overlap than the control group. In addition, a self-report measure purporting to tap 
self-consciousness in both the public and private domains will be administered 
(Mckenzie and Hoyle, 2003). 
It is predicted that: 
* There will be no differences between the control group and those with DPD 
or AS in the recognition of affective states. 
0 If the AS group use a different, less 'intuitive' strategy than control group to 
label affective states, this will be reflected in slower reaction times. 
0 The DPD group will show a different speech rate pattern than the other two 
groups, indicative of less congruent physiological arousal. 
0 Both clinical groups will show significantly more trait-overlap than the 
control group, between themselves and the character in the diary extract. 
0 There will be significant group differences on full 'personal distress' scores 
of the IRI with the AS group scoring higher and the DPD group scoring 
lower, than the other groups. 
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0 Both clinical groups will positively endorse more items indicative of self- 
absorption, than controls on the Self-Absorption Scale (Mckenzie and 
Hoyle). 
1.3 Power analvses 
Group sizes were based on detecting a conservative effect size (0.2) with 95% 
power. The effect size was derived from the data gathered in chapter 4. A sample 
size of 16 for each clinical group (with n= 48 in the control group), with unequal 
sample sizes, was required. 
2. Methods 
2.1 Participants 
See chapter 3 for details of clinical groups and chapter 4 for details of the control 
group. Regarding those who returned the full version of the IRI (see chapter 2 for 
details of controls - pl 1), there were 10 men and 2 women from the AS group with 
a mean age of 37.7 yrs (± 10.1), and in the DPD group there were 5 men and 2 
women with a mean age of 31 yrs (± 4.7). The same people also returned the SAS 
scale with 1 additional person from the DPD group returning this alone. 
2.2 Measures 
The mental state attribution task described in chapter 4 was used. This consists of 
a series of written diary extracts which convey various affective states without 
explicitly stating them. Participants were required to choose from 4 options the 
mental state that best describes the protagonist. This was followed by the speech 
rate task, again as described in chapter 4. Lastly, participants were required to 
endorse traits that best described the character in the vignette using the same 
paradigm as described in chapter 4. In all cases the 'self-traits' were filled in at 
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least 24 hours before or after the experimental session although in most cases the 
interval was much longer than that. 
The full version of the IRI (Davis, 1980) was also sent to participants as was the 
Self-Absorption Scale (SAS) which is a newly validated questionnaire designed to 
tap both private and public self-absorption (Davis, 1980). The scale has 18 items, 
and factor analysis revealed that 9 items load onto private self-absorption and 9 
onto public self-absorption. For instance: 
*I have difficulty focusing on what others are talking about because I wonder what 
they're thinking of me - Public Self-Absorption 
0 My mind never focuses on things other than myself for very long - Private Self- 
Absorption 
2.3 Procedure 
All measures were given in a standardised way as reported in chapter 4. The only 
difference was that people with DPD were not given the TOM tasks and so these 
were not dispersed in between the diary extracts. Instead, they performed the 
conditional reasoning tasks (as detailed in chapter 3) between each extract to 
control for carry-over effects. 
As in chapter 4, these tasks were given as part of a wider testing session although 
some additional tests were administered with the clinical groups (see chapter 3 for 
details of reasoning tasks which were not administered to the control group) whilst 
other tests were dropped. Lastly, the full version of the IRI and SAS was sent to all 





Firstly, the dataset for each task was tested for normality and where deviations 
were found, the data were transformed using either logarithmic or square root. 
Next, initial simple analyses were performed to compare group performance on 
each task. This was followed by an exploration of the effect of demographic 
factors to control for using unmatched groups (see chapter 3). For each task 
gender, education (measured categorically), age, occupation (whether or not the 
participant was a mental health worker) and verbal IQ were considered. Verbal 10 
was chosen over other forms of IQ as the tasks used have a major verbal 
component and because the NART, a verbal task itself, was used to estimate IQ 
(see chapter 3). Lastly, a full model was performed to examine group differences 
on the depenclant variable for each task, adjusting for any demographic factors 
previously shown to be of relevance. To summarise, for each task the following 
analyses were conducted: 
*A simple analysis to examine group differences on the dependant variable. 
A simple analysis to explore the association between demographic factors 
and the dependant variable. 
A full factorial analysis to examine group differences on the dependant 
variable whilst controlling for the necessary demographic factors. 
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3.1 Interpersonal Reactivity Index and Self-Absorption Scale 
Simple group analyses 
Full details of the control group scores on the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI - 
Davis, 1980) and Self-Absorption Scale (SAS - Davis, 1980) cat) be found in 
chapter 2. An initial one-way ANOVA comparing all 3 groups on each factor of the 
IRI showed significant group differences on 'personal distress' (F(2,42) = 4.13, p= 
. 
023) and 'perspective taking' (F(2,42) = 3.53, p= . 
039). Post hoc Scheff6 tests 
revealed the difference on 'personal distress' to be between the AS and DPD 
groups (see figure 5.2) and the difference on 'perspective-taking' to be between the 
control and AS groups. No differences were found for the 'fantasy' items (F(., 42) = 
1.87, p> . 
05) or 'empathic concern' (F(2,42) = . 
71, p> . 
05). These data are in 
keeping with the results from other measures of empathy, namely the EQ wherein 
group differences were found on 'cognitive empathy', and also the previous 
findings from these groups on the reduced 'personal distress' items from the IRI 
(see chapter 3). To summarise: 
Differences were found between the AS and DPD group on 'personal 
distress'. 





















4 1I I 24 12 7 CONTROL AS DPD 
group 
Demographic factors 
Analyses were performed to consider the role of demographic factors on the 
different components of empathy as measured by the IRL Gender differences with 
women scoring higher were found on both the 'empathic concern' (t = -2.19, df 41, 
p= . 034), and 'perspective-ta king' (t =-2.46, df 41, p= . 018) - see Table 5.1. 
Differences were also found between high and low verbal IQ groups (based on a 
median split at 122) on the 'perspective-taking' scale (t = 1.99, df 40, p=0.054). 
All these factors were therefore entered as covariates in the final analysis. 
Full analysis 
A factorial ANOVA was conducted with 'empathic concern' as the dependant 
variable and 2 between-participants factors being gender (male vs. female) and 
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group (control/AS/DPD). There was no main effect for group (F(;, ,,, ) = . 
04, p> . 
05), 
gender (F(j, 42) = 3.01, p= . 
091) nor an interaction between gender and group (F(,. 
42) = . 
163, p> . 
05). Lastly, an ANCOVA was conducted with 'perspective-taking' as 
the dependant variable, one fixed factor of group and a continuous covariate of 
verbal IQ. Again, there was no main effect for group (F(2,41) = . 
89, p> . 
05), or 
gender (F(j, 41) = 1.93, p> . 
05), nor was there an interaction between gender and 
group (F(2,41) = . 
50, p> . 
05), but there was a significant main effect for verbal 10 
(F(j, 41) = 6.36, p= . 
016). This suggests the group difference previously observed 
on 'perspective-taking' may result from variation in IQ. 
Table 5.1 Mean and SD scores for each qroup on IRI Subscales 
iri empathic concern iri perspective taking 
sex sex 
male female male female 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
group ctrl 17.78 2.73 19.73 5.04 16.56 2.35 18.67 5.27 
as 17.1 3.45 19.50 212 12.4 5.4 17 4,24 
dp 16.40 4.16 20.50 . 71 16.2 7.69 19.50 . 71 
To summarise: 
No significant group differences were found for 'empathic concern' even 
with demographic factors held constant. 
No significant group differences were found for 'perspective-taking' and 
verbal IQ accounted for much of the variance. 
Regarding the Self Absorption Scale (SAS) subscales, 2 one way ANOVAs were 
conducted for group and each subscale. There were main group effects for each 
subscale [public: F(2,29) = 4.149, p= . 
027/private: F(ý, 
_,,, ) = 
4.12, p= . 
027). Post hoc 
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Scheft tests revealed there to be weak evidence of differences between the 
clinical and control groups on both the private (DPD: p= . 0921AS p= . 053) and 
public (DPD: p= . 059/AS p =. 074) self-absorption scales 
(see Figure 5.3). There 
were no demographic differences on either subscale of the SAS. 
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3.2 Affective state labellinq (viqneftes) 
Simple group analyses 
Although the data did not fully meet the parametric assumptions and were non- 
normally distributed, there was homogeneity of variance (F(2,77) = -12, p> -05)- 
A 
one-way ANOVA was therefore conducted to examine the effect of group 
membership on total number of correctly labelled affective states. No group 
differences were found for this variable (F(2,79) = 2.12, p> . 05) suggesting all 




In order to explore this lack of significant association further, the influence of 
demographic factors was also examined. Affective state attribution was not found 
to be related to age (t = -. 32, df 76, p> . 05), gender (t = -1.48, df 78, p> . 05), 
verbal IQ (t = . 36, df 76, p> . 05), education (t = -. 66, df 76, p> . 05) or occupation (t 
= 1.37, df 78, p> . 05). 
Full analysis 
Subsequently, a3x3 repeated measures ANOVA was performed to examined the 
relationship between the differing difficulty levels of emotion attribution in the 3 
groups (see table 5.2) in an attempt to tease apart the processes underlying 
affective state attribution. 
Table 5.2: Mean and SD score on items of different difficulty levels 
total score on level I total score on level 2 total score on level 3 
questions questions questions 
Mean SID Mean SD Mean SID 
group CONTROL 2.52 . 58 1.52 . 95 1.94 . 89 
AS 2.56 . 51 2.06 . 77 1.88 . 81 
DPD 2.06 1 1.5 . 73 1.81 . 75 
Total 2.44 . 69 1.63 . 89 1.9 . 84 
The dependent variable was difficulty (with 3 levels) and the independent variable 
group (AS/DPD/control). The assumption of sphericity was met and there was 
homogeneity of variance on all but level 1. A main effect was found for 'difficulty 
levels' [F (2,154) = 13.85, p= . 0011 and paired t tests revealed the differences to 
be between all the levels (level 1 vs. 3: t=4.91, df 79, p= . 001/level 1 vs. 2: t= 
6.4, df 79, p= . 001/ level 2 vs. 3: t=2.43, df 79, p= . 028). However, as with the 
control data in chapter 4, participants tended to find level 2 harder than level 3 
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regardless of group membership (see figure 3). Although, despite the lack of a 
significant interaction between group and 'difficulty level' (F(4,154) 1.54, p> . 
001) 
or the main effect for group (F(2,77) = 2.12, p> . 
05), the plot did suggest that the AS 
group tended to find level 2 easier than the other groups (see figure 5.4) and that 
the DPD group found level 1 more difficult. This may suggest the use of different 
strategies by each group. 


















M level 2 
F--Ilevel 3 
There was no difference between groups on the non-emotional vignette (F(2.79) ": 
1.45, p> . 
05). 
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In summary: 
0 There were no significant group differences on the affective state labelling 
task even with demographic factors taken into consideration. 
* Accuracy rates differed between 'difficulty' levels with participants finding 
'level 2' the most difficult. 
3.3. Reaction times 
Simple group analysis 
The data were log transformed and three outliers (2 from the AS group and 1 from 
the DPD group) dropped. A simple one-way ANOVA was then performed to 
explore group differences on the time taken to label the affective states, and no 
significant differences were found (F(2,74)"": 1.37, p> . 
05) - see Table 5.3. 
Demographic factors 
Next analyses were conducted to examine the effect of various demographic 
factors on the time taken to label the mental states. Mean reaction times were 
significantly related to age (t = 1.99, df 74, p= . 
051) and education (t = 3.34, df 76, 
p< . 
001). However, they were not related to gender (t = . 
6, df 76, p> . 
05), verbal, 
IQ (t = -1.58, df 74, p> . 
05) or occupation (t = -1.26, df 76, p> . 
05). Age and 
education were therefore included in subsequent analyses which examined 
reaction times for each vignette. 
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Table 5.3: Mean and SD reaction times on each viqnette 
Vignette B Vignefte C Vignette D 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
group CONTROL 1.43 . 17 1.33 . 14 1.38 . 13 
AS 1.54 . 21 1.40 . 17 1.46 . 13 
DPD 1.47 . 13 1.35 . 15 1.40 . 15 
Total 1.46 . 17 1.35 . 15 1.40 . 14 
* NB these data have been normalised using a logarithmic transformation 
Full analysis 
A3x3x2 repeated measures ANOVA was then performed with reaction time as 
the dependant variable (3 vignettes), group with 3 levels, age co-varied and 
education entered as an additional between-group factor. As there was 
homogeneity of regression lines and the assumptions of sphericity and 
homogeneity of variance were met, a full factorial model was run. There was a 
significant main effect for reaction time (F(2.134) = 3.65, p=0.028) but no significant 
interactions between reaction time and age (F(2,134) ý . 
451, p> . 
05), group (F(4,134) 
= . 
068, p> . 
05) or higher education (F(2,134) = 1.36, p> . 
05) and neither was there a 
3 way interaction (F(4.134). 21, p >. 05) - see Table. 5.4. 
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Table 5.4: Within-participants effects for reaction times from repeated measure 
ANOVA 
Tests of Within- Participants Effects 
Type III Sum of Squares df Mean Square F I Sig. 
Reaction Time 6.92013-02 2 3.460E-02 13.665 1 . 028 
Reaction Time * AGE 8.515E-03 2 4.25713-03 . 451 1.63TI 
Reaction Time * Group 2.56213-03 4 6.406E-04 . 068 1.991; 
Reaction Time * Education 2.572E-02 2 1.28613-02 1.362!. 260; 
Reaction Time * Group * Age 7.907E-03 4 1.977E-03 . 209 
ý. 933, 
Error (Reaction Time) F F 1.265 1 1341 9.440E-03 111 
Paired Wests revealed significant differences between each vignette with 
participants taking longest to attribute affective states in vignette b followed by d 
and c (b vs. c: t=7.11, df 77, p <. 001/b vs. dt=3.9, df 79, p= . 001 1/c vs. d: t=- 
. 3.34, df 77, p= . 01). There was no main effect for group on reaction time 
(see 
table 5.5) perhaps suggesting that all groups used similar strategies (F (2,67)2 . 503, 
p>. 05). 
Table 5.5: Between-participants effects for reaction time with age co-varied from 
repeated measures ANOVA 
Tests of Between-Participants Effects 
Type III Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
ýIntercept 27.909 1 27.909 1581.825 1 . 0011 
AGE . 145 1 . 145 
i 3.027 1 . 0861 
GROUP 4.82513-02 2 2.41313-02 1 . 503 
1.6071 
HIGHER . 150 1 . 150 3.123 . 082 
GROUP*HIGHERI 1.49813-02 21 
- 
7.488E-03 . 156 . 85 
Error 3.214 671 T 4.797E-02 
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The plot based on the estimated means after adjusting for age (see Figure 5.5) 
indicate that the AS group did react slightly slower overall in the task but this was 
not statistically significant. That this group showed the same pattern as the other 
groups suggests that all groups adopted the same kind of strategy. 























* There were no significant differences between groups in the time taken to 
label the affective states. 
* Age was associated with reaction times on this task. 




3.4. Speech rate 
Simple analyses were not conducted on this variable as summing the speech rate 
data from each vignette, would not be meaningful. 
Demographic factors 
Parametric tests were conducted to explore the effects of demographic variables 
on a log transformation of speech rate. There was no effect for gender (vignette b: 
t=-. 85, df 68, p> . 05 /vignette c: t= . 91, df 67, p> . 05/vignette d: t= . 78, df 67, p 
> . 05) or age (groups created by performing a median split at 32 yrs) for vignette c- 
(t = -1.17, df 65, p> . 05) or vignette d (t = -. 27, df 65, p> . 05). There was a 
significant difference for speech rate after vignette b (t = 2.2, df 63.5 for unequal 
variances, p =. 031) with the older group showing the most change. Age was 
therefore entered as a covariate in subsequent analyses. There were also 
significant differences on the dichotomous variable designed to measure education 
i. e. presence/absence of higher education, both on vignette b (t = -2.06, df 66, p 
. 043) and vignette d (t = -2.13, df 65, p= . 037). 
Full analysis 
Log-transformed variables were used in a repeated measures ANOVA with speech 
rate as the within-participant variable with 3 levels (sad/happy/fear) and 2 between 
group factors: education with (presence and absence of higher education) and 
group (control/AS/DPD). 
Due to technical problems, 5 people from the AS group and 3 people from the DPD 
group had the speech rate dataset missing. In addition, 2x higher education 
f, Piro I 
values were missing - and the age data for 1 person in the A& group. To maximise 
the degrees of freedom in the repeated measures ANOVA, the missing age data 
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were replaced with the series mean and the education data replaced with one 
value from each category. 
As there was homogeneity of regression slopes for age and group, and sphericity, 
a full factorial model was performed. The main effect for speech rate approached 
significance (F(2,61) = 2.83, p= . 
063). There was also a significant interaction 
between speech rate and age (F(2,122) = 3.9, p= . 
023) and between speech and 
group (F(4,122) = 2.4, p= . 
054) suggesting these factors had an effect on speech 
rate for some of the vignettes (see Table 5.6). 
Table 5.6: Within-participants effects for speech rate from repeated measures 
ANOVA 
Tests of Within- Participants Effects 
Type III Sum of Squares df Mean Square IF I Sig. 
Speech Rate 5.845E-02 2 2.922E-02 
T 
2.825 1.063 
Speech Rate * Age 8.064E-02 2 4.032E-02 3.898 . 023 
Speech Rate * Education 1.509E-02 2 7.547E-03 . 730 1.484 
Speech Rate * Group 9.914E-02 4 2.479E-02 '2.396 1.054: 
Speech Rate * Education Group 4.408E-02 4 1.1 02E-02 11.066 ý. 3771 
Error (Speech) 1.262 1 1221 1.034E-02 11 
Regarding between-participants effects, there were no main effects for group (F(2, 
58) ý . 54, p> . 05) or education 
(see table 5.7) although again this approached 
significance (F(j, 61) = 3.07, p= . 085). However, there was no 
interaction between 
speech rate and education (F(2.122) . 73, p> . 05), speech rate, education and age 
(F(4,122) = 1.07, p> . 05) or any interaction 
between group and higher education (F(2, 
el) = 1.84, P> . 05). 
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Table 5.7: Between-partici pants effects for speech rate with aqe as a covariate 
from repeated measures ANOVA 
Tests of Between -Partic i pants Effects 
Type III Sum of Squares (11', Mean Square 1ý' Sig. 
Intercept 105.912 1 105.912 S320.534 . 001 
AGE 3.271 E-07 1 3.2711--07 . 000 . 
096 
EDUCATION---- 3.9-12E-02 1 3.9 1 2F-02 3.074 . 085 
GROUP 1.376E-02 2 6. S82F-03 . 
541 . 
58S 
EDUCATION GROUP 4.683E-02 2 2.341 E-02 1.831) . 
168 
Error . 
776 61 1.273E-02 
Planned contrasts revealed the near significant speech rate and group interaction 
to be between the 'sad' and 'happy' vignettes (F(2,61) = 4.28, p= . 
021). 
Examination of the plot of means adjusted for age, showed that the DPD group 
performed significantly different to the other groups (see Figure 5.6 below). 
Paradoxically, it appears the DPD participants decelerated their speech after the 
happy vignette while the other groups tended to accelerate and there was also a 
tendency for the DPD group to accelerate after the sad vignette again in contrast to 
the other groups. This is indicative of a lack of congruent emotional response, as 
such congruencies are taken to be characteristic of parallel empathy. In summary: 
0 Speech rate differed between vignettes in the expected directions. 
e Age was associated with speech rate with older people slowing down more 
after the sad vignette. 
o The DPD group displayed differential speech rate to the other groups. 
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* Original data were expressed as a percentage of the baseline so an increase on y axis 
represents deceleration and decrease represents acceleration from the baseline, following 
each vignette. 
3.5 Trait Task 
There were two dependant variables; i) self-overlap variable - percentage of the 
I self traits that were later endorsed for the target, and ii) target-overlap variable - 
percentage of traits attributed to the target that were earlier endorsed for the self. 
The self-overlap variable was normalised using a square root transformation. 
There are also two further variables key to these analyses: i) 'mean no of traits 
attributed to the target overall' and ii) 'number of traits attributed to self' (see 
below). 
Consistent with the original study (Davis et aL, 1996), the association between 





overall' and ii) 'no of traits attributed to self', and the depenclant variables was 
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explored from the outset. Both these variables were predictors of trait overlap in 
chapter 4. Although, there were no group differences on 'mean number of traits 
attributed to the target' (F(2,77) 'ý 1.07, p> . 
05) or'number of traits attributed to self 
(F(2,77) = 2.02, p> . 05) there were significant associations within-groups 
for both 
variables for all 3 groups. Therefore, the decision was made to enter these 
measures as covariates in all analyses. However, as both indices of number of 
traits were also inter-correlated, only the measure with the strongest correlation 
with the dependant variable was entered into each analysis - 'number of traits 
attributed to self in the target-overlap analysis and 'mean number of traits 
attributed to the target' in the self-overlap analysis. These were also the significant 
predictors in chapter 4. These variables were therefore included from the outset 
Group analyses 
There was homogeneity of the regression lines (see Figure 5.7) and so an 
ANCOVA controlling for 'number of self traits' was conducted for group and target- 
overlap. There was a main effect for the covariate 'number of self traits' as 
expected (F(j, 77) = 168.08, p> . 001). There was also a main effect 
for group (F(2,77) 
= 5.1, p= . 008). 
178 
iapter 5 






L- 60 Q) 
0 



















0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 






Post hoc ScheffL6 tests revealed the difference to be between the control and DPD 
groups (p = . 019) with the difference between the AS and control group 
approaching significance (p = . 089). Examination of the means show that both 
clinical groups had a tendency to show more target-overlap (see Table 5.8). 
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Table 5.8: Mean % tarqet-overlap score adausted for 'number of self traits 
endorsed 
95% Confidence Interval 
Mean Std. Error 
group Lower Bound Upper Bound 
control 42.03: 2.11 37.82 46.24 
AS 50.98'1 3.521 43.96 57.99 
D PD 53.73 3.681 46.4 1 61.06 
This pattern suggests that people with AS processed the vignettes in a more 
egocentric way than the controls and the DPD group more egocentric still. The 
results of the 'target-overlap' analyses therefore show that: 
* The DPD group showed more 'target-overlap' than the control group. 
The same near significant pattern was observed for the AS group. 
The same type of analysis was also performed to explore the association between 
group membership and 'self-overlap' (as opposed target-overlap in the previous 
section). Based on previous findings (see above and chapter 4) the means were 
adjusted to reflect 'mean number of traits attributed to the target'. In this instance, 
the regression lines were heterogeneous between groups (F(: ', 77) = 4.03, p= . 
022) 
having important consequences for interpretation of the data (see figure 7). With 
this interaction built into the model there was also a main effect for group (F(., ý, ') = 
6.27, p=0.003) and for the covariate 'mean number of traits attributed to the 
target' after all the affective state vignettes (F(i , 77) 




Post hoc Scheff6 tests revealed significant differences between the AS and control 
group (p = . 
022) with the difference between the DPD and control group 
approaching significance (p = . 
087). This suggests that once again the clinical 
groups displayed more overlap than controls. However, as the relationship 
between the 'mean number of traits attributed to the target' and 'self-overlap' was 
not the same for the DIDD group as it was for the other groups, this difference 
needs to be considered when interpreting the data. It seems from the plot of 
means that for the DPD groups' overlap score was least affected by the gross 
number of traits they attributed to the characters in the vignette (see figure 5.8). 
Figure 5.8: The association between tarqet-overlap, the number of traits attributed 
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* The AS group displayed more overlap, as measured by the 'self-overlap' 
variable, than controls. 
eA similar, near significant pattern was observed between those with DPD 
and controls. 
Demographic factors 
In order to explore the data further, we looked at age, gender, whether or not the 
participant entered higher education, whether or not their occupation was mental 
health worker at the IOP and verbal 10 as estimated from the NART on i) the self- 
overlap variable i. e. percentage of the 'self' traits that were later endorsed for the 
target and ii) target-overlap variable, that is, percentage of traits attributed to the 
target that were earlier endorsed for the self. 
There were no differences between younger and older participants (based on a 
median split at 32 yrs - target-overlap: t= . 06, df 74, p> . 05, self-overlap: t= . 62, 
df 74, p> . 05), nor between men and women (t = -1.12, df 76, p> . 05/ t= . 19, df 
76, p> . 05) or between those recruited from mental health workers and those not (t 
= -. 23, df 76, p> . 05/ t=-. 13, df 76, p= . 05). However, differences were found 
between those educated to degree level and those not (t = . 205, df 74, p= . 045/ t= 
3.43, df 74, p= . 001) and on measures of verbal IQ, again using a median split, 
nearly reached significance (t = -1.84, df 75, p= . 070/ t= -1.88, df 75, p= . 063). 
As the groups are fairly equally matched on verbal IQ but not on education (see 
chapter 3), the latter was entered as a variable in all subsequent analyses. 
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The only demographic factors associated with 'self-overlap' and 'target- 
overlap'were education and verbal IQ. 
Full analysis 
A factorial ANCOVA with 2 between group factors - 'group' with 3 levels and 
education with 2 levels - and 1 covariate - number of traits attributed to 'self', was 
performed with the dependant variable as 'target' overlap. The dataset conformed 
to parametric and other assumptions. The covariate (no. of traits attributed to the 
, 75) 
158.6, p< . 001) association with the target- self) showed a significant (F(l 
overlap' as expected. There was no main effect for education (F(i ý, ý = 1.96, p> , 7, 
. 
05) and neither was there an interaction between education and group (F(-' 7ý)) 
2.76, p> . 
05). Regarding the specific hypotheses, there were significant group 
differences on the dependant variable (F(2,75) = 3.86, p= . 
026) - see figure 8. 
Corrected post hoc Bonferroni adjusted comparisons reveal significant differences 
between the control and DPD group (p = . 
























Fiqure 5.9: Mean % tarqet-overlap adusted for no. of self traits 
control AS DPD 
It seems therefore that. 
Compared to controls, the DPD group showed more overlap as measured 
by the 'target-overlap' variable, even with demographic factors considered. 
e The similar pattern previously observed for the AS group on this variable 
disappeared once the relevant demographic factors were statistically 
controlled. 
The same analysis was also conducted for the alternative index of 'self-overlap' 
with 'mean number of traits attributed to the targets' as a covariate. With the 
additional grouping variable the data still conformed to the homogeneity of variance 
principle (F(5,70) = 2.18, p> . 
05). Again there was an interaction between the 
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covariate and group, suggesting a lack of homogeneity of regression slopes (see 
Figure 5.9) and so the interaction was built into the model. There was a main 
effect for 'mean no of traits attributed to target' (F(j, 75) "': 105.7, p> . 001). There 
was no main effect for education (F(j, 75) = 1.59, p> . 05) nor was there an 
interaction between education and group (F(2,75) 1.842, p> . 05). Regarding 
specific hypotheses, there were significant group differences on the dependant 
variable (F(2,75) = 5.86 p= . 004), and there was also an interaction between group 
and 'mean number of traits attributed to the target' (F(2,75) = 3.95, p= . 024) - see 
figure 7. Corrected post hoc Bonferroni comparisons revealed significant 
differences between the control and DPD group (p = . 015) and the difference 
between the control and AS group approached significance (p = . 068) - see Figure 
5.10 below). 
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The AS group show a near significant tendency to display more 'self- 
overlap' than the control group. 
The DPD group show more 'self-overlap', however, they also show a 
differential relationship between the depenclant variable and covariate (see 
below for further discussion). 
4. Discussion 
As predicted, all the groups were able to label the affective states of the 
protagonist and there were no reaction time differences, suggesting they all used 
similar strategies. The clinical groups showed significantly more trait overlap than 
controls which may be indicative of egocentric simulation. In addition, the IDPID 
group also showed speech rate patterns, suggesting a lack of congruent 
physiological arousal. This is in keeping with reports from people who suffer from 
DPID of a subjective emotional blunting. 
In line with the data from chapter 3, there were significant differences between the 
DPD and AS groups on the full scale IRI 'personal distress' items. The failure to 
detect a difference between the control and clinical groups may have been due to 
the small sample size, although the difference between the AS and control groups 
approached significance. The loss of a significant difference on the 'perspective- 
taking' items, once verbal IQ was adequately controlled, may be due to the ability 
of people with AS with high IQ's to 'hack out' compensatory routes in this domain 
(see chapter 6). The differences observed on the SAS scale showed that, as 
predicted, both clinical groups were higher on self-absorption (both public and 
private) than the control group; this is in line with the prediction that both groups 
will process other people's affective states in an egocentric way (see below). 
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Findings from the mental state labelling task show that all participants could label 
the non-affective epistemic states in the control vignette, confirming that people 
with AS can appreciate some simple representational states. On the affective state 
vignettes, an effect for difficulty level was also found, indicating that this 
manipulation was partially successful. However, all groups generally found level 2 
more difficulty than level 3 which might be explained by previous findings that 
suggest people tend to pick up broad rather than specific affective states from 
written narratives (Gygax et aL, 2003). This may be especially so when one 
considers that level 2 emotional states were designed to be somewhat 
idiosyncratic and/or unusual reactions to the situation. In replication, a larger range 
of scores may be more sensitive to individual variation. 
The reaction times in each group were similar, suggesting that all the groups may 
have used the same strategy. Although the AS group were slightly slower on all 
the vignettes this was not statistically significant; this is of particular interest as 
some previous studies have suggested that people with AS may use effortful, rule- 
based strategies which would be expected to manifest a longer reaction time. 
Although an alternative explanation is that the task prompted all groups to use a 
rule-based strategy. This would mean that the lack of group differences cannot be 
interpreted safely to suggest the AS group fully appreciated the affective states 
displayed by the protagonist. Zahavi and Parnas (2003) point out that the common 
strategy advocated by 'theory-theorists' for appreciating others' mental states is 
remarkably similar to that understood to be the basis of compensatory strategies in 
people with ASDs and high IQ's i. e. 'wooden algorithms and formulae' (see also 
Belmonte and Yurgelun-Todd, 2003). Consistent with this idea, there is also the 
possibility that each difficulty level evoked a different strategy, which may have 
confounded the reaction time data. The AS group tended to do better than both 
other groups on level 2, the hardest level, although again this result was not 
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significant. This may indicate that these items required a strategy at which the AS 
group were more skilled such as rule-based processing based on such 'algorithms 
and formulae'. 
Differential processing was also evident on 'level V items of the task. There was a 
tendency for the DPD group to endorse more incorrect basic emotional reactions 
and examination of the raw data suggest that this was the case for a handful of 
participants in this group, explaining the heterogeneity of variance for this particular 
difficulty level. One explanation is that the comprehension of simple basic 
emotions may be easier if the qualitative dimensions can be appreciated, and 
perhaps a covert online somatosensory representation constructed (see Adolphs et 
al., 2000). Some people with DPD may find this difficult and indirect evidence of 
this is provided by the speech rate data (see below). Furthermore, people with 
DPD have been shown not to activate some of the brain areas involved in 
constructing implicit online somatosensory representations (Phillips et aL, 2001). 
However, despite the possible different processing styles adopted for each level of 
C V, KI to% difficulty, none of these effects were statistically significant and overall both eeRIFQ 
groups performed in a manner similar to controls. Bearing this in mind it seems 
that these data need to be considered in the light of the other components of this 
task, physiological arousal and the use of the self-concept. 
In all the groups, physiological arousal as measured by speech rate after the sad 
vignette was associated with age, with older people displaying more enhanced 
mood-congruent speech rate (they slowed down more). However, even after 
controlling for age, an interaction remained between speech rate and group with 
the DPD group displaying differential speech rate on the sad and happy vignettes. 
The direction of this difference indicates a lack of congruent physiological arousal 
as they decelerated after the happy vignette and accelerated after the sad vignette, 
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in contrast to the other groups. This suggests a lack of congruent emotional 
response to other people's affective states. However, this is contrary to the data 
from the self-report measures (see chapter 2 and 3) which suggest that people with 
DPD do feel emotional empathy and empathic concern. One explanation is that 
this discrepancy may be due to the items on the self-report measures tapping more 
than simply physiological reactions, such as meta-representational ability. 
Interestingly, the DPD group still showed some physiological reactions to the 
stimuli i. e. they did not stay at baseline, but their responses were inconsistent with 
an empathic response. This may suggest that the 'emotional blunting' they 
describe may be the subjective result of an 'emotional mismatch'. Lastly, there 
were no group differences on the control or fear vignettes. This finding may be due 
to the fact that speech rate measures do not distinguish between 'personal 
distress' and 'parallel empathy'. However, this group's IRI 'personal distress' 
scores were low suggesting they are not prone to this state, although it is true to 
say their scores did not represent a complete absence of distress in response to 
displays of emotion. 
As predicted, the AS group performed remarkably similarly to the control group on 
this task. Although their speech rate appeared to be generally slewe than the 
other groups this was not significant (see figure 5). This adds to the now growing 
evidence that people with AS (or indeed ASDs) can respond emotionally to other 
people's affective states inasmuch as they have the ability to experience affective 
empathy. Consistent with this, no group differences were found on the 'empathic 
concern' items on the IRL The AS group also reported high levels of 'personal 
distress' and showed physiological arousal in accordance with parallel affective 
empathy e. g. in the 'sad'vignette. This may shed light on the interrelation between 
distress and arousal, suggesting that affective empathy may be a precursor to 
189 
Chapter 5 
personal distress (see Figure 1). It seems that the idea that people with ASIDs are 
I emotionally cold' may be misguided, or at least an over-generalisation, and 
instead their problems lie in other domains of social cognition. 
In terms of the task, there were distinctive speech rate patterns for each of the 
affective states as predicted. However, the dataset as a whole needs to be 
interpreted with caution because of lack of power due to missing data. 
Furthermore, as discussed in chapter 4 this measure has neither the sensitivity to 
pick up reactive states such as sympathy and compassion nor to distinguish 
between egocentric and empathic reactions. 
The data from the trait task suggests a tendency for both clinical groups to process 
others' affective states egocentrically, in line with their scores on the self- 
absorption scale (see above). The DPD group scored consistently higher than the 
control group on the trait overlap scores, suggesting a more extreme reliance on 
the self-concept when attributing affective states. For both types of trait overlap 
variable, differences were found between control and DPD groups, over and above 
the effects of the covariate and demographic factors, suggesting the use of 
different cognitive processes. The AS group also showed significantly more 
overlap than the control group on the 'self-overlap' variable, although the near 
significant difference for the 'target-overlap' variable disappeared once 
demographic factors were controlled. 
More specifically, for the 'self-overlap' variable, in addition to group differences, 
there was an interaction between sheer number of traits attributed to the target and 
group membership, indicating that the data deviates from the assumption of 
homogeneity of regression slopes. However, examination of the scatterplot (see 
Figure 6) suggests this interaction results from the DPD group showing less of an 
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association between self-overlap and the covariate Le. raw number of traits 
attributed to the target, than the other groups, consistent with the idea of the 'self 
being the centre of the DPD sufferers' world. Furthermore, an effect of group still 
remained above and beyond the interaction with the covariate suggesting that 
some of the explained variance is independent of this interaction. Post hoc tests 
with adjusted significance levels show this additional variance to be due to 
significant differences between the control and AS groups. These tests also 
revealed a significant difference between the DPD and control group, but as 
explained, this has to be interpreted along with the interaction. 
In terms of interpretation, it seems that the DPD group utilise the self-concept in 
reasoning about others' mental states, to a greater degree than people in the 
control group. These effects are independent of education and the 'number of 
traits attributed to the self. As explained, the findings from the 'self overlap 
variable may be in part due to the DPD group displaying self-other overlap which is 
to some extent independent from the actual number of traits attributed. To find 
that those with DPD rely more on the self-concept when decoding others' affective 
states, in contrast to those without IDPID, is potentially important for devising clinical 
interventions. Results from previous chapters do not suggest that these groups 
are more empathic than the control group, and this would be contrary to clinical 
reports, ruling out a simple linear relationship between trait overlap and empathy. 
It seems much more likely that the relationship is more complex, with an optimum 
level such as that displayed by controls, with overlap over and above this indicative 
of differential processing. An excess of overlap may be best explained with 
reference to the 'egocentriclallocentric' distinction with additional overlap 
representing 'egocentric' simulation (see chapter4and Decety and Sommerville, 
A 
2003, Langdon and Coltheart, 2001). This would fit well with the newly emerging 
"'14"4 (41 
N 
literature on 'self-absorption' in DPD and provides support for therapeutic 
191 
Chapter 5 
interventions that have a component geared towards defocusing the client from 
their own self-concept. It may well be that such a strategy, if successful, would 
have the indirect result of reinstating the qualitative experience of empathy. These 
findings need to be further explored and examined empirically. 
The trait overlap scores for the AS group were also consistently higher than 
controls but lower than the DPD group. This pattern was statistically significant for 
the 'self-overlap' variable and still approaching significance when demographic 
factors were controlled although this was not the case for 'target-overlap'. These 
data suggest that the AS group also rely on egocentric processing, as predicted 
and in line with their 'personal distress' scores from chapter 3. To find that people 
with AS can use a cognitive representation of the self in this way suggests this 
early developmental mechanism is intact (see chapter 1), which may be important 
for devising clinical interventions, if required. However, these results also suggest 
that allocentric and egocentric simulations are best represented by a continuum 
rather than discrete categories and for some reason the DPD group fall further 
along that continuum. This effect needs further exploration as there are clearly 
differences between the phenomenological experiences of these two groups. Yet if 
high-functioning people with autism are found to suffer social anxiety (see 
introduction) there may also be some similarities. It is important to undertake 
further empirical work to both elucidate the different processes involved in 
egocentric simulation, and create a model with greater specificity. 
Future studies should also focus on the nature of the social cognitive processes 
that utilise the self-concept. More explanation is needed as to the process that 
distinguishes egocentric and allocentric simulation. In addition, a more complete 
understanding of the developmental course of this process may be invaluable for 
therapeutic interventions. We know that newborn babies can imitate, and the 
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suggestion is that this skill is a precursor to ToM and empathy (Meltzoff and 
Decety, - 2003). We do not know whether simulation or the use of shared 
representations is an intermediary stage in ordinary development (that remains a 
useful strategy for understanding affective states - see chapter 4) that may be 
preserved in milder forms of autism. Furthermore, does egocentric simulation 
result from participants simply employing executive processes in some kind of 
compensatory strategy or is it part of the dedicated social cognition module? The 
association and/or dissociation between both types of simulation and theory-theory 
processes", including their neural and cognitive bases, also needs to be further 
explored, in order to build a complete picture of the processes involved in social 
cognition. 
4.1 Conclusions 
4.1.1 Depersonalisation Disorder and Empath 
The main finding of interest is that people with DPD do not display the same 
physiological reactions to other people's affective states as other groups. With 
both sad and happy affective states the reactions they display are in fact opposite 
to those predicted suggesting that they were not emotionally in tune with the 
protagonist. This may contribute to their subjective lack of empathy. Their lack of 
a personal distress' to others peoples affective states also indicates 'emotional 
blunting'. 
However, the results from the trait task suggest that despite their lack of a 
physiological egocentric reaction, people with DPD may still have the cognitive 
underpinnings of personal distress, namely an egocentric representation of others' 
affective states. The trait task indicates that for the DPD group, intersubjectivity 
2 'Although both allocentric simulation and theory-theory processes require a full appreciation of the 
self/other distinction they differ conceptually as the former also utilises the 'self-concept'. 
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relies on the 'self more than it does in control groups. This fits with recent 
cog nitive-behavioural models which suggest that people with DPD have an 
excessive self-focus. 
It is not clear whether these two components of empathy are linked. It may be that 
facilitating an allocentric viewpoint would automatically lead to appropriate 
physiological reactions or vice versa but this is not clear from the current data. 
More studies need to be undertaken to ascertain the relationship between these 
two processes and to construct a full and comprehensive model of empathy in both 
healthy and clinical groups. In the meantime, it may be worthwhile monitoring the 
effect strategies which aim to remove excessive self focus, have on emotional 
blunting per se including affect in response to other people's emotional states. 
4.1.2 Asperger's Syndrome and Empath 
The main finding for the AS group is that they can indeed label other people's 
emotional states and that this seems to be based on a type of simulation rather 
than purely rule-based reasoning. However, although the evidence suggests 
people with AS are using an online strategy, it is not possible to derive this 
definitively from these data alone and replications and further explorations are 
needed. The data also suggest that people with AS show physiological reactions 
similar to those of controls (or 'neurotypicals', in the words of PK who has 
Asperger's Syndrome) and consistent with empathic reactions to other people's 
affective states, although these reactions seem to stem from the application of a 
largely egocentric processing strategy. 
Although it is exciting to a find this preserved skill in the social cognitive domain, 
real-life social interaction is not as fractionated as empirical tests, and situations 
without complex representational states where emotional states appear in isolation, 
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probably occur rarely. People with AS have been shown to do badly on more 
naturalistic studies of social cognition (see above) and in addition, they may 
process facial affect in a different way to controls [although see chapter 6 and Blair 
(2003a)]. Blair (2003a) also points out that ToM is necessary for social referencing 
which is an integral part of online social interaction. Despite this, it is useful to 
know that people with AS are relatively intact on this basic social cognitive skill and 
this may be of help in devising training interventions, if required. This may be 
especially so for more severe cases if this basic skill (empathy) can be enhanced 
rather than other more complex methods of attributing mental states. 
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Dissociating the Components of Empathy 
1. Backqround 
A major function of 'theory of mind' 
(ToM) is the attribution of epistemic Contents at a qlance 
representational states, which in 1. Background 
some respects require more complex LI Socio-cognitive ToM 
processing than pure affective states. 1.2 Socio-perceptual ToM 
A distinction has been made between 
2. Methods 
the socio-cognitive and socio- 
2.1 Participants 
perceptual aspects of ToM (Tager- 
2.2 Measures 
Flusberg and Sullivan, 2000) which 
rests on the type of stimuli 
2.2.1 ToM task 
communicating the mental state. The 
2.2.2 Eyes Test 
former are said to be specialised for 2.3 Procedure 
representational mental states and 3. Results 
the latter for appreciating mental 3.1 ToM task 
states from facial and bodily 3.2 Eyes Test 
expressions (which are largely, 
4. Discussion 
although not solely, affecýe). This 
distinction is similar 
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to the earlier division between 'hot' and cold' cognition (see chapter 1) and may have 
important implications for the type of processes required. 
This chapter will describe data that tap both domains, using standardised measures, 
from people with Asperger's Syndrome (AS) and those with Depersonalisation 
Disorder (DPD). The AS group were tested on both first and second order socio- 
cognitive ToM tasks that have been successfully validated on healthy and clinical adult 
populations (Rowe et aL, 2001). In addition, both groups were tested on complex 
mental state attribution from pictures of the eyes alone - the 'Reading the Mind in 
Eyes Task' (Baron-Cohen et aL, 2001). 
1.1 Socio-Coqnitive ToM 
The phrase `ToM' was originally used to refer solely to the ability to appreciate 
representational epistemic states, which are said by some to invoke a theoretical 
reasoning strategy (see Zahavi and Parnas, 2003). However, it is often used more 
broadly now (see chapter 1). The idea that people with autistic spectrum disorders 
(ASDs) have problems appreciating these types of mental states is well established 
and has been the focus of a large research program (Baron-Cohen, 1999b, Frith, 
2001, Frith, 2003) since the 1980's (Premack and Woodruff, 1978, Wimmer and 
Perner, 1983). More recent work suggests that the appreciation of 'false belief may 
be the developmental basis of understanding 'interpretative diversity' or the idea that 
perception is an active process and 2 people can interpret identical stimuli in different 
ways (Luckett, 2002). Furthermore, it is now thought that the skills involved in the 
6 cold' aspects of ToM may well be dissociable from other aspects of empathy, as 
indicated by the fact that people who display signs of psychopathy tend to do well on 
such tasks despite deficits in other aspects of empathy (Blair, 1996). 
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Although the ToM account of ASDs is well documented, it is not altogether clear 
whether it fully explains the social difficulties shown in ASDs. Although most studies 
find that people with ASDs do not pass first and second order ToM tasks, some high- 
functioning individuals with autism pass these tests, including some people with 
Asperger's Syndrome. However, people with ASDs often reach this developmental 
milestone at a later chronological and/or verbal age than comparison groups (Baron- 
Cohen, 1999b, Frith, 2001) and the same people still tend to have problems with more 
naturalistic (Frith, 2001, Joliffe and Baron-Cohen, 1999, Heavey et at, 2000) or more 
difficult tasks (Klin, 2000). 
One explanation for this inconsistency is the relationship between 'executive 
dysfunction' and 'ToM'. There is a body of evidence that suggests that people with 
ASIDs may have problems with executive function skills (Hughes et aL, 1994). These 
executive function skills which enable us to 'maintain an appropriate problem-solving 
set for the attainment of a future goal' (Griffith et aL, 1999) and include skills such as 
cognitive flexibility, planning and set-shifting. The idea is that problems applying these 
skills underlie the social deficits observed in ASDs. The fact that people with AS 
sometimes show 'executive dysfunction' but do not always show 'ToM' deficits 
(Ozonoff et aL, 1991) and people with more severe ASDs show problem in both areas, 
has been taken as evidence for a causal role for executive functions. However, the 
results have been inconsistent with some young children with autism displaying 
severe ToM deficits but yet do not display executive dysfunction (Griffith at at, 1999). 
Furthermore, recent studies have found these two sets of skills to be dissociated in 
people with selective brain damage (Fine et aL, 2001, Bach et aL, 2000). 
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An alternative explanation for the apparently successful performance of high- 
functioning people with ASIDs on ToM tasks, is that they manage to 'hack out' (Luckett, 
2002, Happe, 1994a) unusual ways of solving such tasks and employ compensatory 
strategies (Frith, 2001, Frith and Happe, 1999). This suggests that the apparently 
preserved skills do not represent an actual sparing of 7oM'. This is consistent with 
the observation that people with AS need a higher verbal IQ than control groups to 
pass such tasks suggesting language may provide 'an alternative neuro-cognitive 
route to representational thought' (Fisher, 2002). The differential brain activation (as 
compared to controls) observed in a group of 5 men with AS during first and second 
order ToM tasks (Happe et aL, 1996) sits well with this hypothesis. 
Lastly, aside from verbal intelligence, there has been some debate regarding the 
influence of other aspects of IQ on ToM reasoning (Buitelaar, 1997, Happe, 1994b), 
although, as already discussed in relation to verbal IQ, it may be a simple case of 
intelligence masking the deficits in both ToM' and 'executive function'. Bearing all 
these issues in mind, it is surprising that people with Asperger's Syndrome and high- 
functioning autism are often lumped together in experimental studies, as the diagnostic 
distinction between the two is based on language and intelligence. In fact, Ozonoff 
(1991) argued that 'collapsing groups with different abilities for the purposes of 
research projects may obscure relationships and patterns that might be apparent if a 
more homogenous sample had been used'. If such a 'mixed group' approach Is 
adopted then it is important to match individuals cases to controls using the person-to- 
person method (Buitelaar, 1997) in order to control for both between group differences 
and variation within the groups. 
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In the current chapter, participants with AS were tested on first and second order'ToM' 
reasoning tasks in order to further unravel the processes at play in this type of 
reasoning. These data, when considered along with that from preceding chapters, 
also allowed the exploration of any association or dissociation between some of the 
different components of empathy such as ToM and emotional resonance, (Blair, 1996). 
However, as there was no reason to believe that people with DPD would display 
problems in this domain ('cold' mental state attribution) they were not given this task. 
1.2 Socio-perceptual ToM 
People with ASDs may also have particular problems with the socio-perceptual or 'hot' 
aspects of ToM (see chapter 1 and 5). However, despite evidence of a deficit (Blair, 
1996, Hobson et aL, 1988) the exact nature is unclear. One study suggests that the 
observed deficits in facial affect processing may not actually be specific to facial stimuli 
(Davies et aL, 1994). In contrast, another study indicates that the problems may be 
isolable to social rather than simple basic emotional states (Capps et aL, 1992). More 
recent studies suggest that people with ASDs may rely on different strategies to 
decode facial affect (Bormann-Kischkel et aL, 1995, Hall et aL, 2003). For instance, it 
may be that as a group, people with ASI)s pay more attention to the mouth than other 
regions of the face such as the eyes (Joseph and Tanaka, 2003, Klin et aL, 2002). Yet 
a further alternative view, is that people with ASDs may perform as well as groups that 
are properly matched for verbal IQ and age (Ozonoff et aL, 1990). 
The idea that people with ASDs process facial expressions in a distinctive way is 
partially backed up by recent WRI studies which suggest they do not activate the 
traditional 'fusiform face area'when perceiving facial affect (Critchley et 8L, 2000, Ogal 
et aL, 2003, Pierce et aL, 2001). Although one study has implicated the fusiform 'face' 
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area with expertise rather than face processing per se (Gauthier et aL, 1999). So it is 
entirely possible that, as a result of their symptomatology, people with ASDs have 
simply failed to develop expertise in this area. However, the picture is far from clear 
and in a recent review article, Blair (2003c) argues in line with Ozonoff (1990) - see 
above - that the findings to date regarding difficulties in emotional processing arise 
through insufficient matching on mental age. In addition, several studies have not 
found impairments in the recognition of basic emotion from facial affect - see above 
plus Adolphs (2001 b)22 - which may mean that the problem is specific to complex 
emotional states. 
Regarding AS, one 'pilot study' (so described because of the incomplete nature of the 
diagnosis) found 10 people with AS to be impaired on recognising facial affect and 
affective prosody (Adolphs et aL, 2001 b). Another pair of case studies included one 
young man with AS to be impaired on labelling facial affect, but the other performed as 
well as controls (Shamay-Tsoory et at., 2002). However, one study has specifically 
addressed the use of compensatory strategies in such tasks and found actual 
evidence of differential processing of socio-perceptual stimuli, in people with AS 
(Shamay-Tsoory et aL, 2002). Thirteen people with AS and age and verbal IQ 
matched controls took part in 3 tests of emotion recognition. The first involved the 
simple matching of emotion words, the second the matching of emotional faces and 
words, and the last again required the matching of faces and words, however, the 
faces were already presented with an accompanying word which was sometimes 
incongruent Le. happy face with 'happy' and happy face with 'fear'. The people with 
AS performed significantly worse when identifying the emotion accompanied by an 
22 Although this study did findla deficits in people with ASI)s in making 'social judgements' from facial 
but not lexical stimuli. 
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incongruent word, despite showing similar performance on the other tasks. This 
suggests that the verbal information was more salient to them than the subjective 
affective information. This very much hints at the use of alternative, largely verbal 
route in solving such tasks 
Another study tested those with high-functioning autism and AS on a test requiring 
mental state attribution from the eyes alone and found a lower accuracy rate than that 
displayed by controls (Baron-Cohen et aL, 2001). It is arguably easier to use unusual 
compensatory routes to decode facial affect from the whole face and/or basic 
emotions. The 'Reading the Mind from the Eyes Test', however, tests for more 
complex mental states with limited cues and so it is less likely that it can be solved 
using such routes. 
Furthermore, using fMRI techniques to measure brain activation during performance 
on this task, Baron-Cohen et aL, (2000) found that a group comprising people with AS 
and HFA failed to activate some of the same regions as the control group (the 
amygdala), again indicative of differential processing (Baron-Cohen et aL, 2000). On 
the basis of this and other evidence the authors propose an 'amygdala' theory of 
autism which finds further backing in the literature (Adolphs at al., 2001b, Howard et 
aL, 2000). Further support for the role of the amygdala in the 'Eyes' task can be found 
in brain lesion studies (Shaw et aL, 2003a). However, it should be pointed out that 
other areas thought to be involved in more traditional ToM tasks Le. prefrontal areas 
were also activated in controls during this task. 
The 'Reading the Mind in the Eyes' task has also been given to adults with 
psychopathy who were not found to perform worse than controls (Richell et aL, 2003). 
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Turning to people with DPID, if we accept that like people with psychopathy, those with 
DPD may have problems with empathy (see above and previous chapter) and may 
show blunted physiological responses to emotions, these results may be of help in 
predicting the performance of the DPD group on this task. However, there is some 
debate as to how these findings fit with the current literature. There is a body of 
evidence suggesting that people with psychopathy have amygdala dysfunction (Blair, 
2003b) which fits with other accounts of the amygdala as being involved with emotion 
processing (see chapter 7). If true, and the amygdala is involved in the eyes task, 
then this would predict that people with psychopathy would find this task particularly 
difficult, yet this is not the case. 
Richell et aL, (2003) suggest an alternative explanation for this paradox. They 
propose that the task recruits the amygdala where possible (and remember that it was 
only one area in a circuitry thought to be important for such tasks) but that other 
compensatory cortical routes may be developed to circumnavigate a dysfunctional 
amygdala if the 'lesion' occurs at an early developmental stage. This explanation is in 
line with the intact performance of some psychopaths on other ToM' tasks (see 
above), since they are presumed to have developmental difficulties which have been 
compensated for. The authors also argue that their account explains the severity of 
deficits observed in children with psychopathic tendencies as compared to 
psychopathic adults (Richell et aL, 2003). 
A recent comprehensive study examining a large group of people with amygdala 
damage occurring at different developmental stages, found that early as opposed to 
twts . late damage resulted in ToM deficits on socio-cognitive tasks (Shaw et 8L, 20call 
VV 
This is contrary to Blair's assertion that compensatory cortical routes are established In 
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response to early amygdala damage. However, Blair's claim refers to socio- 
perceptual rather than socio-cognitive ToM and it may be that such compensatory 
routes are more readily developed to circumnavigate the latter kind of deficit. At this 
stage the role of the amygdala in different developmental disorders remains unclear, 
particularly as the theory seems to lack specificity with there being both an amygdala 
theory of ASDs and psychopathy (see chapter 7 for more thorough review). 
In terms of adults with DIDID, it is not expected that they will show deficits on this task 
since despite their subjective problems with empathy these are not generally 
observed. Even if people with IDPID share some characteristics with those with 
psychopathy, such as emotional blunting and lack of the affective components of 
empathy (see chapter 5), this would not necessarily interfere with their inability to 
decode complex mental states. Furthermore, if the amygdala is specifically involved in 
the perception of complex mental states from the eyes, and it exerts its maximal effect 
when the damage is early, then there is no reason to believe the DPID group, whose 
1A. Fa43 - 
problems have a typically adult/adolescent onset (Shaw et al., 2004t), will be impaired 
A 
on this task. It is predicted that: 
0 The AS group will be able to perform accurately first order ToM tasks although 
they may have problems with second order tasks. 
0 The AS group will be significantly less accurate than a control group at 
decoding mental states from photographs of the eyes. 
0 The DPD group will not show any difference from controls in their ability to 





The same participants will be used as those described in chapter ý and 5 (see chapter 
3, p2&4 for demographic details). The Eyes task was administered to all 3 groups 
(controls n= 48) and the Rowe tasks to the Asperger's group and all the control 
participants (n = 53). 
2.2 Measures 
2.2.1 ToM task 
This is a test of advanced 'ToM' ability (Rowe et aL, 2001) that has previously been 
validated on both healthy volunteers and people with frontal lobe damage. It tests 
both first and second order ToM inference (see appendix 5 and 2) and is aimed at a 
general adult population. In the original study there were 12 vignettes, 6 first order and 
6 second order; however due to time constraints, 4 vignettes were used in the current 
study -2 first order and 2 second order. Each vignette was followed by a set of 
questions: 
i) False belief test question - taps the ability to make mental state inferences 
regarding a false belief. 
ii) Inference question - tests the capacity make non-mental state inferences. 
W) Fact question - focuses on facts about the relevant events that are integral 
to the false understanding. 
iv)Memory question - to assess the role of memory in the task. 
The data from this task were coded according to the author's original scoring metho& 
The responses for 20 participants were rated independently by 2 people in order to 
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examine inter-rater reliability. For the control sample there was 97.5% agreement for 
the first order tasks and 92.5% agreement for the second order tasks with 98% 
agreement for the inference, memory and fact questions. All 16 responses for the 
clinical group were also coded by 2 independent raters and there was 100% 
agreement for first order tasks and 97 % for second order tasks. 
In order to further explore the data, the control group responses were also coded for 
Ogist' -1 point being allocated for an answer being partially correct and 2 points for 
fully correct. This additional coding strategy was formalised when collecting data from 
the clinical group, and an additional probe question was included, designed to elicit the 
extent to which the participant understood the extract 
2.2.2 Eves Test 
In the 'Reading the Mind from the Eyes Test' (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001), participants 
are required to look at a photograph of an actor's eyes and choose one of 4 words that 
best describes what the actor is thinking or feeling. The task is one of mental state 
inference from socio-perceptual cues as opposed to verbal material and it has been 
shown to reliably distinguish between groups of healthy volunteers and those with 
AS/HFA. Participants were allocated 1 point for a correct answer yielding a total score 
out of 36. 
2.3 Procedure 
The first and second order 'ToM' tasks were presented in written format as opposed to 
orally. Participants were given the extract and told to read it as carefully as they would 
be required to answer questions afterwards and would not be able to refer back to the 
extract. The extracts were then presented in a counterbalanced order using a 
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reversed 4x4 Latin Square along with 4 diary vignette (see chapter 4) i. e. one 
vignette followed by one ToM extract. 
For all groups, the Eyes task was, however, presented at the end of the testing 
session. The task was self-paced and participants were required to say their answer 
out loud as opposed to writing it down. The instructions were adapted slightly to 
incorporate this change: 
For each set of eyes, choose and say out loud the word which best describes what the person in the 
picture is thinking or feeling. You may feel that more than one word is applicable but Please j LISt chOOSC 
one word, the word which you consider to be most suitable. Before making your ChOiCC, make sure that 
you [lave read all 4 words. You should try to do the task as quickly its possible. Ifyou reallý don't kno\\ 
what a word means you can look it up in the definition handout. 
3. Results 
The dataset for each task was examined for normality and if necessary, the data were 
transformed using the appropriate method e. g. logarithmic and square root. This was 
followed by simple analyses to compare group performance on each Uisk. 
Demographic factors were then explored: gender, education (measured categorically), 
age, occupation (whether or not the participant was a mental health worker) and verbal 
IQ were considered. Lastly, a full analysis was conducted to examine group 
differences on the dependant variable for each task, adjusting for any demographic 
factors previously shown to be of relevance. 
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To summarise, for each task the following analyses were conducted: 
9A simple analysis to examine group differences on the dependant variable. 
*A simple analysis to explore the association between demographic factors and 
the depenclant variable. 
A full factorial analysis to examine group differences on the dependant variable 
whilst controlling for the necessary demographic factors. 
3.1 ToM Task. 
Simple group analysis 
Initially, mean and standard deviation percentage accuracy scores were calculated for 
each pair of first and second order ToM tasks in order to allow comparison with the 
normative data (see Table 6.1). 
Table 6.1: Mean and SD accuracv rates on false belief questions 
Second order 
First order vignettes - First order vignettes - vignettes - no Seco nd order 
no. correct % correct vignettes - correct 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
CONTROL 1.32 
. 78 66.04 
38.94 
. 34 48 17 23 93 
AS 
. 
81 40 40.63 20.16 . 
38 
ý62 18 75 30 96 
As the data significantly differed from the normative data provided by Rowe et al., 
(2001) (first order 88%/second order 66%) and this was most marked on the second 
order tasks, the data were examined more closely. It transpired that only 4 people 
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managed to express the correct attribution on one of the second order extracts. This 
task was therefore dropped from subsequent analysis. 
The remaining data were reconverted to raw scores. They were non-normally 
distributed so non-parametric tests were used to examine group differences. A Mann- 
Whitney test revealed significant group differences (z = -2.27, p= . 023) on the test 
questions and it seems that the AS group found this task more difficult than controls. 
There were also significant group differences on the non-mental state inference 
question in the same direction (z = -1.96, p= . 05). However, this was 
found to be 
statistically independent of accuracy rate on the test question (F(1,65) 0.59, p> . 05) 
when entered into the analysis as a covariate. There were no group differences on 
either the memory (z = -. 1.54, p> . 05) or fact questions (z = -1.11, p> . 05). Chi 
squared analyses also revealed no significant group differences on the type of 
attribution made on these 3 tasks. 
Demographic factors 
Analyses were then conducted to examine the effect of various demographic factors 
on accuracy rate on the 3 remaining ToM extracts. One instance of missing education 
data was substituted with the group mean. The percentage of correct answers was 
not related to age (t = -0.17, df 62, p> . 05), gender (t 3.14, df 62, p> . 05), verbal 
IQ - based on a median split at 122 - (t = 1.55, df 58, p> . 05), however, it was related 
to the presence or absence of postgraduate education 23 (t =-2.77, df 64, p= . 07), and 
full IQ as estimated from the NART (t = 2.59, df 58, p =. 012). 
23 Presence or absence of postgraduate education showed the largest effect so statistical values are based 




Next an ANCOVA was conducted in order to control for the demographic variables. 
Although parametric assumptions were not met there was fairly large sample size and 
homogeneity of variance, so a decision was taken to use this test as no equivalent 
non-parametric method exists. Accuracy rate was the dependant variable and there 
were 2 between group factors i) diagnostic group (2 levels) and ii) postgraduate 
education (2 levels) and with full scale IQ as a covariate. There was no interaction 
between full scale IQ and group (F(j, 6o) . 83, p> . 05) suggesting the assumption of 
homogeneity of regression slope were met and the groups displayed similar 
relationships between IQ and accuracy rates. 
The full factorial model was run and the main effect previously observed for group 
disappeared (F(l, 60) = 1.59, p> . 05) with the dataset adjusted for full scale IQ (see 
Table 6.2). 
Table 6.2: Between-participants effects on % correct on first and second order ToM 
tasks adousted for IQ 
Tests of Between-PartIcipants Effects 
I Type III Sum of Squares df ManSqU2re F Sig. 
Corrected Model 8985.11 4 2246.277 3.1851 . 02 
Intercept 1083.64 1 1083.643.1 1.536 1 . 22 
; IQ 2157.83 1 2157.830 1 3.059 1.086 1 
GROUP 1118.22 1 111 8.22Z 1-. 5 8-Ti .2 13 
EDUCATION 8.33 1 8.33 . 012 1.914 
GROUP * EDUCATION i 291.99 11 291.99 1 . 414 
1.5231 
Error 38792.67 1 551 705.32 1 
Total 197777.78 1 1 1 
Corrected Total 47777.78 1 591 1 
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There was no main effect for education, (F(l, ro) = . 012, p> . 05) 10 or any interaction 
(see above). However, full scale IQ as estimated from the NART was approaching 
significance (F(l, rO) = 3.06, p= . 086) suggesting this accounted for the majority of the 
variance in this task. It seems that despite the fact that these two groups appeared 
fairly well matched on full scale IQ (AS grp mean = 117.29 ± 5.83 and control mean = 
120.56 ± 4.61) there were significant differences on this variable (t = 2.239, df 61, p= 
. 029) which may have influenced performance on this task, hence the earlier 
significant result. 
Lastly, the data for the extra coding strategies were transformed to percentage 
accuracy rate overall for all 4 first and second order tasks and these were found to be 
78.1 % for the AS group and 70% for the controls. 
3.2 The Eves Test 
Simple group analyses 


























Both clinical groups met the assumption of normality but this was violated in the 
healthy control group. The dataset was examined for outliers and two cases 
dropped (one person scoring 16 and another of 19 - see table 3 for means and 
SD's), however, the sample still remained negatively skewed. But as the sample 
size was considered sufficient and there was homogeneity of variance, parametric 
tests were used. A one way ANOVA with post hoc Scheft tests revealed near 
significant differences between the AS and control groups on the task (F(2,81) 
2.97, p= . 057) suggesting that as predicted the AS group performed significantly 
less well than controls. 
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Table 6.3: Mean and SD Score on'eves'tes 
Mean SD 
group CONTROL 27.22 3.37 51 
AS 24.88 4.4 16 
DPD 27.47 3.16 16 
Demographic factors 
Next the influence of demographic factors on accuracy rate on this task was 
examined. Gender (t = -2.25, df 80, p= . 027), education (t = -. 2.32, df 80, p= . 023) 
and verbal IQ (t = 2.19, df 74, p= . 032) all played a significant role in accuracy in 
decoding mental states from the eyes. To control for the potentially confounding 
effects of these variables they were all entered in subsequent analysis (the AS group 
comprised 2 women and 14 men). 
Full analysis 
An ANCOVA with 3 between group factors (gender: 2 levels, education: 2 levels and 
group: 3 levels) and I covariate (verbal 10) was performed (see Table 6.4). 
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Table6.4: Between-12articipants effect on the 'eves test' adiusted for verbal IQ 
Tests of Between-Participants Effects 
I 
tI Type III Sum of Squares df 
I Mean Square IF Sig. 
Corrected Model 364.71 11 1 33.16 3.176 . 0021 
, Intercept 4.49 17 4.49 . 430 
1.514 
VERBALIQ 135.44 1 135.44 1 12.97511.0011 
GROUP 40.13 2 20.06 1.922 
SEX 42.6 1 42.6 4.081 1.048 
EDUCATION 6.74 17 6.74 . 646 . 4251 GROUP*SEX 14.5 2 7.25 . 695 . 503 
GROUP * EDUCATION .3 2 . 15 . 014 . 9861 
SEX * EDUCATION . 54 11 . 54 . 052 . 8211 
j GROUP * SEX * EDUCATION 1.43 11 1.43 1 . 137 
1.7121 
Erro r 668.07 
1 641 10.44 
Total 55737 1 761 
Corrected Total 1032.78 1 751 
The homogeneity of regression lines assumption was met and there was homogeneity 
of variance. There was a significant main effect for gender (F(j, 76) = 4.08, p=0.48) 
and verbal IQ (F(1.76) ý 12.08, p= . 001) accounting for better performance in females 
and those with higher 10's. However, group differences were not significant (F(2,76) 0 
1.92, p= . 155) and neither were any of the interactions (see Figure 6.2). This 
suggests that the demographic and other general factors were more important In this 
task rather than group membership. Despite the non-significant effect for group there 
was a near significant difference using planned contrasts between the DPD and 















control AS DPD 
4. 
This group of people with Asperger's Syndrome performed significantly less well 
than the control group on both the socio-perceptual and socio-cognitive ToM task. 
Howeve r, these effects largely disappeared once the domain general skill of 
intelligence was fully controlled. The DPD group however performed in line with 
predictions and did not display any problems on the 'Reading the Mind from the 
Eyes' task, and in fact they were found to perform particularly well suggesting 
comparisons between DPD and psychopathy may be fruitful. 
The interpretation given for performance on the Rowe et al, (2001) 2 nd order ToM 
tasks is hampered by the low accuracy rate observed in healthy controls. For some 
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reason, all participants found one of the second order tasks particularly difficult. 
Unfortunately, scores on this specific extract were not reported in the normative data, 
so it is not clear whether or not these results are consistent with the original study. 
This is compounded by the fact that the original study used 12 vignettes (as opposed 
to 4), so poor performance on only one extract would be obscured in the grand mean. 
This disparity and resulting small range of scores may also account for the lower 
accuracy rates reported overall, even when the particularly difficult extract was 
dropped. 
Alternatively, it is possible that the control group selected were not reasonably 
representative of the normal population. However, this is unlikely as the groups' 
performance on other standardised tests (see chapter 3) suggests otherwise. Aside 
from these possibilities, the only other known difference between this and the original 
study is that the extracts were originally presented orally, compared to the written 
format in the current study and that the instructions were adapted to reflect this. It 
seems improbable that this could account for the discrepancy in accuracy rates. 
Despite the lack of consistency regarding accuracy on this test, it is still possible to 
obtain some insight into the key processes needed to solve such tasks. Group 
differences were found on both the mental state and non-mental state inference 
questions. However, none were found once full scale 10 as estimated from the NART 
was controlled. This lack of group difference once IQ was taken into account, 
suggests IQ plays an important role in 'ToM' tasks and that the previously observed 
group differences are likely to be due to domain general rather than specific 
processes. Although the mean IQ for the AS group was quite high in this study, there 
were significant group differences on this variable and approximately 20% more 
216 
Chapter 6 
variance in the clinical group. It is therefore possible that the near significant effect for 
IQ partially resulted from the wider range of scores in the clinical group. If so then a 
reasonable explanation for these findings is that those with high IQs in the clinical 
group were able to apply compensatory strategies (see above) in line with the 'hacking 
out' hypothesis. This option may not be available to people with sub-acute focal brain 
damage. 
Interestingly, these findings are not necessarily inconsistent with Rowe and 
-colleagues' original study in which the authors found no significant group differences 
on verbal or full scale IQ. In that study, it appears there may have also been more 
variation in IQ in the clinical groups (control SD 8.3, cases SID 13.35). This suggests 
that individuals were not specifically matched on this factor and it is therefore possible 
that this failure to match cases and controls pairwise may have accounted for some of 
the variance in error rate. Furthermore, 10 was not entered as a covariate in the final 
analyses. 
In addition, the discrepancy between the original and additional coding strategies 
employed suggests that both groups understood more than they managed to express 
- or failed to express their knowledge in explicit 'mentalising' terms as required by the 
experimenter i. e. 'he thinks she thinks' etc. It also seems that the scoring procedure on 
this task was perhaps more stringent than other similar tasks (Happe, 1994a) as items 
were automatically considered incorrect if they did not relate very closely to the 
prototypical answer. Unfortunately, tasks such as these lose the objective and 
definitive qualities of first order false belief tasks, as accuracy rates are to some extent 
based on the ability of participants to express their 'mentalising' ability in a particular 
and specific way. In support of this idea, some argue that the use of such language is 
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indicative of 'spontaneous' mentalising (Happe, 1994a), however, it is also possible 
that such tasks tap other skills such as the pragmatic language ability with which 
people with ASI)s and frontal lobe damage (Rowe et aL, 2001) may have problems. In 
one study requiring the attribution of mental states to geometric shapes - see above - 
(Klin, 2000) people with AS (as opposed to other ASDs) were found to improve their 
performance when additional, more explicit, instructions were given. 
In the current paradigm, however. the authors in the original study ruled out the latter 
explanation because although the clinical group answered the non-mental state 
inference questions incorrectly, which they took to be a measure of pragmatic 
language skill, performance on these items was statistically independent from the main 
effects. The same pattern of results was also found in the current study. However, 
this line of reasoning is based on the assumption that pragmatic language ability is 
equal for both sets of questions i. e. both mental and non-mental state inference 
questions and it is not entirely clear that this is the case. It is in fact possible (and 
seems likely) that the non-mental state inference questions are less ambiguous, with 
their pragmatic purpose being more explicit rather than in the test questions, for 
example: 
Test Question: Why does Richard say this? 
Control Participants Responses: 'Because he assumes she hasn't got the message, and so thinks he 
hasn't been home and started'. 
Inference Question: Why do you think Ann needed to hurry to get to the DlY shop? 
Control Participants Responses: 'Because it closed at 6pm. ' 
218 
Chapter 6 
If this is the case, and the mental state items tap pragmatic language ability more so 
than the non-mental state items, then such language ability would be a potential 
confound. In the current study, the group differences were larger for the mental state 
inference items which by this line of reasoning could reflect the role of increased 
ambiguity and the need for pragmatic language ability. This explanation is consistent 
with the findings from the alternative coding system which yielded higher accuracy 
rates, and the fact that the control group showed a lower accuracy rates than 
expected, suggesting they also found the items ambiguous. 
Interestingly, the opposite of failing to appreciate the pragmatic cues of a situation, is a 
well known phenomenon within psychology known as 'demand characteristics'. This Is 
the ability of more socially skilled people to pick up the requirements of the 
experimenter that have only been implied, although this is not restricted to language. It 
is possible that this may have occurred with some individuals in the control group. In 
replication, more explicit instructions and unambiguous questions, perhaps with 
examples, may lead to a higher accuracy rate across groups. Furthermore, due to the 
subjective nature of such tasks it is important that co-validation be performed with at 
least one rater blind to the clinical group which, unfortunately, was not possible in the 
current study. 
Turning to the 'Reading the Mind in the Eyes' task, the finding that people with 
Asperger's Syndrome had a lower accuracy rate. than controls on this task is 
consistent with previous findings. Again this effect disappeared once IQ was 
statistically controlled. This suggests the task again taps domain general rather than 
specific skills. In the original study, verbal IQ was not controlled in all the comparison 
groups, but a comparison group matched for verbal IQ was selected, and group 
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differences were still found. Again it is not clear whether the individuals were matched 
for IQ or the group overall, although the SID was larger in the clinical group, suggesting 
more variation. 
A further difference between this and the original study is that the latter did not 
statistically control for gender differences. If verbal IQ and gender differences do play 
significant roles in performance on the eyes task, then perhaps these factors account 
for some of the variance in the original study as opposed to simply domain specific 
group differences. There are two possible explanations for the role of verbal IQ in this 
task, firstly, that it is the basis of compensatory strategies in the ASD group (as with 
the socio-cognitive task) or secondly, that it exerts an influence through the verbal load 
of the task. The latter is unlikely as participants were provided with a handout detailing 
definitions and examples of all the words used. It seems more probable that this 
group of people with AS, who had particularly high IQ's, were also able to put that 
intelligence to use in solving the task using unusual strategies. In replication, it may 
be worth coding the data according to the more sensitive coding strategy suggested by 
Adolphs et aL, (2002). This approach uses the actual responses of the control group 
as a baseline rather than the data gathered when the task was developed 
The fact that IQ accounted for much of the variance in both 'ToM' tasks does suggest 
that people with AS and high IQs can construct and employ compensatory strategies 
to meet the requirements of such experimental tasks. This is in line with previous 
studies and highlight the gap between performance on empirical tests that are 
purposely fractionated for experimental control and real-life online situations with rapid 
and dynamic stimuli (KIin et aL, 2000). 
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The DPD group performed as well as controls which is in line with the performance of 
people with psychopathy, suggesting this group can decode complex affective states. 
Furthermore, despite a non significant main effect there is some evidence to suggest 
superior performance once IQ and gender were controlled. To find that this group may 
be particularly good at this task, whilst failing to show physiological arousal (see 
chapter 5) suggests a profile that is similar to psychopathy. Although, there are 
obvious phenomenological differences between the two groups, comparisons may be 
useful theoretically. 
Lastly, if the data from the AS group are taken to represent an instance of successful 
compensatory strategies rather than spared 7oM' ability, then the possibility of 
dissociation between some aspects of 'affective empathy' becomes tenable (Blair, 
1996). In chapter 5, the suggestion was that those with DPD did not have the 
emotional arousal necessary for 'affective empathy' in contrast to the AS group. 
However, in this chapter, the AS group seem to use unusual processing routes to 
decode complex mental states whereas the DPD group displayed no problems with 
this aspect of empathy. This may provide additional evidence of a 'double 
dissociation' (Blair, 1996) between some components of empathy i. e. 'ToM, and 
physiological response, and is in line with earlier evidence suggesting a dissociation 
between psychopathy and ASI)s (Blair, 1996). This does not, however, stretch to the 
other aspects of empathy identified such as labelling affective states from non-facial 
stimuli and the use of the self-concept. 
In replication, it would be useful to employ more sensitive indices of the strategies 
employed such as reaction times and fully match individuals within the groups on IQ, 
gender and education. This is especially true since the control group in the current 
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study may not have been representative of the normal population regarding education, 
although there was no significant main effect for education in any of the analyses. It 
may also be helpful to formally gather qualitative and subjective data as to the nature 
of the processes employed, especially as the groups detailed here probably have 
sufficient insight. Regarding the socio-cognitive ToM task more explicit task 
instructions as to the nature of response required to get the question correct, with 
perhaps a few examples beforehand, may prevent responses being scored as 
incorrect simply on the basis of ambiguity. This would have to be balanced against the 
risk of inducing a response set as a result of priming the participants. 
4.1 Conclusions 
In summary, it appears that people with Asperger's Syndrome may employ unusual 
strategies to pass first and second order ToM reasoning tasks in an experimental 
setting. However, it is not clear how much these tasks tap additional skills such as 
pragmatic language ability. People with AS were also found to perform at the same 
level of controls on the 'Reading the Mind in the Eyes' task once factors such as 
gender and IQ were controlled. Again, due to the variation in IQ in the clinical group, 
including a number of individuals with quite high IQ's, it is likely that this is due to 
reliance on complex and unusual rule-based compensatory strategies. 
To find that people who report DPD did well on the 'Reading the Mind from the Eyes' 
task suggests that their emotion perception skills are intact despite their lack of 
physiological responses to other people's affective states. This provides further 
Support for validity of comparisons between psychopathy and DPD. Lastly, data 
presented in this and the last chapter may go someway to suggest a 'double 
dissociation' between these two components of empathy (Blair, 1996). The DPD group 
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seem to have preserved 'ToM' ability but may lack the affective physiological 
component of empathy, whereas the AS group have may have the affective 
component intact but the 'ToM' component is impaired. 
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The Neural Correlates of Empathy 
1. Backqround 
Shallice (1989) has argued that multi- 
level theories in psychology have 
more predictive power than single 
level theories. In other words, the 
more we know about a process from 
different levels of explanation, the 
more likely we are to have an 
accurate understanding of use in 
explaining both existing and novel 
conditions. As well as adding to 
existing knowledge, localisation of 
cognitive functions to brain regions 
can also play an important role in 
'falsification' (Popper, 1963) and in 
helping to decide between competing 
theories (Shallice, 2003). 
Establishing the neural correlates of 
empathy and investigating how the 
different components may be 
fractionated, will therefore be of value 
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clinically applicable model. Cognitive functions can be localised within the brain 
through the study of people with selective brain damage -a method that has been 
used successfully for many years. However, relatively new techniques allow the 
mapping of cerebral blood flow and hence function, in vivo. Functional magnetic 
resonance brain imaging (fMRI) is particularly non-invasive as it relies on the magnetic 
properties of oxy- and deoxyhaemoglobin as opposed to the radioactive tracers used 
in other methods i. e. positron emission tomography (PET). In vivo techniques again 
play an important part in the 'falsification' process by providing new evidence for 
theories previously reliant on data from 'lesion' studies alone. In addition, these 
methods can tell us about the healthy as opposed to the injured non-typical brain, 
which may differ in important ways (Savoy, 2001). Such techniques may also be 
especially helpful in situations where processes are difficult to detect using simple 
cognitive paradigms i. e. when people use compensatory strategies (see chapters 5 
and 6). 
This chapter describes data gathered from a newly adapted test of social cognition 
designed to test the neural correlates of mental state attribution using naturalistic and 
hence more ecologically valid stimuli. The test is based on a well-validated and 
dynamic test of non-verbal sensitivity (Rosenthal et aL, 1979). For the current study, it 
was computerised, updated, and revised to suit an WRI paradigm. 
1.1 Socio-coqnitive ToM 
There is now a large body of research looking at the functional neuroanatomy of socio- 
cognitive ToM (Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan, 2000) or 'cold cognition' (Stone et al., 
1998), that is, the ability to attribute representational mental states (see Frith and Frith, 
2003 for a review) without reference to feelings and emotionýý; One of the first studies 
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was conducted by Fletcher and colleagues using a PET paradigrif'during which 
participants interpreted non-literal utterances, in the Happ6 Strange stories task 
(Happe, 1994a). ýActivation specific to the experimental condition was found in the left 
medial frontal gyrus and posterior cingulate cortex. 11A series of further studies using 
the same task also found the medial prefrontal areas to be activated (Vogeley et 8/., 
2001, Gallagher et al., 2000). eln addition, Gallagher et al., (2000) used similar stimuli 
in cartoon form designed to elicit representational ToM which again activated medial 
prefrontal areas along with the superior temporal sulcus and temporal poles. Frith and 
Frith (2003) point out that these 3 areas are consistently activated during the 
performance of such tasks/ 
'OThe medial prefrontal cortex has also been shown to be activated in studies that 
induce implicit mentalising such as a game of stone, paper, scissors (Gallagher et a/., 
2002) and in a game involving mutual co-operation (McCabe et aL, 2001). of interest 
is that this activation was specific to the condition where participants thought their 
opponent was a person rather than a computer, suggesting these areas are involved 
in detecting intentionality". Furtherhasks that evoke neural activation in medial frontal 
areas include a study using the Heider and Simmel (1944) paradigm in which 
participants view geometric shapes moving on a screen and then attribute mental 
states to them (Castelli et aL, 2002)*Lastly, the medial prefrontal cortex has also been 
implicated in imitation (Decety et aL, 2002) which is consistent with recent ideas that 
imitation my be a precursor to empathy (Meltzoff and Gopnik, 1993b)>d 
24 Baron-Cohen Proposes the existence of an intentionality detector which attributes intentions to agents 
that are moving and/or acting on objects. 
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A further study purporting to examine the neural correlates of empathy has also used 
stimuli that tap socio-cognitive ToM. Farrow et aL, (2001) had participants make a 
series of social judgements including some requiring empathy (understanding and 
appreciating the protagonists' emotional state) and forgiveability (deciding which 
crimes are more forgivable). Main activation for the empathy condition was found in 
the left anterior middle temporal gyrus. -ý 
Furthermore, Eslinger (1998) review data from their earlier study where a group of 40 
people who had suffered damage to their frontal lobes, undertook a series of empathy 
self-report measures (Grattan, 1994). As a group, they were found to score lower than 
the comparison group on items tapping both cognitive and emotional empathy (see 
chapter 2) although the authors conclude that this may be for different reasons. 
Inverse associations were found between measures of 'cognitive flexibility' and 
empathy suggesting that this executive function is key. These correlations were most 
evident for the people with left dorsolateral lesions. This led the authors to tentatively 
suggest that the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex may be specifically involved in 
perspective-taking or cognitive empathy by virtue of cognitive flexibility whilst the 
orbitofrontal cortex be more specialised for emotional empathy (also see Shamay et 
aL, 2003). This is also consistent with the somatic marker hypothesis (Damasio, 
1994). 
In addition, Stone et aL, (1998) found that people with bilateral orbitofrontal lesions 
had problems on a test of the faux pas whereas those with unilateral dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) did not. Detecting a faux pas requires the ability to integrate 
mental state attribution with empathy i. e. appreciating that the actions of the 
protagonist could have been hurtful, and it seems this may be where the problem lie. It 
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seems therefore that orbitofrontal areas may play a role in this integrative aspect of 
. 
empathy, fusing an appreciation of the epistemic and affective mental states of others. _ 
1.2 Socio-percentual ToM 
The neural correlates of socio-perceptual ToM or 'hot cognition', and In particular 
regarding facial affect, have been extensively characterised. One set of theories 
argue that the affective processing of each of the basic emotions is subserved by a 
dedicated unique neural substrate. Blair & Perschardt (2003) in response to Preston 
and deWaal (2003) point out that this possible fractionation of emotion perception has 
important implications for localising the neural correlates of empathy, assuming that 
empathy entails, in part invoking a similar mental state to that observed - be it fear, 
disgust, joy etc. The evidence for this position is most compelling for the role of the 
human amygdala in the processing of frightening stimuli. Several studies of people 
with bilateral lesions of the amygdala have found deficits in the recognition and 
evaluation of fearful faces (for instance see Adolphs et aL, 1994). This is 
complemented by fMRI studies which have demonstrated activation of the amygdala, 
particularly in paradigms which involve the passive viewing of fearful faces (for 
instance see Whalen, 1998). 
But whether the amygdala is specialised simply for fear, all negative emotions or those 
which evoke withdrawal behaviours is unclear. Examining the lesion studies there is 
considerable variation in impairments in the recognition of facial expressions of 
emotion arising from bilateral lesions of the amygdala, with some studies reporting 
deficits in all emotions, and others reporting no impairments at all relative to brain 




been reported to not only fearful faces, but also facial expressions of anger, sadness 
and even happiness (for a review see Zald, 2003). 
Further evidence in favour of the categorical perception of emotions, comes from the 
impairment of disgust processing observed in people with pathology of the basal 
ganglia (such as Huntington's disease) and insula. The insula has been found to be 
selectively activated in response to facial displays of disgust (Phillips et at, 1998). In 
addition, one recent study found the same areas to be activated in the same 
participants when experiencing disgust (from inhaling a noxious odour) and perceiving 
disgust (from seeing a dynamic disgusted face) - see Wicker et aL, (2003a). 
However, the insula has been found to be responsive to emotional states per se and 
recent theories propose this area may be useful in reconstructing an online 
representation of the perceived emotional state (Adolphs et aL, 2000) and it may be 
that this process is particularly necessary when perceiving disgust. 
Brain structures may also be specialised to respond to different types of emotional 
cue. Harid (2002a) found the amygdala to be more specialised for facial expressions 
rather than emotional ly-lade n scenarios. Furthermore, in a pair of experiments, 
Hoffman and Haxby (2000) found that face identity and eye gaze processing had 
different neural substrates. Eye gaze was found to be mediated by the superior 
temporal sulcus (STS) with the interparietal sulcus encoding the direction of that gaze. 
A further study found the STS to be involved in gaze shifts towards the participant 
(Pelphrey et al., 2003). The superior temporal gyrus has also been implicated in 
emotion perception under conditions of direct gaze (Wicker et aL, 2003b). Others 
have also found the amygdala to be more activated when reading mental states from 
direct rather than averted gaze (George et aL, 2001, Emery, 2000, Kawashima et aL, 
229 
Chapter 7 
1999) which fits with the idea of its role in scanning the environment for stimuli Of 
significance. 
Despite the abundance of work on perception of emotion from the facial area, there is 
a lack of work on the perception of affect from bodily expressions. Sprengelmeyer 
(1999) used a test of emotional postures with a person with bilateral amygdala 
damage and a left thalamic lesion. The task required the participant to identify 6 basic 
emotions (including surprise) from 60 static photographs minus faces of actors 
portraying the different affective states (10 per emotion). The participant was 
significantly impaired in recognising fear (as compared to 10 healthy controls). 
However, Adolphs and Tranel (2003) found the amygdala to only be involved in stimuli 
that include faces. In this study 4 people with bilateral amygdala damage were found 
not to be impaired in recognising anger from stimuli excluding but were impaired when 
the face was present. Furthermore, the people with amygdala damage did not show 
the usual advantage in recognising emotions (including fear) with the face present. 
Aside from these studies, as far as we are aware there is only one study that 
specifically examines the neural correlates of the perception of mental states from 
static bodily expressions and gestures alone. Hadjikhani and DeGelder (2003) looked 
at static fearful bodily expressions and found activation in the fusiform gyrus and 
amygdala. In addition, there is a growing literature on action perception from dynamic 
stimuli which is likely to be of relevance (Decety, 2002). That emotion perception is 
ordinarily based on dynamic stimuli is another important characteristic of real-life 
mental state attribution (LaBar et a/., 2003). Adolphs and Tranel (2003) point out that 
the use of dynamic stimuli will probably engage different processing streams such as 
the extrastriate visual cortices and may rely less on the amygdala. However, the use 
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of dynamic stimuli depicting mental state information in localisation studies is in its 
infancy. LaBar et aL, (2003) found activation specific to the superior temporal sulcus 
when comparing dynamic facial emotion stimuli with dynamic facial identity stimuli. 
This is consistent with the role of the superior temporal cortex in perceiving 'biological 
motion' (Adolphs, 2003). 
Another study systematically examined this issue and indeed found different neural 
codes for the perception of static vs. dynamic facial expressions (Kilts et aL, 2003). 
Furthermore, Adolphs et aL, (2003) in a study designed to look at the fractionation of 
emotion systems by valence (see above) found that a person with extensive brain 
damage that largely spared the somatosensory cortex could not recognise any basic 
emotions except happiness from static displays but could identify the same emotions 
from dynamic displays. This again suggests that dynamic stimuli recruit different 
neural processes to static stimuli and the authors hypothesise that damage to the 
anterior temporal lobe and medial frontal cortices may be responsible for the deficits 
observed in this person. Thus, these areas are responsible for associating static 
stimuli with the brain structures ordinarily used for emotion perception. It seems that 
dynamic stimuli may invoke different strategies for decoding mental states. 
Support for this assertion comes from one study that used dynamic stimuli to examine 
the neural correlates of 'sympathy' which by our definition would be called empathy 
(Decety and Chaminade, 2003). Participants were required to watch a series of video 
clips showing people telling sad and neutral stories that they had supposedly 
experienced. The experimental manipulation involved the use of stories which were 
either congruent or incongruent to the emotional expression displayed. In addition to 
activation in emotion processing areas, there was activation consistent with a 'shared 
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representation' network (Decety and Chaminade, 2003). The idea of 'shared 
representations' is closely allied to the growing body of work on 'action perception'. 
1.3 'Shared representations' 
A 
-,. The 
discovery of neurones in the premotor cortex that are activated in response to 
both observing and executing an action may be important for developing a model of 
mental state perception (Gallese and Goldman, 1998). According to Gallese (2003) 
studies examining action execution and action observation in humans suggest that 
these neurones may extend back to the inferior parietal cortex which has connections 
to the superior temporal sulcus. 
ý4 There is also some evidence to suggest that these 
neurones also exist in Broca's area (Heiser et aL, 2003 4*, R -PF@r. 6), Harnze! et aL, 
2003), an area traditionally thought to be specialised for language. This is consistent 
N. Pl 
with the idea that language evolved from gestures. Ujallese builds on the existence of 
such neurones as evidence for his 'shared manifold hypothesis' which at the 
phenomenological level is described as 'how our actions, emotions and sensations 
become implicitly meaningful' and at a functional level relies on the use of 'as-if 
modes of interaction to enable models of self and other. \ 
A similar concept has also been proposed based on the use of 'shared 
representations' wherein 'perception and action share common neural and cognitive 
codes' (Decety and Chaminade, 2003, Decety and Sommerville, 2003)ý Grezes and 
Decety (2001) undertook a meta-analysis of approximately 30 studies examining 
action generation, action simulation, action observation and verb generation. Many 
areas were found to be involved but the main areas of activation specific to action 
simulation studies were the premotor cortex in 83% of studies, and the dorsal part of 
the dorsolateral prefrontal gyrus, whereas the supramarginal gyrus was activated in all 
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the studies involving simulation, and the superior parietal lobe in 50% of studies. 
This lends support to the idea that action perception, observation and simulation share 
common neural codes is therefore well supported. 
One ingenious study exploited the 'sharedness' of self and other representations and 
had participants move their arm whilst observing incongruent arm movement. 
Interference was found only when the other arm was human as opposed to robotic 
(Kilner et aL, 2003). In another study exploring action, participants were required to 
simulate actions with either a first or third person perspective. Results indicate that the 
right inferior parietal, precuneus and posterior cingulate be involved in third person 
perspective when compared to first person perspective, and the somatosensory cortex 
and left inferior parietal cortex in first person as compared to third person perspectives 
(Ruby and Decety, 2001). Activation in the supplementary motor area (SMA), 
precentral gyrus and precuneus were common to both conditions. However, as the 
precuneus was more activated in the third person perspective the authors go onto 
argue that this area be 'critically involved in discriminating self from others, by way of 
involvement in the representation of the self. In addition, a further study found the 
somatosensory cortex to be involved in distinguishing stimuli generated by the self or 
another, finding less activation in this area when the stimuli was self-produced 
(Blakemore et aL, 1998a). 
A later study by these authors found the inferior parietal cortex to be involved both in 
imitation and being imitated (Decety et aL, 2002). Chaminade et aL, (2002) also found 
this area to be activated during an imitation paradigm along with the superior parietal 
lobe. It seems that the parietal lobe may be key to distinguishing actions and 
behaviours that belong to the self and others (Blakemore, 2003b). Activation was also 
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found in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) during imitation which the authors 
suggest is due to involvement in the 'preparation of forthcoming action based on 
stored information'. The parietal areas were also found to be more activated when 
participants were hypnotised to attribute their own actions as external in a PET study 
(Blakemore et aL, 2003). 
Although the notion of 'shared representations' has recently been extended to facial 
actions portraying mental states (see Decety and Chaminade, 2003 above) there is 
less work examining whether this model is appropriate for mental state attribution and 
whether actions depicting mental states i. e. facial expressions and gestures, are 
processed in the same way as other actions The superior parietal networks bilaterally 
were activated in a study examining intentional contingency between shapes at a 
distance whereby intentionality was experimentally induced by having one shape 
appearing as if it was looking at or following the other (Blakemore, 2003a). 
%k Furthermore,, 4NBlakemore and Decety (2001b) point out that the fact that the brain 
appears to be hardwired to perceive 'biological motion' and that we tend to attribute 
intentionality to such stimuli, indicates a link between the perception of action and the 
attribution of mental states. Further evidence can also be found in the developmental 
literature and the observation that infants imitate the expressions of others from a very 
early age (Meltzoff and Decety, 2003). 
Carr and colleagues (2003) conducted a similar study explicitly examining both 
imitation and observation. Participants were required to either imitate or simply 
observe a series of photographs (hence static) of facial affect. Both conditions were 
found to activate a largely similar network in the brain, however, the premotor areas 
including inferior frontal cortex, superior temporal cortex, insula and amygdala were all 
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activated to a larger degree in the imitation condition. The authors argue that the 
insula plays an important role in this type of empathy. 
ýIln 
addition, one recent study 
showed cognitive conceptual perspective-taking to activate action perception and 
recognition areas (Ruby and Decety, 2003) suggesting this strategy may also be 
useful in general perspective-taking. 
,J The Perception Action Model proposed by Preston and DeWaal (2003) is a broad 
account incorporating the idea that social cognition stems from the tendency to 
activate one's own representations in response to perceiving a particular state in 
another (see chapter 1). This model provides a framework which incorporates much 
of the work described above. This account finds support, in a PET study examining the 
neural correlates of imagining your own and someone else's emotional experience 
(Preston, 2002) whereby very similar brain areas were found to be activated. In 
addition, a further more recent model of emotion perception, draws on early theories of 
the nature of emotion, and in doing so emphasises the production of an affective state 
in response to the identification of stimuli of emotional significance (Phillips at al., 
2003). Again, this model sits well with simulation accounts. 
4 Further neuropsychological evidence in favour of an action perception or simulation 
model of mental state attribution comes from another research group who place great 
importance on the contribution of somatosensory areas in decoding affective states 
(including the insula). They found data consistent with the use of 'shared 
representations' including the recruitment of the insula and the somatosensory cortices 
including supramarginal gyrus (Adolphs et aL, 2000) in emotion perception. The 
researchers equate these findings with evidence for a simulation account (Adolphs, 
2003, Adolphs, 1999). 
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The most comprehensive study to suggest the existence of such a mechanism 
involved 3D lesion mapping in 108 people with focal brain lesions (Adolphs et a/., 
2000). Lesions were registered in common brain space to allow comparison and 
participants were tested on a series of tasks. Damage to somatosensory related areas 
were found affect naming emotions and appreciating emotional concepts (tested by 
having participants sort photographs of facial affect according to similarity). The insula 
alone was specifically implicated in conceptual knowledge independent of lexical 
stimuli. The authors interpret these data as consistent with the idea that covert 
somatosensory online representations are constructed when emotion judgments are 
made. 
Adolphs (2002) points out that such a simulation-type mechanism (see chapter 1 and 
4) may be particularly useful when the stimuli to be decoded are difficult or when the 
'explicit knowledge triggered ... is insufficient to recognise the emotion' (Adolphs, 2002). 
Under these circumstances it might be helpful to construct knowledge regarding the 
observed mental state via the generation of a simulation. He further argues that facial 
expressions can be viewed as a special class of action i. e. 'facial affect action' and so 
it is reasonable to assume that the same mechanisms used in action are recruited in 
decoding facial affect. However, he also suggests that it is unlikely that this is the 
case in all instances of facial affect recognition and that this might be dependant on 
the demands of the task. He describes a useful analogy between retrieving 
knowledge regarding the shape of your house which may not require the visual 
cortices at all whereas retrieving knowledge of the number of windows or shape of the 
windows would require more activation of the visual cortices. 
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A paradigm that uses particularly difficult stimuli (i. e. fleeting, Impoverished or non- 
prototypical) may therefore be of use in examining the cognitive and neural correlates 
of 'simulation'. In real life mindreading, social cues are delivered in varied conditions, 
and sometimes there are lots of rich cues like in a one-to-one conversation but at other 
times the information available is very limited, for instance, when trying to read the 
mental state of someone across a room or when a person turns their head away. 
As discussed in previous chapters (see chapter 4), 4the main cognitive difference 
between all these accounts which can loosely be grouped together as 'simulation' 
theories and those based on applying a theory, is the use of information about the self 
in appreciating other peoples' mental states in the former. To this end the neural 
correlates of self-reflection become relevant. Vogeley et aL, (2001) used the Happ6 
strange stories (see above) but manipulated whether or not the participants were 
protagonists in the story. Based on this and other data Vogeley and Fink (2003) argue 
that in addition to medial prefrontal areas, medial parietal and lateral temporoparietal 
cortices are involved in the first person perspective and adopting an egocentric frame 
of reference. Johnson et aL (2002) also found posterior cingulate activation when 
participants responded to a series of statements about their own abilities and traits. 
Self-referential processing of trait adjectives also activated this area (Kelley et aL, 
2002). In addition, Kircher and colleagues (2000) used pictures of the self and 
partners faces' and found activation in the left inferior parietal areas when viewing the 
self. Moreover, Kircher et aL, (2002) found self-referential processing to activate the 
left superior parietal lobe and left precuneus. These data are consistent with the idea 
that parietal areas are important for distinguishing self from other. However, although 
these brain areas are likely to be important, a recent study by Ramnani and Miall 
(2004) provide evidence to suggest that the overlap between self and other isn't 
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complete. They found differential activation in the premotor cortex in response to 
adopting a third and first person perspective and argue for a mechanism based, for 
instance, on mental imagery of the other's actions. 
Pý To conclude, it seems that several unresolved issues remain that are of relevance to 
establishing the neural correlates, of empathy. Firstly, there is a lack of studies using 
dynamic stimuli to portray mental states and hence exploring whether an action 
perception model is appropriate for decoding mental state 'actions'. In addition, it is 
not known whether such a model is only applicable to stimuli that are particularly 
difficult to d6code or with all dynamic mental state expressions. Furthermore, it is not 
clear to what extent areas relating to self representation are recruited in decoding 
others' mental states. Lastly, data are scarce as to the neural correlates of mental 
state attribution from bodily expressions alone. 
The Profile of Nonverbal Sensitivity - PONS - (Rosenthal et aL, 1979) is an offline 
mental state attribution task based on video clips of an actor displaying various mental 
states using facial and bodily expressions and gestures. It is therefore well placed for 
examining these issues. The PONS is a well validated test of a person's ability to 
decode mental state information without verbal cues (see appendix 7 for description of 
stimuli). It uses a series of 2 second video-clips of an actor in various affective 
interpersonal situations and hence displaying expressions and gestures depicting 
different mental states. These clips are presented in 3 different physical channels: i) 
face ii) body iii) figure (face and body together - see appendix 8 for examples). The 
task is forced choice from 2 options, and the similarity of the alternative is 
systematically varied, hence introducing an additional 'difficulty' variable. This task 
has been adapted for an fMRI paradigm by adding 2 control conditions and 
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computerising it (Lawrence et al., 2004). The mental state labels have also been 
refined and the stimulus presentation counterbalanced more thoroughly. Over the 
years the PONS has been used with many different samples and there are a wealth of 
data confirming its reliability and validity in both healthy individuals and clinical groups. 
Furthermore, it has recently been revived and used in a study with people with 
schizophrenia who were shown to perform less well than controls (Toomey et al., 
2002). This revised version of the online (online PONS-r) has been piloted 'offline' on 
20 healthy volunteers. It is predicted that: 
" The PONS-r will activate brain areas associated with 'shared representations' 
such as premotor and SMA, inferior frontal gyrus, precentral gyrus, 
somatosensory areas such as the insula and supramarginal gyrus, and areas 
in the parietal cortex such as inferior parietal cortex, precuneus, and superior 
parietal lobule. 
" The medial frontal cortex may also be activated during the PONS-r in line with 
traditional ToM tasks. 
" Areas relating to self processing such as the precuneus and posterior cingulate 
will also be activated during the PONS-r. 
" The amygdala will not be activated when participants view the clips in the 
PONS-r as at least 50% of the clips do not include the face and in the clips that 
do, eye gaze is not directed at the participant. 
" If a 'shared representations' network is only activated with dynamic stimuli that 
are difficult to decode then the 'figure' stimuli will not activate this network. 
" The fusiform gyrus will be activated in response to 'body' stimuli. 
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The original version of the Profile of Non-Verbal Sensitivity (Rosenthal et aL, 1979) 
contained 20 clips of real-life situations presented in 11 conditions along with 
instructions to 'judge which of the two real-life situations is represented by the 
segment' . There were 
2 sound conditions one with the content distorted and the other 
with the tape randomly spliced to obscure the content. There were 3 visual non- 
mental state inferences, face only, figure and body only. Each non-mental state 
inference was presented without sound (3 conditions) and with each of the two sound 
conditions (6 conditions) and lastly, each sound condition was presented without visual 
stimuli (2 conditions) resulting in 11 conditions in all. 
The two sound conditions were dropped due to potential interference from the noise of 
the scanner. This left 3 conditions, face, body and face and body together (figure). All 
20 clips and their variations i. e. 60 clips in total were digitised and the task was 
computerised to allow use in an WRI paradigm and furthermore to allow the 
measurement of reaction times. 
Two additional conditions were designed to control for brain activation due to 
subsidiary processes: 
1) button press condition -a 'stop/go' task simply requiring a button press in 
response to 'go'. This is necessary for cognitive subtraction of activation due to sirnplyý 
viewing the screen and pressing the button. 
2) 'non-mental state' inference condition - participants have to decide on the 
physical 'channel' displaying the mental state from one of two of the folloWng options 
i. e. body, face or figure. As this condition uses the same video clips as those used in 
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the experimental task, this condition controls for activation as a result of viewing the 
video clips and making a decision based upon them using a button press. 
The final task had 180 clips 60 blank, 60 non-mental state inference - 20 face, 20 
body, 20 figure and 60 mental state attribution - 20 face, 20 body, 20 figure. 
Participants were required to choose one of two response alternatives displayed on 
the screen. Each clip lasts approximately 2 secs although the response choices were 
displayed for 8 secs (see Figure 7.1). 












--, 7.5-- 8* 
1.5 secs; 2 secs; 4 secs .5 secs 
*words disappear once choice has been made and at 8 secs cycle for next stimuli commences 
2.2. Mental state labels 
In the original study the correct and incorrect answers from which the selection was 
made were often presented as short sentences. For the revised version the answers 
and their foils were updated and made more succinct by reducing each mental state 
descriptor to a maximum of 2 words. Four colleagues were sent the 'figure' clip, the 
original word and alternative suggestions and were asked to either endorse one of the 
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given suggestions or provide an alternative. The final labels were chosen according to 
the majority endorsement. This meant that no label was chosen without at least 2 
people in agreement although in the majority of cases all 4 raters and the 
experimenter agreed. The original and final labels can be found in appendix 7. 
2.3 Counterbalancinq 
2.3.1 Foils: exoerimental 
in the original version of the task, allocation of response alternatives were random with 
adjustments made so that no clip was over- or under-represented. However, as the 
original task had a different number of conditions, the order of presentation was 
reworked for the current paradigm and the similarity of the response labels were 
equally balanced rather than randomly allocated as this variable is integral to task 
difficulty. Across non-mental state inferences i. e. for face, body and figure -5 foils 
were similar mental stateS25 ,5 were the same broad valence (i. e. positive or negative) 
and 5 were the opposite valence. 
2.3.2 Foils: control 
Again this was balanced so that each possibility appeared an equal amount of times. 
For example, when 'face'was the correct alternative - the incorrect alternative was: 
5 body left 
5 body right 
5 figure left 
5 figure right 




2.3.3. Button press condition 
'Go' appears half the time on the right and half on the left. 
Fiqure 7.2: Example of stimuli in each condition* 









# each stimuli runs through the cycle detailed in Figure 1. 
*X= correct answer and 0= incorrect answer. 
x0 
2.3.4. Randomisation Checks 
All the variables were correlated with the clip number to see if there was a tendency 
for any one condition, response alternative or physical 'channel' to be overrepresented 
at the beginning or end of the task. The only significant variable was 'face' in the 
mental state inference condition meaning that there was a slight tendency for face only 
clips in this condition to appear at the beginning - however this was a low correlation (r 
= -. 273, n= 20, p= . 
035) and this didn't hold for both mental and non-mental state 
inference conditions combined. 
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3. Offline Pilot Stud 
3.1 Desiqn 
The online PONS-r has 3 conditions (see Figure 7.2 above): 
1) button press condition -a 'stop/go' task simply requiring a button press in 
response to 'go'. 
2) non-mental state inference condition - participants have to decide on the 
physical 'channel' displayed from one of two options i. e. body, face or figure. 
3) experimental condition - participants are shown clips of 20 mental states, 
one at a time and have to choose the correct answer after each, from 2 alternatives. 
The clips are graded in difficulty in two ways; 1) the non-mental state inference 
displayed - some clips just show the actors body alone, which does not have as many 
cues as the face or figure, hence making it more difficult to decipher 2) the similarity of 
the response alternative - task difficulty is increased if the incorrect answer is very 
similar to the correct one. 
3.2 Procedure 
The instructions were altered to fit the new paradigm and were as follows: 
Please choose the word that best describes the behaviour or feelings of the person in 
the video clip. 
Initially, participants were given an Information Sheet and the opportunity to ask any 
questions. They were then given a practice run consisting of 9 items and were 
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allowed to do this as many times as they wanted. The error rate and reaction times 
were measured for all conditions. Next they were given the task proper along with the 
'Reading the Mind from the Eyes task' (Baron-Cohen et aL, 2001 - see chapter 6), the 
EQ (Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright, 2004 in press) and the IRI (Davis, 1980 - see 
chapter 2). 
3.3 Participants 
Nine men and 11 women recruited from the Institute of Psychiatry (11) and local area 
(9). Their mean age was 35.1 years (± 10.43). 
3.4 Results 
The mean and standard deviation scores can be found in table 7.1. 
Table 7.1 Mean accuracy rate on the PONS-r out of 60 
Mental Non-Mental 
State State Button 
Inference Inference Press 
Mean 43.7 - 57.3 59.5 
SD 2.74 1.69 . 69 
20 20 20 
The expected pattern was observed with the mental state items invoking more errors, 




: Wrdte on the mental state items was remarkably similar to the 
normative data (72.8 % in the current study as opposed to 77% in the original 
datasets) and was high enough to be above chance and low enough to indicate a lack 
of ceiling effects. The range of scores was, however, small which is probably due to 
the limited sample size. 
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In terms of the two different types of 'difficulty' manipulations I) lexical - similarity of the 
foil and ii) non-mental state inference of presentation, mean accuracy rates were 
computed (see Table 7.2). The expected pattern of results was observed with the 
highest accuracy rate on stimuli were the face or figure was shown, dropping when 
participants were just shown the 'body' items. The pattern for lexical difficulty however 
deviated slightly from the predicted pattern as it appeared that the medium items were 
slightly easier than the 'easy' items, however, the accuracy rate may have been 
elevated by the increased spread of scores as a result of having double the amount of 
items. 
Table 7.2 Mean accuracv rate on the each condition of the PONS-r 
Lexical Lexical Lexical Figure - Body - Face - 
#easy' 'medium' 'difficult mental mental mental 
items - out items - out items - out state items state items state Items 
of 15 of 30 of 15 - out of 20 - out of 20 - out of 20 
Mean 10.5 24.7 9.4 15.8 11.6 16-05 
SD 1.15 1.95 1.47 1.4 1.47 1.61 
N 20 20 20 20 20 20 
An item by item inspection revealed that across physical channels all items except 3 
were endorsed as correct by more than 50% of sample, and those with a higher error 
rate only occurred when the response alternative was very similar i. e. thankful vs. 
affection, and/or when the 'physical' channel was body. 
In terms of validity, some modest, but not statistically significant, correlations were 
observed between performance on the 'Reading the Mind in the Eyes task' and 
accuracy on the body items (r = . 407, n= 20, p= . 075) which may reflect the fact that 
both tasks are similar inasmuch as they are designed to be difficult being based on 
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limited cues. A positive association was also observed with between performance on 
body items and 'personal distress' scores on the IRI (r = . 392, p= . 088) consistent with 
the findings from previous chapters (see chapter 4) that an egocentric affective 
response to other's emotional states is related to accurate mental state labelling. 
4. Online studv: Methods 
4.1 Participants 
An fMRI study was conducted with 12 right-handed healthy volunteers. There were 6 
men and 6 women and the mean age was 32.2 years (± 9.95). None of the 
participants had a history of mental or neurological illness nor did they have any 
contraindications for scanning. The mean verbal IQ as predicted from the NART was 
119.4 (± 5.9). All participants were also pre-screened with the EQ and scored within 
normal range on the EQ for their gender (see chapter 2). 
4.2 Procedure 
Prior to the study, participants were given standardised instructions, a consent form 
and screened for MRI suitability. They also completed the Eyes Test (Baron-Cohen 
et aL, 2001). 
4.3. Imaqe acauisition 
Participants were then scanned using GE Signa 1.5T Neuro-optimised MR system 
(General Electric, Milwaukee, WI, USA). After the collection of high resolution 
structural scans (3.3mm thick) in the axial plane, an event-related design was 
employed with 60 clips in each of the 3 conditions presented in a randomised order, 
therefore, totalling 180 clips. With a TR of 2 secs and each of 180 stimuli lasting 8 
seconds (video clips 2 secs and ISI 6 secs), 720 gradient echo echoplanar T2* 
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weighted images were acquired at each of 16 near-axial, 7mm thick planes. Accuracy 
rate and reaction times were also measured; these data were not used in the statistical 
analysis but simply to check that the participant followed the instructions and that the 
constraints of the MRI scan did not adversely affect performance on the task. 
4.5 lmaqe analvsis 
The data were analysed using in-house software (XBAMv2 and 3), a non-parametric 
method of analysis which derives probabilities of significance from random 
permutations. Images were first corrected for head motion (Bullmore et aL, 1999). 
Next, the physiological response and corresponding change in the T2 weighted signal 
intensity as a result of the experimental conditions, was estimated by using a least 
squares fitting of a sinusoidal regression model at each voxel for all the images 
(Bullmore, 1996). The regression model included a pair of sine and cosine waves to 
allow the shape of the haemodynamic response to be estimated at each voxel. 
Next the fundamental power quotient (FPQ - fundamental power divided by its 
standard error) was estimated at each voxel and represented in a descriptive 
parametric map which was registered in standard stereotactic space (Talairach and 
Tournoux, 1988) and smoothed by a 2D Gaussian filter (± 5mm). Permutation testing 
was then used to identify voxels demonstrating significant median standardised power 
of response (median FPQ), over all subjects, during each task with one-tailed 
probability of false positive error set at p= . 001 This process was randomly permuted 
10 times and the FPQ estimated after each permutation (Brammer et aL, 1997). 
In summary, the permutation procedure consisted of each time series in the observed 
image being randomly permuted and the sinusoidal regression model fitted by 
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generalised least-squares after permutation. This gave an estimate of standardised 
power under the null hypothesis that the estimated FPQ is not determined by the 
experimental design. Repeating this procedure 10 times at each voxel, generated 10 
maps under the null hypothesis for each participant. Each map was transformed into 
standard space and smoothed, just as the observed maps are. Lastly, the null 
distribution of the median FPQ was computed, by taking each participant's median 
FPQ at each voxel for each set of permuted FPQ maps. The median FPQ observed at 
each voxel was then tested at the critical value corresponding to the one-tailed 
probability of a type 1 error, p= . 001. Voxels that 'pass' this critical threshold were 
considered 'activated' specific to the experimental design. Such a non-parametric 
approach is thought to be particularly appropriate for small sample sizes where outliers 
can adversely affect the dataset. 
In addition, each participants dataset was manually checked for movement and as 3 
participants were shown to have some movement artefact, these datasets were 
registered using a longer, more thorough registration process in xbam-v3. These 
datasets were also detrended as it is possible that other variables can influence data 
acquisition which can be removed by detrending using different filters. 
5. Online study: results 
5.1 Behavioural 
T-tests; were conducted to examine any group differences on task performance 
between those who performed the task online and those that undertook the task 
outside of the scanner. Group differences were observed on the 'figure' items only (t 
6.074, df 30, p< . 001). 
Examination of the means show that the 'online' group 
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performed significantly less well with a mean score of 12.6 as opposed to 15.8 in the 
offline group. 
It was reasoned that this difference was probably due to the stimuli images being 
viewed at a further distance in the online task due to restrictions imposed by fMRI 
scanning. It was not possible to blow up the images to compensate due to their poor 
resolution. it would be expected that this difference between on- and offline 
presentations would exert its biggest influence in the 'figure' which is a smaller image 
(see appendix 8). The magnitude of the difference between the online and offline 
condition indicates a slight, although significant reduction in overall accuracy. 
The relationship between other empathy measures (Eyes test and EQ) and accuracy 
rates on the PONS-r was then examined for the entire group (those who did the task 
both offline and online). Items of medium lexical difficulty were positively related to 
demotional reactivity' as measured by the EQ (r = . 339, df 31, p= . 062). The 
relationship between 'body' items and 'social skills' as measured by the EQ (r = . 314, 
df 31, p= . 084) was also approaching significance. 
5.2 fMRI Data 
In order to explore any differences between condition in mean power of functional 
activation, generic brain activation maps (GBAMs) were constructed. The subtraction 




5.2.1 Simi)le Analvses 
In order to examine brain activation specific to the experimental condition, first 
activation specific to 'non-mental state inference' > control was considered. The non- 
mental state inference task used a forced choice format to prompt participants to 
decide whether the channel shown was body, face or figure. Activation in this 
condition relates primarily to viewing the images and making a non-mental state 
inference as opposed to simply reading some words and pressing a button in 
response (i. e. the stop/go control task). 
Areas of brain activation are reported in Table 7.3 along with voxel size and the 
maximum FPQ (see above). The main areas of activation were seen in the precentral 
gyrus, visual areas including V1 and V2 and parastriate areas, anterior mid cingulate, 
frontal pole, angular gyrus, fusiform gyrus, middle temporal gyrus, medial frontal and 





areas activated for non-mental state inference > button press"' 
No. x v z Side BA Brain Reqion Max FPO 
50 15 -23 53 R 4 Precentral Gyrus (MI) 0.050943 
32 -25 -69 31 L 19 Primary Visual Cortex 0.049853 
29 11 -17 37 R 24 Ant-Mid Cingulate Gyrus 0.052118 
25 -17 46 -7 L 10 Frontal Pole 0.050745 
24 -21 -60 37 L 7 Precuneus 0.058946 
24 -11 -76 26 L 19 Primary Visual Cortex 0.047918 
23 -47 -46 -2 L 21 Middle Temporal Gyrus 0.063561 
21 -36 -46 -7 L 37 Fusiform Gyrus 0.041057 
20 -17 -80 -7 L 18 Primary Visual Cortex 0.047169 
19 25 13 53 R 6 Premotor Cortex & SMA 0.066316 
19 . 11 43 15 L 
32 Medial Frontal Lobe 0.099519 
19 -36 -37 37 L 
40 Supramarginal Gyrus 0.044399 
18 15 30 37 R 9 DLPFC 0.038271 
16 -32 -26 48 L 4 
Precentral Gyrus (Ml) 0.047641 
9 -43 -60 26 L 39 Angular Gyrus 0.043621 
Brain activation was extensive as the 'button press' condition does not control for 
visual input (see Figure 7.3). However, this comparison allows the identification of 
areas specific to the 'non-mental state inference'. It is also possible that participants 
may have 'implicitly decoded the mental states in this condition (see discussion for 
further explanation). 
26 This analysis is hypothesis driven and only areas relating to the experimental hypotheses are reported. 
All areas are activated at p= . 00 1. 
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Fiqure 7.3. 'Non-mental state inference > button press group brain activation 
maps 1 
The next comparison was between areas activated for the 'mental state inference I 
task over and above that observed in the 'non-mental state inference' task. There 
are less areas of activation here due to the matching of control conditions (see 
Figure 7.4). 
' Left is right - red is 'non-mental state inference' and yellow is 'button press' - activation at a 




Fiqure 74 Mental state inference > non-mental state inference group brain 
activation maps' 
Table 74 gives further details of this comparison. Activation specific to the 'mental 
state inference' task was observed in areas such as the dorso- and ventro-lateral 
prefrontal cortex. medial frontal lobe and superior temporal gyrus, inferior frontal 
gyrus, premotor cortex. supramarginal gyrus, precentral gyrus, insula. 




Table 7.4: Areas of brain activation for mental state inference >non-mental state 
inference 
No. x v z Side BA Brain Reqion -MaxFPQ 
29 -40 13 42 L 9 DLPFC 0.064775 
29 4 -37 37 R 31 Post Cingulate Gyrus 0.072134 
25 -43 23 20 L 45 Inf Frontal Gyrus (Broca's) 0.082364 
23 -53 -33 9 L 22 Superior Temporal Gyrus 0.086157 
23 -61 -37 -7 L 21 Middle Temporal Gyrus 0.069781 
18 -47 30 . 13 L 47 VLPFC 0.063568 
17 25 20 37 R 32 Medial Frontal Lobe 0.0688544 
16 -53 -39 26 L 40 Supramarginal Gyrus 0.069683 
16 -40 -10 48 L 4 Precentral Gyrus (MI) 0.092911 
14 4 13 48 R 6 Premotor Cortex & SMA 0.083023 
13 -53 -50 -2 
L 37 Middle Temporal Gyrus 0.082817 
10 -43 20 -18 L 38 
Ant Temporal Pole 0.079585 
10 36 20 -2 R 72 Insula 0.079585 
7 15 -39 48 R 5 Superior Parietal Lobule 0.069841 
5.2.2 Channel analyses 
in order to explore areas of activation specific to decoding mental states from the body 
alone, the data were analysed to allow comparisons between the physical 'channel' of 
presentation (see Table 7.5). By examining these contrasts together, it is possible to 
circumnavigate the potential confound created by the 'body' stimuli being more difficult 
to decipher than the 'face' and 'figure' stimuli. Although, there are a lack of data 
regarding the neural substrates of emotion perception from the body, it is expected 




Table 7.5: Activation specific to'bodv in the mental state Inference condition" 
No. xyz BA Brain Region 
Face> Body 
10 0 -74 -1 18 Primary Visual (Peristriate V2, V3) 
Body> Face 
9 43 -64 5 37 R Middle Occipital gyrus 
80 -57 37 18 Primary Visual (Peristriate V2, V3) 
Body > Figure 
14 -45 -66 -2 19 L Primary Visual Cortex 
6 50 24 22 47 R Inferior Frontal Gyrus 
Figure > Body 
8 -15 0 32 24 L Anterior Mid Cingulate Gyrus 
6 -14 -13 42 23 L Posterior Cingulate Gyrus 
Figure > Face 
18 -16 -1 34 20 L Infedor Temporal Gyrus 
18 29 4 50 6R Premotor Cortex & SMA 
13 -27 13 45 6L Premotor Cortex & SMA 
Face > Figure 
8 46 28 22 16 R DLPFC 
*Data reported here have a high number of expected false positives in comparison to those observed and 
hence carry a risk of type 1 errors, but as activations are theoretically plausible and relevant to our 
hypotheses, they are reported nevertheless. 
NB Figure = face and body 
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Activation specific to face > body was observed in visual areas. Activation for body 
> face was observed in the middle occipital gyrus and visual areas (see Figure 
7.5a). Activation specific to body > figure was again observed in visual areas and 
the inferior frontal gyrus (see Fig 7.5b). Activation relating to figure > body, 
however was observed in the anterior cingulate (see Fig 7.5c). Whereas activation 
relating to figure > face was observed in the inferior temporal gyrus (Fig 7.5d). By a 
process of deduction, it is reasonable to suggest that the areas relating to body are 
indeed areas invoked when reasoning with particularly difficult material whereas 
the figure vs. body comparison (when considered in light of the fig vs. face 
activation) relates to activation specific to body without the added confound of 
difficulty (see below). 
Fiq 7.5a: Body> Face' Fig 7-5b: Body Vs. Fig 
Left is right for Fig 7.5 a, b, c, d. Slices illustrated show the greatest contrast between conditions. 
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Fiq 7.5c: Fiq > Body Fiq 7.5dý Fiq > Face 
Anterior Mid Cingulate Inferior Temporal 
5.2.3 Lexical analyses 
No differences in activation were observed between conditions which were lexically 
easy' i. e. the foil was dissimilar to the correct answer, or lexically difficult i. e. the 
foil was very similar to the correct answer, suggesting the same strategies were at 
play irrespective of this aspect of task 'difficulty'. 
5.2.4. Behavioural measures 
As there was an association between 'emotional reactivity' and items of medium 
lexical difficulty i. e. 50% of the mental state attribution items, these behavioural 
data were correlated with activation from the mental state inference task > non- 
mental state inference task (see Table 7.6). 
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Table 7.6: Brain areas that showed a Positive association with 'emotional 
reactivity' scores 
No. x y z BA Brain Reqion 
20 35 -35 -3 36 R Occipitotemporal Gyrus 
15 -16 27 -12 11 L Orbitofrontal Cortex 
14 32 -39 5 36 R Occipitotemporal Gyrus 
6 -57 -10 19 21 L postcentral gyrus 
7 55 -41 27 37 R Inferior Parietal Lobule 
4 52 14 14 47 R Inferior frontal gyrus 
Areas that were positively correlated with 'emotional reactivity' levels include the 
orbitofrontal cortex, occipitotemporal gyrus (fusiform face area), inferior frontal 
gyrus, postcentral gyrus and the inferior parietal lobule (see Figure 7.6). 
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This suggests these areas may be central to mental state attribution in those with an 
increased tendency to experience an affective response to others' emotional states. 
6. Discussion 
The main findings from this study were that brain areas typically associated with the 
use of 'shared representations' (Decety and Chaminade, 2003) to understand other 
people's mental states were activated alongside those thought to underlie traditional 
ToM reasoning. This is consistent with a theory of mental state attribution based on a 
model of action recognition (Decety, 2002) as expected from a task tapping the neural 
correlates of dynamic stimuli. In addition, these findings are in line with the ideas of 
Adolphs at al., (2000) that 'covert online somatosensory representations' may be of 
particular use when the stimuli to be decoded are especially difficult. 
The pre-motor cortex and SMA, precentral gyrus and precuneus were also activated in 
a series of studies by Decety and colleagues investigating action recognition and 
imitation (see above). To find these areas activated in an emotion perception 
paradigm adds some weight to the validity of the action perception model which 
implicates imitation as the basis for emotion perception, at least with dynamic stimuli. 
The precuneus has also been recruited in paradigms examining self-recognition (see 
above) and it has been suggested that through this role, it plays an important part in 
discriminating self from other. 
In addition, the pre-motor cortex is thought to contain mirror neurones that fire both 
when observing and executing an action which may even be arranged in a 
somatotopic manner (Buccino et aL, 2001). The precentral gyrus (Ml) was also 
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activated during a study examining the first and third person simulation of action and 
so is thought to represent another area of overlap between self and other 
representations (Ruby and Decety, 2001). The fact that it was activated here again 
suggests that this area is involved in representing others actions, including actions 
depicting the others' mental states. 
A series of studies have suggested the superior parietal lobe is vital to distinguishing 
self from other (see above). To find it activated here, in the mental state inference 
condition, is therefore consistent with previous findings. The same is true of the 
observed activation of the posterior cingulate. Emerging evidence suggests this 
structure to be involved primarily in higher order representation of the self (and by this 
route it may be involved in representations about other people) as it has been 
activated in paradigms tapping self representation. 
Somatosensory areas such as the insula and supramarginal gyrus were also activated 
in the current study. Activation of the supramarginal gyrus is consistent with the idea 
that the inferior parietal lobule plays an important role in distinguishing self from other. 
Adolphs , et al 
(2000) also found both these areas to be important for emot , ion 
perception, especially when the target mental state was difficult to decode from static 
stimuli. It seems that mental states that are particularly difficult to decode may require 
the construction of a 'covert online somatosensory' representation. In addition, the 
insula is thought to be involved in disgust (Phillips et aL, 1998), both its experience 
and perception (Wicker et aL, 2003a). Carr et aL, (2003) also found the insula to be 
implicated both when participants observe and imitate the emotional expressions of 
others. The activation of these areas in the current paradigm is no surprise as the 
current stimuli was both dynamic and difficult. 
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The activation of Broca's area is of particular interest due to the recent suggestion that 
this area be involved in imitation and perhaps contains mirror neurones being adjacent 
to premotor areas (but see Ramnani and Miall, 2004 for discussion). This raises 
interesting questions regarding the link between language and mental state attribution 
and for the understanding of some impairments in clinical groups such as those with 
Asperger's Syndrome (see earlier chapters). However, interpretation of this finding 
must be pursued with caution as it is possible that the extra verbal load in this mental 
state inference task could account for it. An additional explanation is that people 
attempted to lip read in some of the conditions or had a tendency for 'silent speech' 
although participants debriefing suggests this was not the case. 
As expected, areas associated with traditional ToM task were also recruited in this 
paradigm, consistent with previous WRI work. These include the DLPFC and medial 
frontal cortex and medial temporal gyrus. The medial frontal cortex and medial 
temporal gyrus are involved in ToM attribution, according to numerous studies (see 
above). The DLPFC has also been found to be involved in empathy, and it is thought 
it may exert its influence through cognitive flexibility (Eslinger, 1998). Alternatively, 
others have also found the DLPFC to be involved in the preparation of action and it is 
entirely possible that its role in empathic ability is based upon this. Furthermore, the 
medial superior temporal gyrus which is thought to be specialised in perceiving facial 
affect, in particular from the eye region, was also recruited. 
More complex comparisons were conducted to examine activation specific to the 
perception of mental states from the body vs. face area and difficult vs. easy s. 
ý'timuli. 
No differences in activation were found at a probability level low enough to eliminate 
false positives, indicative of a lack of differential activation. The lack of difference in 
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activation between figure and body in the areas relating to 'shared representations' 
goes some way to suggest that with dynamic stimuli at least, an action perception 
model is appropriate regardless of task difficulty. However, there is also the possibility 
that the 'figure' items were actually more difficult in this paradigm by virtue of them 
being hard to see (see above). But the lack of differential inactivation for body > face 
also suggests that'difficult' stimuli i. e. body, did not invoke special circuits. In addition, 
there was no difference in activation between items that were considered harder in 
terms of lexical difficulty i. e. easy vs. hard. It seems therefore that, at least with 
dynamic stimuli, a simulation approach may be appropriate independent of task 
difficulty, in contrast to the differential processing observed between difficult and easy 
static stimuli (Adolphs et aL, 2000). 
However, despite this, some differential activation did exist at a probability of 0.05. 
Although, these results carry a high risk of a type 1 error, as they fit well with the 
literature they require some discussion. The inferior frontal gyrus, GlG-Q-Q #0 Weeeýs 
a; aa was activated in the body > figure. This comparison is most likely to tap task 
'difficulty' and this finding is consistent with the use of 'mirror neurones' in decoding 
other people's mental states. However, perhaps this result is not surprising when one 
considers that the 'body' stimuli were in one sense composed solely of gestures. This 
may provide one explanation for the evolutionary basis of 'mirror neurones' in an area 
traditionally specialised for speech. The middle occipital lobe was also activated in the 
body > face condition, and this area has been shown to be activated when perceiving 
'biological motion' from point light displays (Vaina et aL, 2001) and the fusiform gyrus 
was also activated in a study looking at static bodily expressions of fear (Hadjikhani 
and DeGelder, 2003). This therefore suggests that this area is being activated in 
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response to decoding mental states from bodily expressions rather than In response to 
difficult stimuli. 
The existence of these subtle differences in activation combined with the lack of global 
difference suggests that some key areas may be activated more when additional 
simulative processing is needed. In other words, the same strategy Is employed with 
dynamic stimuli regardless of the task difficulty, but activation is stronger in certain key 
areas when the task is particularly difficult in an 'additive' manner. These differences 
could therefore to some extent be viewed as quantitative rather than qualitative. This is 
consistent with Adolph's analogy (see above) regarding the different resources 
required to visualise the different aspects of your own house. If this is the case, then 
these data suggest that Sfeee'a aFes eAd the use of mirror neurones, are key to the 
recognition of mental states especially when the task requires full use of the available 
resources. 
The general lack of differences does not support the functional specialisation of brain 
areas for particular body parts i. e. face vs. body, at least with dynamic stimuli, as 
elicited in this paradigm. However, again, the differential activation observed when the 
probability threshold was lowered may shed some light on the processing of mental 
state information from different body areas. The 'figure' clips are most ideally placed 
for examining the neural correlates of decoding mental states from bodily expressions, 
as they are not confounded by 'difficulty' issues to the same degree as the 'body' clips. 
Figure > body activated the anterior mid cingulate and posterior cingulate both of 
which have been shown to be involved in representing information regarding the self 
(Kelley et aL, 2002) including bodily information (Lane et at., 1997, Critchley et aL, 
2003, Critchley et aL, 2001). Of course, it could be argued that this comparison 
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merely represents the inclusion of a face in the 'figure' stimuli but activation observed 
in the face > figure comparison does not support this explanation. The Inferior 
temporal gyrus was also activated in figure > face, as were premotor areas, perhaps 
reflecting weak somatotopic activation. It seems therefore possible to conclude 
tentatively that the same areas are involved in decoding mental states from different 
parts of the body, but that the anterior, posterior cingulate and inferior temporal gyrus 
may play a particular role in decoding bodily expressions (ie., without the face), in 
addition to the middle occipital lobe (see above). 
Behavioural measures were also correlated to examine their association with different 
areas of brain activation. Scores on the 'emotional reactivity' component of the EQ 
were found to be significantly correlated with activation in the 'fusiform face area', 
orbitofrontal cortex, inferior frontal gyrus, postcentral gyrus and inferior parietal lobule. 
The inferior parietal lobule is thought to be a central component of the 'shared 
representations' network playing a key role in distinguishing the 'self from 'other'. 
The inferior frontal gyrus is thought to contain mirror neurones (see above) and 
perhaps this activation suggests those high on 'emotional reactivity' are more likely to 
utilise the representations produced by such neurones. To find increased activation in 
the fusiform gyrus, an area thought to be specialised for perceiving faces, in people 
high on 'emotional reactivity', is also of interest. In addition, the orbitofrontal cortex is 
thought to be involved in the more complex aspects of empathy such as integrating 
epistemic and affective states (Eslinger, 1998, Damasio, 1994). Activation in the 
postcentral gyrus fits well with a simulation account of 'empathy' (see above) and so it 
is of interest that this area is more activated in those who self-report overt affective 
responses in response to other people's mental states. 
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These data suggest that such areas are fundamental to attributing mental states in 
those who rate themselves as high on 'emotional reactivity' and are therefore more 
likely to respond affectively to others' mental states. Future work should attempt to 
distinguish between 'affective empathy' and 'personal distress' since 'emotional 
reactivity' may tap both concepts (see chapter 2). However, it is also possible that 
these two types of emotional reactivity share some cognitive processes and hence 
similar brain activation patterns (see chapter 4). Adams (2001) points out that a 
person feeling despair in response to another person's despair, may have their 'mirror 
neurones firing' even if the despair is not felt for the target and the response is one of 
@personal distress'. 
No amygdala activation was observed in this study. However, a methodological 
criticism of fMRl and other techniques reliant on the subtraction method may have a 
bearing on this finding. Areas that are activated in both comparison conditions may 
be''cancelled ouV. Activation presented as specific to an experimental condition is 
actually activation specific to that condition over and above a comparison condition. 
This can lead to important areas of overlapping activation being missed. This issue 
may be particularly problematic in the current study as 'implicit' mental state attribution 
may have occurred in the 'non-mental state inference condition' (see Carr et aL, 2003). 
Unfortunately, this was unavoidable due to the need to control for the activation of the 
visual areas. Although the choice alternatives were displayed for 1.5 secs; before the 
clip in an attempt to circumnavigate this effect and prime people to attend to the 
correct aspect of the clip, the overlap between activation in both mental state and non- 
mental state inference conditions suggests implicit mental state processing probably 
still occurred. Although this does not detract from the validity of the findings for the 
mental state inference task, some important areas of activation may have been 
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missed. Having said this, the similarity in activation between the two conditions 
suggests that areas were more activated in the condition requiring explicit mental state 
attribution as they remained significantly activated when contrasted with the non- 
mental state inference task (see Carr et aL, 2003). However, this does mean that It Is 
not possible to say conclusively that the amygdala was not activated. 
Further areas that may have been 'subtracted' out include the precentral gyrus; 50 
voxels were activated above threshold in the 'non-mental state inference' condition 
and only 16 in the 'mental state inference' condition. The lack of activation in the 
'fusiform gyrus' in the main analysis may well also be a result of such 'cancelling' out. 
The fact that it was associated with 'emotional reactivity' suggests this may be the 
case. However, this finding is also consistent with the idea that this area is actually 
specialised for 'expertise' as opposed to faces per se (Haxby et aL, 2002). The 
angular gyrus was also activated in the non-mental state condition but not in the 
'mental state condition' and it is possible that this area is important for mental state 
appreciation. This area has been found to be activated during reflection on one's own 
personality traits (Kjaer et aL, 2002) and electrical stimulation of this area has induced 
the sensation of an out-of-body experience (Blanke et aL, 2002). In addition, lesions in 
the dominant angular gyrus have been associated with body image disturbances. 
These data therefore suggest this area plays a key role in representing the self, which 
is also consistent with previous observations of activation in the inferior parietal lobule 
being vital for distinguishing self from other. 
There are few limitations in this study that require discussion and clarification. A 
potential confound is having seen constituent 'parts' of the video clips before as body 
and face are again shown in the figure condition. This means that for up to 2/3 
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(although probably less depending on the order of presentation) of the simulation 
conditions it is technically possible to work out the right answer from memory by 
remembering which response alternative appeared before either in a figure or 
facelbody clip. However to adopt such a strategy would be quite effortful as one would 
have to remember seeing the face/body/figure and corresponding words, all in a very 
short space of time. Previous studies using the PONS have not controlled for this 
potential confound and participant debriefing indicated that this strategy was not 
adopted. 
Further limitations general to WRI imaging include the reliability of methods used to 
localise function. Swallow et aL, (2003) argue that group mapping may be unreliable, 
in part be due to the fact that anatomical differences are treated as random error. It 
seems that although fruitful to examine groups of data in order to learn where a 
function is localised, as in the current study, to examine the individual generic brain 
activation maps may be more reliable. It may therefore be worth re-examining the 
current datasets individually at a later date. 
Lastly, the fact that this study used a whole-brain approach carries certain limitations. 
The brain areas reported were selected on the basis a priorii hypotheses and voxel 
size, however, much activation went unreported which may mean key areas are 
missed. This is especially true when attempting to localise relatively new process 
such as this aspect of empathy, where there are only a handful of previous studies of 
direct relevance to generate hypotheses. With such cautions in mind, the data from 
this study does seem to support the utility of an action recognition model of emotion 




It seems that an action perception model based on the use of 'shared representations' 
is of use for decoding other people's mental states when presented using dynamic 
stimuli and the main nodes in the neural network supporting are the inferior frontal 
gyrus, premotor cortex and SMA, precentral gyrus, supramarginal gyrus, insula, 
IDLPFC, precuneus and other areas in the inferior and superior parietal lobules. 
However, more information is needed on the conditions in' which this strategy is 
adopted. The data presented here tentatively suggests that this approach is of use 
with all dynamic stimuli rather than that which are simply difficult to decode. 
The relationship between the processes recruited for both dynamic and static mental 
state processing remains unclear. Are the areas typically thought to be involved in 
emotion perception from static stimuli still key to perceiving those same states from 
dynamic stimuli? The data presented here complements neuropsychological 
(Humphreys et aL, 1993) and neuroimaging studies (LaBar et al., 2003) which suggest 
not. However, further investigation is necessary to tease apart any possible 
dissociation. To conclude, although it seems likely that the attribution of mental states 
from dynamic stimuli is reliant on 'shared representations', more information as to 
whether there are particular conditions that encourage this strategy. 
6.2 Further Work 
Pilot studies using the offline PONS-r are already underway with the clinical groups 
discussed elsewhere in this thesis as a prelude to online studies. The prediction is 
that people with DPD may have particular problems with this kind of emotion 
perception, as to be expected from a group whose sense of self (a vital component of 
using 'shared representations') is in disarray. People with AS, however, may perform 
269 
Chapter 7 
better on some aspects of this task than they do in other areas of social cognition, 




The cognitive neuropsychiatric 
approach is based on the application 
of the principles of cognitive 
psychology and neuropsychology to 
the understanding of psychiatric 
conditions and behavioural 
phenomena (Halligan and David, 
2001). This involves developing a 
cognitive model of normal function 
and then applying it in the clinical and 
neuropsychological domain. The aim 
of this thesis was to explore empathy, 
and in so doing construct a normal 
model of empathic processes that will 
be of value in explaining clinical 
phenomena. Two conditions that 
result in, or from, a disruption of 
empathy were given special attention: 
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4. Empathy and Asperger's 
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S. Empathy and Depersonalisation 
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6. Clinical associations and 
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7. The neural basis of empathy 
8. Limitations 
9. Future work 
10. Conclusions 
Asperger's Syndrome and Depersonalisation Disorder. 
1. Empathy conceptualised 
As a concept empathy is relatively new in English-speaking countries, although the 
term 'sympathy' was in use much earlier and often to denote what we now call 
empathy (Darwin, 1872). Social psychologists have been the most prolific of the 
empirical researchers on this subject, providing a distinction between cognitive and 
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affective empathy early on (Hogan, 1969, Mehrabian and Epstein, 1972). If we 
attempt to define these concepts, a further debate becomes relevant: whether 
there are separate processes specialised for perceiving others' epistemic vs. 
affective states, or 'hot' vs. 'cold' cognition (Stone et al., 2003), which also 
translates loosely (though not completely) into 'socio-perceptual' and 'socio- 
cognitive' theory of mind'- ToM - (Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan, 2000). 
A further concept important in the study of empathy has been proposed: 'personal 
distress' (Davis, 1980). Although this is not empathy per se, it does resemble 
empathy inasmuch as it is an emotional response to others' affective states. This 
similarity has often led to conceptual confusion. A model incorporating this 
distinction together with new ideas from the clinical domain, i. e. ToM was detailed 
in Chapter 1- 
Several self-report measures appear to uphold the distinction between cognitive 
and affective empathy, and those that have measured 'personal distress, also 
suggest its importance. However, all these measures have been shown to have 
important weaknesses, and until recently none were designed with the clinical 
condition in mind. As a result, the first empirical chapter of this thesis (chapter 2) 
sought to clarify and confirm the cognitive and affective distinction, using a new 
self-report measure, the Empathy Quotient (EQ - Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright, 
2004 in PFO&6), and statistical methods. In so doing it further validated the EQ. 
Confirmation of this came when an exploratory factor-analysis uncovered 3 main 
factors: i) 'cognitive empathy', ii) 'emotional reactivity', and iii) 'social skills', 
consistent with traditional ideas of empathy. Unfortunately, items did not 
distinguish between 'personal distress' and 'affective empathy' - hence the 
assignment of the broader label for factor 2. 
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2. Emr)athic processes 
As much previous work has focused on the perception and detection of epistemic 
states, under the program of research aimed at detailing the ToM, we explored the 
perception of affective states from complex stimuli. In the past, emotion attribution 
has only been studied mainly in the context of simple paradigms, for the most part 
based on labelling facial emotional expression (Hadjikhani and DeGelder, 2003). 
The detection of affective states is more characteristic of empathy, as is shown by 
everyday usage of the term, plus the fact that epistemic state detection is usually 
related to cognitive empathy alone. On the other hand, affective states can be the 
focus of both cognitive and affective empathy. In addition, we reasoned in chapter 
4 that the two key components of the empathic process need to be captured 
empirically: the cognitive representation and physiological response. 
In designing a task to tap the cognitive representations that form the basis of 
empathy, ideas were drawn from, the literature on philosophy of mind and 
psychology, where the process of simulation has been proposed as being of 
relevance to the perception of affective states (Gallese and Goldman, 1998). 
Recent findings, ideas and models in neuroscience also support this claim. We 
designed and developed a paradigm using one little-known study by a social 
psychologist exploring the use of the self-representation in perspective-taking as a 
guide (see chapter 4 and Davis et aL, 1996). Data from a control group of 53 
participants showed that, as predicted, self-other overlap was associated with a 
person's self-reported 'emotional reactivity' in response to other's mental state. 
These findings are consistent with a 'simulation' account of the appreciation of 
affective states. Further evidence of the role of the 'self in the perception of 
others' affective states was gathered from the study of clinical groups (see below). 
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In addition, an implicit task designed to tap physiological arousal was used. 
Although the concept of speech-rate has been used within psychology before 
(Teasdale and Fogarty, 1979, and see chapter 4), this is the first time it has been 
used in emotion detection research. It has an important advantage over overt 
methods of measuring arousal such as those based on subjective report inasmuch 
as it is implicit, and hence not prone to demand characteristics. The control data 
gathered from the use of this task suggests it may assist In measuring 
physiological arousal. 
To develop a cognitive test of both of these key components of empathy was 
essential to build a useful model of empathy. This was especially necessary as 
the recent resurgence in the study of empathy and related processes has been 
based largely on neuroscientific rather than on cognitive data (see chapter 7). 
However, these tests only scratch the surface since many unanswered questions 
remain. First, what is simulation: is it a process specialised for affect perception, 
or a domain general process relying on skills such as IQ? Secondly, is simulation 
the process of choice for the detection of all affective states (and indeed some 
think epistemic states), or is it only called upon during particular circumstances? 
Thirdly, does physiological arousal occur when we perceive all affective states, and 
is the difference between cognitive and affective empathy as applied to affective 
states one of degree that is to say, covert vs. overt physiological arousal? These 
questions should form the basis of future work. 
3. Cognitive function and empathy 
The clinical groups detailed in this thesis were shown to have various problems 
with the different components of empathy (see below). However, this was not 
related to verbal intelligence or general cognitive functioning, as both groups were 
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shown to do particular well on different cognitive tests (and even surpass the 
performance of the control group). 
One such task involved conditional reasoning which is a form of logical deductive 
reasoning (Kemp et aL, 1997). For different but predictable reasons both clinical 
groups outperformed control participants on this task (see chapter 3). This 
suggests that these 'clinical' conditions might be better viewed as cognitive styles 
rather than disabilities (Baron-Cohen, 2002b). It also indicates that this type of 
reasoning is distinct from empathic processes (this, however, is only a single 
dissociation and should be viewed cautiously - see below). 
Participants were also tested on a physics task (Baron-Cohen et aL, 1999b), and 
again performed in line with controls. Interestingly, an inverse association was 
observed between reasoning in the physical and empathic domains, suggesting 
there may be some kind of trade-off between these two processes. These data 
again speak against empathy being based on general reasoning processes, and, 
more importantly for this thesis, confirm that the clinical data detailed below were 
not simply due to a failure of general processes. 
4. Empathy and Asperger's Syndrome 
People with ASDs are often viewed by clinicians and laypeople as lacking in 
empathy. To a certain degree this is true. Much research suggests that people 
with ASDs lack the ability to comprehend representational or epistemic states (see 
chapter 1 and 6). People with ASI)s are often impaired in appreciating others' 
mental states, including affective states, that rarely occur in isolation. These skills 
are usually integral to sociability. However, affective empathy in people with ASDs 
has been to some extent overshadowed by research into traditional ToM. Despite 
this, anecdotal reports and indirect findings indicated that any impairments in social 
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cognition may be restricted to representational ToM (Blair, 1999, Frith, 2003). The 
offline tasks developed in this thesis were ideally placed for testing this possibility. 
With regard to physiological arousal as measured by speech rate, people with 
Asperger's Syndrome displayed the same patterns as controls: congruent 
physiological arousal in response to the affective states of the protagonist. Despite 
hints that this might be the case, these data is still surprising, as the notion that 
people with ASI)s are 'emotionally cold' is far-reaching. This finding was also 
consistent with some of the self-report measures in which people with Asperger's 
Syndrome did not score differently to controls i. e. on 'empathic concern' items. 
Their lower scores on 'emotional reactivity' seemed to be due to the inclusion of 
items tapping meta-representation rather than an innate lack of empathy. 
In addition, the scores on the trait-overlap task were also to some extent surprising. 
They suggest that the people with ASIDs used an online strategy to appreciate 
other people's affective states: utilising their own self-concept to understand others 
as opposed to relying on compensatory strategies and 'wooden algorithms' (Zahavi 
and Parnas, 2003). But the data also suggests that the strategy was anchored in 
egocentric rather than allocentric- processes (Langdon and Coltheart, 2001), 
suggesting that this skill may be underdeveloped in people with ASDs. However, 
this is a large improvement on the ability of people with AS to detect epistemic 
states, which is at best described as severely disrupted, any apparent success 
being based on alternative strategies (see below and chapter 6). 
To find spared, or at the very least partially preserved, skills in the social domain in 
people with ASDs, is potentially exciting, all the more so against the backdrop of 
deficits and inadequacies observed in this area. However, on two counts these 
results need to be interpreted cautiously: scientifically, the data need to be 
replicated and the methods refined; and in terms of ecological validity, because 
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affective states are rarely presented in isolation from representational states, and 
the fractionation of social cues for empirical investigation does not reflect the 
constant flow of information in the real world. For all this, to find skills that are 
potentially spared in this domain, may help in interventions designed to enable 
people with ASDs to navigate through the social world. Future work should 
examine whether these findings are specific to Asperger's Syndrome as opposed 
to all autistic spectrum disorders, especially as the brain areas that subserve 
language and simulation may overlap. 
5. Empathy and De personal isation Disorder 
People with Depersonalisation Disorder (DPD) often report a subjective lack of 
empathy. Until now, however, these reports remained anecdotal. A few studies 
examined emotion processing in people with DPD and found evidence of the 
'emotional numbing' often reported by this group (Phillips et aL, 2001, Sierra et aL, 
2002). But no studies specifically examined the perception of other people's 
emotions in DPD sufferers'. Paradoxically, the data from the self-report scales 
(see Chapters 2 and 3) suggest that this group do not have problems with affective 
empathy. However, evidence of emotional blunting was found in the participants' 
responses to the 'personal distress' items of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index 
(Davis, 1980). And furthermore, the objective empathy measures were consistent 
to some extent with the anecdotal reports. 
The results of the speech rate measure of physiological arousal indicate that as a 
group, people with DPD do not experience congruent physiological arousal 
consistent with an empathic response. In fact the speech rate pattern displayed by 
this group showed the opposite profile to the AS and control groups. This is no 
surprise when one considers the anecdotal reports of lack of empathy, along with 
the empirical and subjective reports of 'emotional blunting'. It is intuitive that a lack 
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of emotional arousal concerning the 'self' would transfer to emotional arousal 
regarding 'others'. This therefore suggests that an intact sense of personal 
emotional experience is necessary to enjoy emotional resonance with other 
people. 
Furthermore, the tendency of some people with DPD to perform less well on 
labelling 'basic' emotional states suggests that in certain circumstances 
physiological arousal may also be needed to simply identify or perhaps bolster the 
identification of others' emotional states. However, this result was not significant, 
and only occurred in a handful of participants. But this is the kind of question we 
need to answer in order to further our understanding of emotion perception, 
empathy and the processes that are key. The fact that the AS and control groups 
showed congruent physiological arousal in this task also hints at a vital role for 
emotional experience in emotional perception per se (including cognitive empathy) 
as opposed to affective empathy. Although the tasks were designed to be 
ecologically valid, they were still part of an experimental manipulation, and so to 
find physiological arousal under these conditions suggests the qualitative aspects 
of an emotion may have a general role in emotion detection. 
The DPD group were also shown to use the self-concept in apprehending other 
people's emotional states, though again the overlap was in excess of that observed 
in the control group (and more so than in the AS group). As with the AS group, 
these data was interpreted in line with an egocentric/allocentric distinction. The 
most plausible explanation is that an excess of trait overlap is indicative of 
egocentric simulation (Langdon and Coltheart, 2001). To find the DPD group to be 
over-reliant on the self-concept in this domain is in line with recent cognitive- 
behavioural (CBT) models of DPD which propose an excessive focus on the self. 
This possible causal factor in a lack of subjective empathy is open to immediate 
278 
Chapter 8 
empirical exploration as newly emerging CBT models attempt to defocus the DPD 
client from the self. It would be of interest, therefore, to see if this strategy had any 
effect on reinstating the emotional experience and in turn the empathic one. This 
may be of value to DPD clients who no doubt experience additional distress due to 
this disruption in the empathic process. 
The fact that both those with AS and DPD showed the same excess of trait overlap 
suggests the model lacks specificity. More work is need to explore this issue and 
to plot the differences and similarities between these two groups' who appear 
phenomenologically distinct. The self-other overlap needs to be fully 
operationalised and factors such as the optimum levels explored. Using the 
'double dissociation' method (Shallice, 1989) with these groups, who at first glance 
appear similar on this variable, may help further fractionate this skill. Data 
presented here from these two distinct groups have already been used to this end 
to demonstrate how some components of empathy are dissociable. 
. 
6. Clinical associations and dissociations. 
In this thesis, people with IDPID and those with AS displayed dissimilar speech rate 
patterns indicative of differential physiological arousal in response to the affective 
states of others. That people with DPD were found to perform well on tasks 
designed to tap TOM cognitive empathy (see chapter 6), despite their lack of 
physiological arousal, suggests that these two processes are functionally 
dissociable. This explanation is further strengthened by the fact that people with 
AS only tended to do well on the TOM tasks by using compensatory processes, 
suggesting they were in fact impaired. This hints at a 'double dissociation' of 
function between these two components of empathy. 
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To find the affective and cognitive components of empathy dissociated in this way 
is of use in localising and fully understanding the processes at work in empathy. 
Furthermore, such 'dissociation' may extend further than between physiological 
arousal and ToM reasoning alone. That people with AS had a congruent 
physiological response after perceiving others' affective states suggests they 
understood those states in a qualitative manner. That they fail to appreciate 
qualitatively epistemic states, and that the reverse pattern is found in those with 
DPD, suggests the apprehension of epistemic and affective states or 'hot' and 
'cold' cognition relies on different cognitive (and perhaps neural) processes. This 
finding has important consequences not only for different clinical conditions, but 
also for the eventual localisation of these processes, and the development of a 
cognitive model. 
7. The neural basis of empathv 
The 'offline' data we have gathered suggest that a simulation approach may be of 
use in apprehending affective states. Furthermore, the data from those with DPD 
go some way to reinstate the role of emotional experience in emotion perception. 
In addition, the dissociations of function proposed suggest that perhaps the system 
subserving traditional ToM, with its onus on epistemic states, differs from that 
specialised for affective states. This is consistent with the emerging literature that 
suggests that 'action perception' (Blakemore and Decety, 2001b) and the use of' 
'shared representations' (Decety and Chaminade, 2003) may provide a useful 
framework for 'hot' cognition (see Chapters 1 and 7). 
This idea has been around for a while, and empirically the groundwork has been 
laid in the form of studies examining the neural correlates of action perception vs. 
generation, and various manipulations such as imitation. However, it is only very 
recently that actual emotion recognition or mental state attribution paradigms have 
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been studied experimentally within this framework (for instance see Decety and 
Chaminade, 2003 and chapter 7, Carr et aL, 2003). 
In this thesis, stimuli from an existing social psychology experiment were used 
(Rosenthal et aL, 1979), in order to explore the application of action recognition 
models to mental state attribution. The stimuli had two helpful components that 
made them appropriate for exploring the link between these two models: it was 
dynamic and difficult (Adolphs, 2001a). Both of these factors are thought to induce 
'shared representations' as the strategy of choice. The stimuli were revised to suit 
an WRI paradigm, and validated offline (see chapter 7). 
Activation specific to the experimental condition was consistent with the use of 
$shared representations' in decoding other people's mental states. It included brain 
areas that are thought to house 'mirror neurones' (Broca's Area and premotor 
cortex), and areas key to distinguishing the self from other (parietal lobe) and those 
central to constructing online representations (somatosensory areas such as the 
insula). This data therefore suggests that an 'action perception' model is suited to 
explaining mental state attribution, especially when the stimuli are dynamic (which 
is often the case) and can be viewed as emotion action. 
Further data are needed to establish whether such an approach is limited to 
dynamic stimuli, or under what conditions it may be of use with static stimuli. To 
find brain activation consistent with the use of 'shared representations, which is 
very much allied to 'simulation', provides further support for the utility of this 
approach. To find converging evidence from two different levels of explanation is 




This thesis had various general limitations. The clinical groups were incompletely 
characterised on some of the measures, for example, the full-scale IRI (Davis, 
1980), because the decision to administer the full scale was taken post hoc. But 
the data from these measures were interpreted with caution and in conjunction with 
other findings. There was also some missing data that added to this incomplete 
characterisation i. e. the speech rate. However, as power calculations were based 
on stringent levels (95%) enough statistical power remained to detect difference on 
the basis of the existing data. In addition, due to time constraints some of the 
tasks were not administered in their entirety, for example, the Rowe 'theory of 
mind' tasks, which may have limited the conclusions draw from these data. 
Nevertheless, the decision was made in light of the available time and factors such 
as participants concentration and tiredness. 
Many of the tasks used we used were exploratory and will need refinement and 
replication. This is especially so for the tasks detailed in chapter 4. In addition, the 
data from the clinical groups were not replicated, and hence conclusions need to 
be tentative. It could also be argued that the thesis included a lack of standardised 
measures. However, attempts were made to complement the use of exploratory 
tasks, by administering standardised traditional ToM tasks (see chapter 6). 
9. Future Research 
The data gathered in this thesis generates new hypotheses and predictions. First, 
and specifically, the model detailed in Chapter 1 needs to be fully operationalised 
and empirically tested. Secondly, the novel and objective tests of empathy need to 
be refined and further validated. Thirdly, the nature of simulation and similar 
processes needs to be explored, and a cognitive model generated with greater 
specificity. These steps would in turn enable a more thorough exploration of the 
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empathic process in the clinical groups detailed. The next logical step which is 
already underway, is to carry out functional neuroirnaging on clinical groups 
detailed in this thesis whilst doing the PONS-r, the results of which will add to the 
cognitive data reported in chapter 5 and hence strengthen our knowledge 
regarding these conditions. 
10. Conclusions 
Summarised, the main findings from this thesis are: 1) it is possible to quantify 
empathy using a combination of subjective and implicit measures; ii) that people 
with AS have some elements of empathy preserved; iii) people with DPD have 
trouble responding with affective empathy; iv) 'simulation' and 'shared 
representations' are central to empathy and have a distinct functional 
neuroanatomy. Many unanswered questions remain regarding the nature of these 
processes and their disruption. However, it is hoped that Ow-feet that the findings 
in this thesis are of relevance to at least two clinical conditions, and also that they 
help specify a normal neuropsychological model of empathy. If so the utility of a 
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Appendix 1: The Empathy Quotient - (Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright, 2004 In 
press). 
How to rill out the nuestionnaire 
Below area list ofstatements. Please read each statement verv careful and rate how strongly you 
agree or disagree with it by circling your answer. There are no right or wrong answers, or trick 
questions. 
IN ORDER FOR THE SCALE TO BE VALID, YOU MUST ANSWER EVERY QUESTION. 
Examples 
E 1.1 would be very upset if I couldn't listen to music strongly sýýy slightly strongly 
every day. agree IZLý isagree disagree 
E2. I prefer to speak to my friends on the phone rather strongly slightly slightly s? *Ggl-y'*ý\ 3 
than write letters to them. agree agree disagree sac ýZý 




I i g strongly 
world. agree a d i s agree disagree 
E4. I prefer to read than to dance. strongly slightly slightly 
agree agree disagree 
PLEASE TURN OVER 
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I can easily tell if someone else wants to enter a strongly slightly 
conversation. agree agree 






3.1 try to keep up with the current trends and strongly slightly slightly strongly 
fashions. agree agree disagree disagree 
4.1 find it difficult to explain to others things that I strongly slightly slightly strongly 
understand easily, when they dont understand it agree agree disagree disagree 
first time. 
5.1 dream most nights. strongly slightly 
agree agree 
6.1 really enjoy caring for other people. strongly slightly 
agree agree 
7.1 try to solve my own problems rather than strongly slightly 
discussing them with others. agree agree 
8.1 find it hard to know what to do in a social strongly slightly 
situation. agree agree 












10. People often tell me that I went too far in driving strongly slightly slightly strongly 
my point home in a discussion. agree agree disagree disagree 
1. It doesn't bother me too much if I am late meeting strongly slightly slightly strongly 
a ftiend. agree agree disagree disagree 
12. Friendships and relationships are just too strongly slightly 





13.1 would never break a law, no matter how minor. strongly slightly slightly strongly 
agree agree disagree disagree 
14.1 often find it difficult to judge if something is strongly slightly slightly strongly 
rude or polite. agree agree disagree disagree 
15. In a conversation, I tend to focus on my own strongly slightly slightly strongly 
thoughts rather than on what my listener might be agree agree disagree disagree 
thinking. 








18. When I was a child, I enjoyed cutting up womis strongly slightly slightly strongly 
to see what would happen. agree agree disagree disagree 
19.1 can pick up quickly if someone says one thing strongly slightly slightly strongly 
but means another. agree agree disagree disagree 
20.1 tend to have very strong opinions about strongly slightly slightly strongly 
morality. agree agree disagree disagree 
2 1. It is hard for me to see why some things upset strongly slightly 
people so much. agree agree 
22.1 find it easy to put myself in somebody else's strongly slightly 
shoes. agree agree 
23.1 think that good manners are the most important strongly slightly 
thing a parent can teach their child. agree agree 
24.1 Re to do things on the spur of the moment. 













25.1 am good at predicting how someone will feel. strongly slightly 
agree agree 
26.1 am quick to spot when someone in a group is strongly slightly 
feeling awkward or uncomfortable. agree agree 
27. If I say something that someone else is offended strongly slightly 
by, I think that that's their problem, not mine. agree agree 
28. If anyone asked me if I liked their haircut, I strongly slightly 









29.1 can't always see why someone should have felt strongly slightly slightly strongly 
offended by a remark. agree agree disagree disagree 
30. People often tell me that I am very unpredictable. strongly slightly slightly strongly 
agree agree disagree disagree 
31.1 enjoy being the Centre of attention at any social strongly slightly slightly strongly 
gathering. agree agree disagree disagree 
32. Seeing people cry doesn't really upset me. strongly slightly slightly strongly 
agree agree disagree disagree 
33.1 enjoy having discussions about politics. 
34.1 am very blunt, which some people take to be 
rudeness, even though this is unint6ntional. 
strongly slightly slightly strongly 
agree agree disagree disagree 
strongly slightly slightly strongly 
agree agree disagree disagree 
35.1 don't tend to find social situations confusing. strongly slightly slightly strongly 
agree agree disagree disagree 
36. Other people tell me I am good at understanding strongly slightly slightly strongly 
how they are feeling and what they are thinking. agree agree disagree disagree 
PLEASE TURN OVER 
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37. When I talk to people, I tend to talk about their strongly slightly slightly strongly 
experiences rather than my own. agree agree disagree disagree 
38. It upsets me to see an animal in pain. strongly slightly slightly strongly 
agree agree disagree disagree 
39.1 am able to make decisions without being strongly slightly slightly strongly 
influenced by people's feelings. agree agree disagree disagree 
40.1 carft relax until I have done everything I had strongly slightly slightly strongly 
planned to do that day. agree agree disagree disagree 
1.1 can easily tell if someone else is interested or strongly slightly slightly strongly 
bored with what I am saying. agree agree disagree disagree 
42.1 get upset if I see people suffering on news strongly slightly slightly strongly 
programmes. . agree agree 
disagree disagree 
43. Friends usually talk to me about their problems as strongly slightly slightly strongly 
they say that I am very understanding. agree agree disagree disagree 
44.1 can sense if I am intruding, even if the other strongly slightly 
person doesn't tell me. agree agree 
45.1 often start new hobbies but quickly become strongly slightly 
bored with them and move on to something else. agree agree 
46. People sometimes tell me that I have gone too far strongly slightly 
with teasing. agree agree 
47.1 would be too nervous to go on a big 
rollercoaster. 
48. Other people often say that I am insensitive, 
though I don't always see why. 

















49. If I see a stranger in a group, I think that it is up to strongly slightly slightly strongly 
them to make an effort to join in. agree agree disagree disagree 
50.1 usually stay emotionally detached when strongly slightly slightly strongly 
watching a film. agree agree disagree disagree 
5 1.1 like to be very organised in day to day life and strongly slightly slightly strongly 
often make lists of the chores I have to do. agree agree disagree disagree 
52.1 can tune into how someone else feels rapidly strongly slightly slightly strongly 
and intuitively. agree agree disagree disagree 
53.1 dont like to take risks. strongly slightly slightly strongly 
agree agree disagree disagree 
54.1 can easily work out what another person might strongly slightly slightly strongly 
want to talk about. agree agree disagree disagree 
55.1 can tell if someone is masking their true strongly slightly slightly strongly 
emotion. agree agree disagree disagree 
56. Before making a decision I always weigh up the strongly slightly slightly strongly 
pros and cons. agree agree disagree disagree 
57.1 don't consciously work out the rules of social strongly slightly slightly strongly 
situations. agree agree disagree disagree 
58.1 am good at predicting what someone will do. strongly slightly 
agree agree 
59.1 tend to get emotionally involved with a friend's strongly slightly 
problems. agree agree 
60.1 can usually appreciate the other person's strongly slightly 
viewpoint, even if I don't agree with it. agree agree 
















Appendix 3: Diary Extracts Used in the Mental State Attribution Task 
This is an extract from the diary of James who is 42 years old 
I was thinking today how the internet has changed my life in so many ways- I can't 
think of any other invention as of late that has as many uses as the internet. Ellie 
prefers to use the library and says the internet makes people less sociable. She 
just sees how long I spend on the computer - she doesn't realise it promotes 
communication. For me, the biggest attribute of the internet is to be able to access 
any and all types of information instantly. Since I do a lot of long distance walking, 
being able to locate specific routes is brilliant. The same goes for classic car 
things, as well. I belong to five classic car clubs, and I met all of those groups 
through the internet. Ellie thinks the internet isn't any quicker in the long run but it is 
if you know how to use it properly. 
(extract adapted from opendiary. com, 2001) 
1. James thinks that Ellie believes 
a) the internet has made him sociable. 
b) the internet has made him less sociable X30 
c) the internet has made him unsociable. 
d) the internet has made him more sociable. 
2. Ellie believes the internet .... 
a) is not faster than the library X 
b) is slightly faster than the library. 
c) is much faster than the library. 
d) is faster than the library. 
3. James uses the.... 
a) internet to find walking routes. X 
b) internet to find running routes. 
c) library to find running routes. 
d) library to find walking routes. 
4. James believes Ellie.... 
a) does know how to use the internet properly. 
b) doesn't know how to use the internet at all. 
c) does know how to use the internet competently. 
d) doesn't know how to use the internet properly. X 
; () For ease ofreference X denotes to 'pi-cfcf-red, all", \\ cr accol-dill" to flic final , ct of ý: ollll ol ki'll'i 
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This is an extract from the diary of Sally who is 24 years old.... 
Tomorrow is the funeral of my Nan, so as you can imagine I am really riot lookinq 
forward to it. The hardest part about it is that when I see that coffin tomorrow I will 
know that this is the last time I will ever be that close to my Nan again. I hate the 
thought of that. Why did you have to die? I hate never being able to see YOU agairl. 
I hate that we will all be sitting in your house tomorrow and you won't be there. She 
loved that house. I just can't help how much I will miss her, I loved her so much. I 
know these are selfish thoughts, because I know how much she missed my Pop 
and she just wanted to be with him, so I should be happy for her. I can't believe this 
has happened. She was so young for her age, and fit and healthy. 
(extract adapted opendiary. com, 2001) 
1. Sally is.... 
a) calm even though her Nan has died. 
b) angry because her Nan has died. X 
c) furious because her Nan has died. 
d) relaxed even though her Nan has died. 
2. Sally is..... 
a) very unhappy as she will miss her Nan. X 
b) not unhappy even though she will miss her Nan. 
c) inconsolable as she will miss her Nan. 
d) consolable even though she will miss her Nan. 
3. Sally will go to her..... 
a) Pop's after the funeral. 
b) mum's after the funeral. 
c) Nan's after the funeral. X 
d) brother's after the funeral. 
4. Sally feels ........... 
a) ashamed because she isn't happy for her Nan. 
b) unashamed even though she isn't happy for her Nan. 
c) guiltless even though she isn't happy for her Nan. 
d) guilty because she isn't happy for her Nan. X 
Appendices 
This is an extract from the diary of Pauline who is 36 years old 
I woke up this morning in the recovery room to a male nurse standing over me 
saying "Mrs. ---, did they tell you that you have a son? " I couldn't believe it --- a boy 
as I'd hoped -I wanted to ask how he was, but I couldn't even get my eyes open, 
let alone my mouth. Eventually, I croaked out "Is he ok? " "Yes", the nurse said, 
"he was pretty big, too. " Soon after that they took me to see him - he was in 
intensive Care Unit as a precaution because he was born with a fever. He had 
"TONS" of long, black hair. This surprised us both since we were both born with 
moderate amounts of medium coloured hair. My baby boy was 8 pounds 3 ounces 
and 22 inches long. He looked just like my husband and I just wanted to hold him 
and not let go. 
(extract adapted opendiary. com, 2001) 
1. Pauline feels.... 
a) joyless despite having just given birth to a baby boy. 
b) overjoyed having just given birth to a baby boy. X 
C) touched having just given birth to a baby boy. 
d) untouched despite having just given birth to a baby boy. 
2. Pauline behaved in a ....... 
a) caring way towards her son. 
b) loving way towards her son. X 
C) loveless way towards her son. 
d) uncaring way towards her son. 
3. Pauline feels ........... 
a) fulfilled as she has a healthy baby. X 
b) content as she has a healthy baby. 
C) unfulfilled despite having a healthy baby. 
d) discontent despite having a healthy baby. 
4. The baby was born with .... 
a) lots of medium coloured hair. 
b) a small amount of medium coloured hair. 
C) lots of dark coloured hair. X 
d) a small amount of dark coloured hair. 
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This is an extract from the diary of Geoff who is 58 years old 
I usually run at the sight of needles - but its too late for that now - there's no 
getting out of it. I can see lots of needles. The guys in front of me are being 
injected one at a time alternating each arm - left then right. "Oh crap - I'm next". 
The technician swabs my left arm with a cotton ball dipped in alcohol - that 
sickening smell of alcohol. I looked at him, the needle, then looked away. it 
seemed like an eternity before I felt the intense sting of this contraption inject its 
contents into my arm. He removed it from my arm and some residual fluid rail 
down. It was cold. The process continued all over again. Then two more times after 
that. By the time I was finished I felt like a pin cushion full of burning holes. I can 
remember turning pale and having to sit down. 
(extract adapted opendiary. com, 2001) 
1. Geoff had.... 
a) two injections administered to each leg. 
b) one injection administered to each leg. 
c) two injections administered to each arm. X 
d) one injection administered in each arm. 
2. Geoff is..... 
a) unhysterical before receiving an injection. 
b) afraid before receiving an injection. X 
c) hysterical before receiving an injection. 
d) unafraid before receiving an injection. 
3. Geoff finds the injection process 
a) troubling from start to finish. 
b) unbearable from start to finish. X 
c) untroubling from start to finish. 
d) bearable from start to finish. 
4. Geoff is ....... 
a) unbothered when he realises he has to have an injection. 
b) alarmed when he realises he has to have an injection. 
c) bothered when he realises he has to have an injection. X 
d) unalarmed when he realises he has to have an injection. 
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Appendix 5: First order ToM task (Rowe et al., 2001) 
It was Saturday morning and Cathy was going shopping. She drove into town quite 
early in the hope that she wouldn't have too much difficulty parking, but when she got 
there she was surprised to find that it was already busy with lots of shoppers around. 
It looked as though all the parking spaces were taken and she'd have to go to the 
outskirts of the town centre. 
Meanwhile, another shopper, Mr. Watson, had just returned to his car. He had came 
to pick up some spectacles from the opticians'. Unsure of how long he would be, Mr. 
Watson had put sufficient change into his parking meter to allow the maximum two 
hour period for parking. He was pleased to find that it had only taken a few minutes 
to complete his business at the opticians' and he was back at his car within ten 
minutes. 
Cathy had nearly given up searching for a parking space, but just then she saw Mr. 
Watson's car pulling out from the curb up ahead. Cathy was pleased; finding this 
space saved her quite a long walk. She parked the car, switched off the ignition, and 
got her purse out of her handbag, but she found she had no change for the parking 
meter. Traffic wardens often wandered up and down the main road and so Cathy got 
out of the car and, without looking at the meter, ran to the large newsagents' on the 
corner. As soon as Cathy had been served she rushed out with some coins in her 
hand and dashed back to the car. 
Please answer the questions below as quickly and accurately as possible without 
referring back to the extract. We need you to answer all the questions. Please 
write your answers in the space provided. 
1. Why was Cathy in such a hurry to put money in the meter? 
2. Why did Cathy go into the newsagents? 
3. Was there any time left on the parking meter? 
4. What was the purpose of Mr. Watson's visit to town that morning? 
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Appendix 6: Second order ToM task (Rowe et al., 2001) 
Richard and Ann want to re-decorate their spare bedroom. They have several 
wallpaper samples which they have brought home from the DlY shop. After choosing 
one they decide to make a start the next weekend. Ann says she can collect the 
wallpaper on her way home from work next Friday evening. 
On Friday morning Richard's boss unexpectedly tells him he can take the afternoon 
off. When he gets home he phones Ann at work. Unfortunately she is not available. 
One of Ann's colleagues tells him she is at a meeting and she is not sure when Ann 
will be back. Richard explains that he wants to tell her he's got the afternoon off and 
he's going to make a start on their re-decorating. He says, "Can you ask Ann to call 
me at home when she returns? " 
By the time Ann gets back to her office it is after 5prn and all her colleagues have 
gone home. As she collects her things she sees a note on her desk saying, firstly, 
that her husband called to tell her he had the afternoon off and was beginning their 
redecorating work and, secondly, that she should phone him at home. It is late and 
Ann wants to get to the DIY shop before 6pm so she decides that, since she already 
has the message, she won't bother to phone Richard and she will just rush down to 
buy the wallpaper. 
At home Richard has been working very hard. He hasn't heard from Ann and he 
wonders why her colleagues are so unreliable. He's nearly finished stripping off the 
old wallpaper when he hears Ann coming through the front door. He rushes 
downstairs and says "You're going to be surprised when I tell you what I've been 
doing this afternoon". 
Please answer the questions below as quickly and accurately as possible without 
referring back to the extract. We need you to answer all the questions. Please 
write your answers in the space provided. 
1. Why does Richard say that Ann is going to be surprised? 
2. Why do you think Ann needed to hurry to get to the DIY shop? 
3. Did Ann get Richard's message about having the afternoon off? 
4. Which room were they re-decorating? 
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Appendix 7: Mental state labels used in PONS-r 
Old Label New Label 
helping customer explaining something 
ordering food ordering something 
expressing gratitude thankful 
deep affection deep affection 
seducing someone flirtatious 
talking about ones wedding very happy 
leaving on a trip saying goodbye 
admiring nature delighted 
talking to a lost child concerned 
talking about the death of a friend sombre 
talking about ones divorce serious discussion 
returning a item to a shop complaining 
asking forgiveness apologising 
praying pleading 
criticising someone for being late criticising 
nagging a child nagging 
expressing strong dislike exasperation 
threatening someone threatening someone 
jealous anger anger 
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Appendix 8: Stimuli used in PONS-r 
Body - Complaining* 
Face - Criticising 
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Figure - Anger 
' Although the answers are given they may not appear congruent as the stimuli is 11wililt to 
be viewed dynamically and develops over time 
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